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Abstract 
The aim of this project is to explore the ways in which, in the absence of traditional forms 
of government in a global setting, the law can discipline the transnational exercise of 
private power by a variety of market actors (from rating agencies, technical standard-
setters and multi-national agribusinesses to vulture funds). Traditionally, the cross-border 
economic activities of non-state actors fall within the remit of an area of the law known as 
‘private international law’. However, despite the contemporary juridification of 
international politics, private international law has contributed very little to the global 
governance debate, remaining remarkably silent before the increasingly unequal 
distribution of wealth and authority in the world. By abandoning such matters to its public 
international counterpart, it leaves largely untended the private causes of crisis and 
injustice affecting such areas as financial markets, environmental protection, pollution, the 
status of sovereign debt, the bartering (or confiscation) of natural resources and land, the 
use (and misuse) of development aid, (unequal) access to food, the status of migrant 
populations, and many more. On the other hand, public international law itself, on the tide 
of managerialism and fragmentation, is now increasingly confronted with conflicts 
articulated as collisions of jurisdiction and applicable law, among which private or hybrid 
authorities and regimes now occupy a significant place. According to the genealogy of 
private international law depicted here, the discipline has developed, under the aegis of the 
liberal divides between law and politics and between the public and the private spheres, a 
form of epistemological tunnel-vision, actively providing immunity and impunity to 
abusers of private sovereignty. It is now more than time to de-closet private international 
law and excavate the means with which, in its own right, it may impact upon the balance of 
informal power in the global economy. This means both quarrying the new potential of 
human rights in the transnational sphere, and rediscovering the specific savoir-faire 
acquired over many centuries in the recognition of alterity and the responsible 
management of pluralism. In short, adopting a planetary perspective means reaching 
beyond the schism between the public and private spheres and connecting up with the 
politics of international law. 
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Increasing juridification of international politics1 has situated public international 
lawyers as self-styled prime-movers in the design of a new normative ordering beyond 
the state.2 The breaking of geo-political frames accompanying globalisation heralds new 
de-territorialised forms of ‘fragmented sovereignty’,3 points to alternative scenarios of 
global ordering, draws attention to the rise of functional regimes, points to hybrid actors 
and private rule-making, and breathes new life into the recurring debate on the real 
nature of international law as law.4 Beyond international law’s traditional subjects,5 it 
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1 See for example, Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann and Matthias Goldmann, « Developing the Publicness 
of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities »,1375 
GERMAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol.09 No.11). The much heralded contemporary turn to law in the international 
arena, and its corollary, the rise of international courts (and their role as ‘tipping point’ actors; see K Alter, 
‘Tipping the Balance: International Courts and the Construction of International and Domestic Politics’ 
(2010–11) 13 (1) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 1), or the multiplication of new 
supranational law-makers (on which see J Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford 
University Press, 2006)) can also be formulated as a scathing critique, to the extent that the turn to law is 
perceived to be taking place at the expense of the political (see M Koskenniemi, The Politics of 
International Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 359; ‘What we see now is an international realm where law is 
everywhere—the law of this or that regime—but no politics at all …’). As will be shown below, such 
depoliticisation is partly due to the multiplication of autonomous legal regimes, each vying for 
supremacy—partly due to the distinct trend towards the privatisation of trade and investment, partly due 
to the primacy of finance and technical expertise rather than the real economy and deliberative 
democracy, and partly because of the involvement of the supranational courts in discrete dispute 
resolution, rather than in global governance. 
2 On the reasons for this turn from a perspective within the discipline, see C Schwöbel, ‘The Appeal of the 
Project of Global Constitutionalism to Public International Lawyers’ (2012) 13 (1) German Law Journal 1. 
The rise of comparative constitutionalism and international federalism within the field are also 
emblematic of its turn towards grand global institutional design: see, for example, on the perceived 
‘demand for international constitutionalisation’, J Dunod and J Trachtmann (eds), Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International law and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 5 ff; cf J 
Klabbers, A Peters and G Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2009) 4. This turn is, however, not always perceived as convincing, either because it frequently consists of 
projecting familiar domestic forms on the global arena (see D Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global 
Governance’ in Ruling the World?, 37), or because the attainment of global justice may require alternative 
schemes, such as a ‘new global law’ (see R Domingo, The New Global Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2010)), or the exploration of spaces for contestation and recognition (see E Jouannet, Qu’est-ce qu’une 
société internationale juste? Le droit international entre développement et reconnaissance (Pedone, 2011)).  
3 See H Kalmo and Q Skinner (eds), Sovereignty in Fragments (Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
4 The core doctrines of legality and morality that underpin customary international law are currently 
threatened by the claims of rational choice theory to provide more plausible explanations for the 
compliance of sovereign actors (see J Goldsmith and E Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford 
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conquers territories as varied as ecology and energy, economic inequality, displaced 
populations, financial markets, foreign investment, gender and religious diversity—
many of which fall plausibly within the province of private international law insofar as 
they involve individual rights, transnational corporate actors and conflicting legal 
regimes.6 Indeed, the informal empire that is currently unfolding in the shadow of global 
state-led politics is the realm of the private.7 Both ‘public’ and ‘private’ governance8 of 
                                                                                                                                                        
University Press, 2005)). On the other hand, attempts have been made to present ‘outcasting’ as 
enforcement, the lack of which has long been perceived as the strongest argument against public 
international law’s claim to be law (see O Hathaway and S Shapiro, ‘Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic 
and International Law’ (2011) 121 Yale Law Journal 252. In turn, however, the intellectual viability of 
social sciences approaches are challenged (R Howse and R Teitel, ‘Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why 
International Law Really Matters’ (2010) 1(2) Global Policy (online), 10(8) NYU School of Law, Public Law 
Research Paper. It is not, of course, the aim of this article to engage with public international law’s internal 
doctrinal debate; it suffices to point out that similar moves to emphasise ‘unofficial’ reputational sanctions 
in order to consolidate the claims of various forms of infra- or trans-national law, which are a core feature 
of social theory, have also long been at the heart of the arguments for the status of lex mercatoria as 
transnational legal order (see B Goldman, ‘Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria’ (1964) Archives de 
Philosophie du Droit 177; for a dismissal of such arguments as sociology, not law, see P Lagarde, ‘Approche 
critique de la lex mercatoria’ in Le droit des relations économiques internationales, Etudes offertes à B 
Goldman (Litec, 1982) 125. On the comparative dimension to the debate about the legal nature of law-
without-enforcement, see N Jansen and R Michaels, ‘Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, 
Globalization, Privatization’ (2008) 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 843, explaining (at 852) how 
law is more easily perceived independently of enforcement in the European tradition—which may explain 
why modern international law, with its European origins, has had little difficulty defining itself as law. 
5 The entities that qualify as ‘subjects’ having rights and duties under international law (traditionally 
sovereign states) represent a fast-expanding category—now comprising individuals and certain sub-
groups of civil society—as international law conquers new fields, largely in response to the faith placed in 
its ‘providential’ ability to solve the welfare problems of humanity (see E Jouannet, Le droit international 
libéral-Providence. Une histoire du droit international (Bruylant, 2011). Of course, the pre-Westphalian era 
witnessed similar competition between different forms of territorial organisation, which brought about 
the emergence of the modern state (see H Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of 
Systems Change (Princeton University. Press, 1996), referring to complete statehood as historical anomaly 
(see T Risse, Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood (Columbia 
University Press, 2011)).  
6 See Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (n 1) 329, observing that public international law is 
invoked when multinational corporations wreak havoc on the environment, when states engage in 
religious wars, or when globalisation dislocates communities. These situations also involve typical 
‘private’ international law issues, such as conflicts of law in tort, the statutes of private armies in the 
context of the privatisation of war, or immigration and citizenship issues.  
7 On the concept of informal empire, see the seminal article by R Robinson and J Gallagher, ‘The 
Imperialism of Free Trade’ (1953) VI (2.1) Economic History Review 1; compare with the connection to 
(private) international law in M Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish 
Contribution’ (2011) 61 (1) University of Toronto Law Journal 1.  
8 The suggestion here is that private international law has global governance implications, which need to 
be addressed as such. Governance is famously defined by James Rosenau as ‘a more encompassing 
phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions, but also subsumes informal non-
governmental mechanisms whereby those persons and organisations within its purview move ahead, 
satisfy their needs, and fulfill their wants’ (in J Rosenau and E Czempiel (eds), Governance without 
Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1992)). Cf H Kalmo and Q 
Skinner, ‘Introduction: A Concept in Fragments’ in Kalmo and Skinner (n 3) 22. On the notion of the 
‘governance turn’ see J Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric 
Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2 Regulation and Governance 137. The term ‘governance’ has been criticised 
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private economic authority currently focus intense pluri-disciplinary attention from 
politists, traditional, institutional and development economists, sociologists, historians, 
philosophers, linguists and critical theorists of many ilks and horizons. Regime and 
systems theory, political economy, political theories of pluralism all draw attention to 
power structures9 and legal change in a postnational context,10 contributing novel ways 
of thinking about interdependence.11 
Yet private international law remains by and large, if not entirely, absent from the whole 
global governance scene, at least reluctant to offer any systemic vision, or sense of 
meaning, to the changes affecting law and authority in a global environment.12 As 
                                                                                                                                                        
as signalling the invasion of political science vocabulary and managerialism (Koskenniemi, The Politics of 
International Law (n 1) 358), or, alternatively, as carrying too many ‘top-down’ implications (whereas 
private international law can better be seen as an alternative form of regulatory strategy in which private 
actors can contest private power: R Wai, ‘Transnational Private Litigation and Transnational Governance’ 
in P Mueller and M Lederer (eds), Criticizing Global Governance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 243, and 
‘Conflicts and Comity in Transnational Governance: Private International Law as Mechanism and 
Metaphor for Transnational Social Regulation through Plural Legal Regimes’ in C Joerges and E-U 
Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and International Economic Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2011) 240); however, for a very convincing use of the concept, see C Scott and R Wai, 
‘Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The 
Potential Contribution of Transnational “Private” Litigation’ in C Joerges, P Sand and G Teubner (eds), 
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2004) 287–319). Both of these 
arguments carry weight, and it is certainly not intended here to convey a managerial stance, or to neglect 
the importance of private contestation. However, the term ‘governance’ shall be used in connection with 
the political implications of private international law discussed in this paper, not only in order to facilitate 
interdisciplinary dialogue through the use of a common vocabulary, but also because it allows for the 
disengagement of state and law and the constitution of private authority. It does not suppose the 
centrality of the state, or a distinction between government and the governed (see H Shepel, The 
Constitution of Private Governance (Hart Publishing, 2005) 28).  
9 See the very recent attempt at a legal theory of power structures by C Filho, A Legal Theory of Economic 
Power: Implications for Social and Economic Development (Edward Elgar, 2011).  
10 See A Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (Cambridge University Press, 2003); B Hall and T 
Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2002); 
among subsequent, varied and growing literature on this point, see Shepel (n 8); G-P Calliess and P 
Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code (Hart Publishing, 2010); T Büthe and W Mattli, The New 
Global Rulers: Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (Princeton University Press, 2011). On 
regime theory, see also this paper, section II-B-d.  
11 For a particularly convincing ‘integrated’ approach to system change which accounts for 
interdependence, see K Pistor, ‘Contesting Property Rights: Towards an Integrated Theory of Institutional 
and System Change’ (2011) 11(2) Global Jurist, Article 6, www.bepress.com/gj/vol11/iss2/art6. 
12 There are notable exceptions, both implicit and explicit: C Joerges, ‘The Idea of a Three-Dimensional 
Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form’ in Joerges and Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and International Economic Law (n 8) 413; C Joerges, P Kjaer and T Ralli, ‘A New Type of 
Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form in the Postnational Constellation’ (2011) 2(2) Transnational Legal 
Theory 153–65; C Whytock, ‘Domestic Courts and Global Governance’ (2009) 84 Tulane Law Review 67; H 
Buxbaum, ‘Transnational Regulatory Litigation’ (2006) 46 Virginia Journal of International Law 251; A 
Guzmann, ‘Choice of Law: New Foundations’ (2002) 90 Georgetown Law Journal 883; K Knop, R Michaels 
and A Riles, ‘Foreword: Transdisciplinary Conflict of Laws’ (2008) 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 1; J 
Bomhoff, ‘The Reach of Rights’ (2008) 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 73; R Wai, ‘The Interlegality of 
Transnational Private Law’ (2008) 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 107; R Michaels, ‘The Re-State-
ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism’ (2005) 51 Wayne 
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sovereign authority migrates to new sites in the informal global economy,13 it appears to 
have succumbed to some form of ‘post-national trauma’,14 as if unable to survive the 
demise of the Westphalian15 model.16 Despite the fact that the sovereign state’s loss of 
control17 is largely driven by private factors—unleashed flows of capital; alliances of 
non-state entrepreneurs of change; competition in the law-making market—private 
                                                                                                                                                        
Law Review 1209; A Menéndez, ‘United they Diverge? From Conflicts of Law to Constitutional Theory’ 
(2011) 2(2) Transnational Legal Theory 167–92; F Rödl, ‘Democratic Juridification without Statisation: 
Law of Conflict of Laws Instead of a World State’ (2011) 2(2) Transnational Legal Theory 193–213; P 
Kjaer, ‘The Political Foundations of Conflicts Law’ (2011) 2(2) Transnational Legal Theory 227–42; M 
Herberg, ‘Global Governance and Conflict of Laws from a Foucauldian Perspective: The Power/Knowledge 
Nexus Revisited’ (2011) 2(2) Transnational Legal Theory 243–69 (on the latter, see the book review in 
(2012) Revue critique de droit international privé (Rev crit DIP) 244).  
13 See Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (n 10).  
14 D Kennedy, ‘The Methods and the Politics’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: 
Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 345. 
15 The historical reality of the peace of Westphalia (1648), which put an end to the Thirty Years’ War on 
the basis of mutual religious tolerance, is no doubt far from the mythical liberal-positivist model of 
sovereignty that it has come to represent in international legal doctrine. See, on this point, C Thornhill, 
‘Comparative State Formation’ in G Kurian, J Alt, S Chambers and G Garrett (eds), International 
Encyclopedia of Political Science, (CQ Press, 2010), showing that while the Treaty of Westphalia may have 
heralded the articulation of power as detached from private status and recognised the exclusive 
sovereignty of the prince over his territory, nevertheless pluralistic sources of authority remained until 
the late 18th century, which witnessed the congruence between law and state. On the mythology that has 
grown around the concept of Westphalian legal order and presented as the result of a historical 
progression towards the assertion of territorial sovereignty, see C Thornhill, ‘The Future of the State’ in P 
Kjaer, G Teubner and A Febbrajo (eds), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective. The Dark Side of 
Functional Differentiation (Hart Publishing, 2011) 357, and especially 358, explaining that the gradual 
emergence of the concept of the state as an aggregation of institutions that could assume a particular 
density of political authority in one distinct region was not actually about protecting the integrity of state 
territory from the inroads of other states, but articulated power as a resource detached from private 
status. For an excellent account of the historical contingency of the nation state, cf P Berman, ‘The 
Globalization of Jurisdiction’ (2002) 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 311, 444, emphasising that 
only with the Enlightenment did a specific concept of the nation emerge, accompanied by the rise of the 
professional historian as contributing greatly to imagined community (461), and tradition itself being as 
an invention of modernity (462). A critical account of the Westphalian myth of sovereignty and statehood 
can be also found in S Krasner, ‘The Durability of Organised Hypocrisy’ in Kalmo and Skinner (n 3). The 
reference to the Westphalian doctrine here is to emphasise the dominant representation of state 
sovereignty and interstate legal order, and does not prejudge whether or not the Peace of Westphalia was 
actually based on any such doctrine. 
16 J Bomhoff and A Meuwese come to this conclusion, dismissing any meta-regulatory role for private 
international law, in ‘The Meta-Regulation of Transnational Private Regulation’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law 
and Society 138. 
17 S Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (Columbia University Press, 1996). The 
loss of control of sovereignty does not necessarily mean that the sovereign state may not continue to be a 
significant actor on the international scene; much depends, however, on the meaning given to the elusive 
concept of sovereignty, which fulfils diverse functions in diverse contexts: see the various contributions in 
Kalmo and Skinner (n 3). Similar observations can of course be made on the concept of statehood (on the 
historical anomaly of which see T Risse, Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of 
Limited Statehood (Columbia University Press, 2011); P Piirimae, ‘The Westphalian Myth and the Idea of 
External Sovereignty’ in Kalmo and Skinner (n 3) 64). The point here is that there is nevertheless, on the 
one hand, an evident decline of the monopoly of the state in the production of transnational normativity, 
and, on the other, increased dependency of any one state on institutions and policies created or decided 
outside of its own sphere of sovereignty.  
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international law has little to say about, and remains apparently unperturbed by, the 
decline of territory, the reconfiguring of sovereign authority, the rise of functional 
regimes—weathering paradigm-change as if the global had succeeded to the inter-
national18 without further ado.19 There appears to be relatively little dissatisfaction with 
the way things are. Indeed, there is a shared conviction that business can go on as usual 
since the nation-state has not, in the end, disappeared.20 There is also a flattening of the 
significance of globalisation throughout the disciplinary field, and a correlative refusal to 
engage in a reconsideration of the traditional methodological and epistemological 
premises of legal categories developed within the Westphalian conceptual framework.21 
These two observations are all the more surprising given that the greatest challenges for 
the public architects of the global ordering involved in the construction of an 
overarching constitutionalism22 are the appearance of new sources of authority and 
normativity ‘beyond the state’. These public architects particularly focus on sovereign 
newcomers that are not subjects of international law, and on the correlative emergence 
of post-national ‘private’ regimes which do not count as ‘law’ within the meaning of 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and its complex system of 
validation. Indeed, in the eyes of some acute observers of society, a radical change in the 
relationship between political regulation and private governance has pushed the once-
central ‘official’ or state law to the global edge, reducing it to the ‘impulse-generating’ 
periphery of autonomous private normativities.23 Moreover, it has been suggested that 
the local ‘background rules’ of property and contract, operating according to traditional 
                                                 
18 On the successive historical paradigms of the universal, the international and the global, see A 
Garapon, ‘Le global et l’universel’, Centre Perelman, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Séminaire de 
philosophie du Droit, March 2010.  
19 In the European context, attention tends to focus on the new brand of European Union federalism and 
its impact on private international rules, whose increasing technicality encourages a new form of 
scholasticism. And while the rise of human rights under the ECHR gives rise to heated debates over their 
scope and their universality, the specifically transnational element in the cases that come before the 
Strasbourg Court is actually quite limited (see below, section III-A). In the United States, the promising 
area of global regulatory litigation (see Buxbaum, ‘Transnational Regulatory Litigation’ (n 9)) appears to 
be retreating to the protection of territoriality (see below, Morrison v National Australia Bank, 130 S Ct 
2869, 2878 (2010), in the specific context of F-Cubed class actions in the field of securities). 
20 For a prognostic from political science on the future of the nation-state, see J Sgard, E Brousseau and Y 
Schemeil, ‘Sovereignty without Borders: On Individual Rights, the Delegation to Rule and Globalization’ 
Working Paper, Sciences-po, CERI, 2010.  
21 For an emblematic attachment to the Continental private law model, see P Mayer, ‘Le phénomène de la 
coordination des ordres juridiques étatiques en droit privé’ (2007) 217 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de 
Droit International de La Haye (RCADI) 9, especially 111 ff.  
22 See the various contributions in Ruling the World? (n 2), presented as the joint work of leading scholars 
‘to create a comprehensive and integrated framework for understanding global constitutionalization’. 
23 G Teubner, ‘The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ (1992) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1443.  
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conflict-of-law principles, may well be of considerably more import in the global 
economy, in terms of distributional effects, than ordinarily meets the eye.24 Has it not 
been observed, on the other hand, that in a fragmented legal order the politics of 
international (public) law are now a politics of redefinition, which transform political 
conflicts into issues of jurisdiction and applicable law?25 Such a reading of the 
international legal order is precisely that of private international law, which might seem 
then to come into its own. Is this not a time in which the gradual recognition of 
individuals as subjects of international rights gives new pull to a cosmopolitan humanist 
perspective, where familiar private law considerations of community and harmony26 
might come to the fore? 
One might then have expected private international law—which deals traditionally with 
legal diversity in the transnational arena and is characterised by its systemic vision of 
‘conflicts’ justice27—to step in at this point, focusing its energy on ‘polycentric regimes’, 
which are at the heart of contemporary political science and social theory.28 It might 
have made an essential contribution on those substantive issues that carry evident 
implications for global governance issues as varied as citizenship and immigration; 
cyberspace; judicial use of secrecy in provisional injunctive relief; the accountability of 
multinational corporate groups (in fields such as environmental destruction, land-
grabbing, or abuse of power in the food supply chain); the impact of crossborder 
litigation (and the role of the courts) on the functioning of labour markets; regulation of 
daily life in occupied territories; the political foundations of private international law in 
a federal system; the responsibility of rating agencies and other financial gate-keeper 
                                                 
24 See Wai, ‘Conflicts and Comity’ (n 8) on the regulatory significance of background rules for supporting 
venue of contract enforcement, property protection and dispute resolution; Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and 
International Law’ (n 6) 16 ff, showing how the Spanish Scholastics used the ius gentium and its private 
law concept of dominium to create a universal system of private exchange and finance.  
25 See Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (n 1) 352, observing that what appears to be at stake 
now in global governance arrangements is who (or what institution, which regime) gets to decide.  
26 For a contemporary rehabilitation of such values as constitutive of ‘conflicts justice’ (as opposed to 
substantive justice’), see A Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law: Justice, Pluralism 
and Subsidiarity in the International Constitutional Ordering of Private Law (Cambridge University Press. 
2009) especially 16 ff. For a critical reflection, see P Picone, ‘Les méthodes de coordination entre ordres 
juridiques en droit international privé (2000) RCADI 276, especially 211 ff.  
27 Ibid. WHICH WORK ARE YOU REFERRING TO? See  again, Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private 
International law,  
28 For approaches to polycentricity from sociology and systems theory that directly address the issues 
which are at the core of private international law, see J Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and 
Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2 Regulation and Governance 137; A Fischer-
Lescano and G Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of 
Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999. 
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institutions in interconnected market crises; the restructuring of sovereign debt, and so 
on. 
Private international law would seem naturally concerned with rising to the 
epistemological challenges linked to transnational expressions of private power.29 It 
might therefore be expected to adapt its methodology so as to articulate the procedural 
standing of collective interests of civil society; to link state action requirements with 
issues of extraterritoriality; to make sense of private legal transfers or the multiplication 
of transnational functional regimes; to address the transnational dimensions of human 
rights violations; to question the extraordinary autonomy of international commercial 
and investment arbitration; to worry about the spread of shadow finance outside 
regulated institutional frameworks. Yet in the main—and of course with notable 
individual exceptions—the private international law field appears to be directing its 
attention to much narrower, and indeed highly technical, issues, with little awareness of 
or interest in their governance implications.30 Moreover, private international law 
seems to lack any overarching world-vision through which to give meaning to any of the 
changes wrought by the decline of state sovereignty and territory. Significantly, a recent 
search for a meta-regulatory tool in the new configuration of transnational legalities has 
disqualified the field as too state-centred to be able to usefully contribute to the new 
needs of good governance on a global scale.31 Above all, private international law does 
                                                 
29 No attempt will be made here to address the issue of the definition of power (on which see S Lukes’ 
convincing three-dimensional account in Power, A Radical View (Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edn 2004). 
References in this paper to power in connection with private actors will frequently imply domination or 
imbalance (as in Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (n 10)), which it is the law’s role to moderate 
or rectify. The point being made here, therefore, is that as long as private power is not recognised as such, 
it is not made subject to adequate treatment in law. Reciprocally, law cannot apprehend it, because no 
attention is given to the processes of domination and subordination through which compliance is 
obtained. The term ‘private authority’ is sometimes used to denote a claim to legitimacy by private or non-
state rule-makers. Private power is, on the other hand, very often camouflaged.  
30 Such as those that motivate the ‘new global lawyers’ (on whom see Domingo, The New Global Law (n 2)). 
This is not to say that there are not some outstanding monographs and articles on some of these topics: 
see non-exhaustively, in the recent literature, F Marchadier, Les objectifs généraux du droit international 
privé à l’épreuve de la Convention européenne (Bruylant, 2007); M Audit, ‘Aspects internationaux de la 
responsibilité des agences de notation’ (2011) Rev crit DIP 581; C Kleiner, La monnaie dans les relations 
privées internationales (LGDJ, 2009); M Karayanni, ‘Choice of Law under Occupation: How Israeli Law 
Came to Serve Palestinian Plaintiffs’ (2009) 5 Journal of Private International Law 1; J Heymann, Le droit 
international privé à l’épreuve du fédéralisme européen (Economica, 2010). See too, linking up the conflict 
of laws and Kantism, J Romano, ‘Le droit international privé à l’épreuve de la théorie kantienne de la 
justice’ in (2011) Festschrift für Ivo Schwander. The contributions to the ‘Joerges project’ in (2011) 2(2) 
Transnational Legal Theory, cited above (n 12), which appeared when this project was already launched, 
are of course of particular import here. 
31 See, again, Bomhoff and Meuwese (n 16). 
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not appear to have any ambition to check and discipline private power in the global 
economy, allowing it instead to soar high above local constraints and defy the claims of 
the global commons. Human rights theories and methods, however imperfect, appear to 
be the only contenders to fill these gaps.  
This article aims to offer an explication as to why private international law has remained 
closeted32 from concerns of global private power, and attempts to suggest ways in which 
it could return to the scene in order to contribute usefully to the governance of informal 
empire. More specifically, the claim here is that private international law might be better 
able than its public counterpart has been so far (for all its ‘global constitutional’ turn) to 
articulate a political project for the global governance of private power with a horizon of 
transcendence.33 The aim, however, is not to pit one discipline against another, or to 
wage a battle of academic expertise. It is on the contrary to raise awareness of the 
deleterious consequences of the dogmatic separation between public and private 
international law. There are potentially powerful legal tools and arguments which each 
of these fields could provide to address some of the severest forms of hardship and 
inequality in the world today. However, the legal premises upon which the distinction 
between public and private international law rests work precisely to disarm some of 
these potential tools and arguments.  
It is suggested that, to a large extent, raising awareness of the implications of private 
international law for global governance relies upon a double paradox. One the one hand, 
de-closeting private international law in order to allow it to assert its own politics of 
global governance means not only ‘publicising’ private international law by harnessing 
                                                 
32 The reference here is of course to E Sedgewick’s Epistemology of the Closet (University of California 
Press, 2008). While the use of Queer theory might seem unorthodox as applied to a ‘body of law’, there are 
excellent precedents for its use in international law to highlight situations of domination: see, notably, T 
Ruskola, ‘Raping Like a State’ (2010) 57 University of California Law Review 1477. For other useful 
psychoanalytical metaphors in the field of global governance, see G Teubner’s account of law’s 
compulsions and addictions in ‘A Constitutional Moment: The Logics of Hitting the Bottom’ in Kjaer et al 
(eds), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (n 15) 3. It is to be hoped that the ‘travelling’ of 
theory (on which see E Said, The World, the Text and the Critic (Harvard University Press, 1983)) will 
suffer no loss of power in its translation to other fields. The point here is to understand the relationship 
between the two ‘bodies’ of international law, and to identify the symptoms of the inhibition of private 
international law’s governance potential. Such inhibition becomes obvious as the result of a division of 
labour between the political and economic spheres, which liberalism keeps carefully distinct, while 
ostensibly subordinating the private to the public, the market to government. 
33 On the loss of such a horizon—or of ‘secular faith’—in public international law, see Koskenniemi (n 6). 
See too, for a similar observation on the state of private international law, J Paul, ‘The Isolation of Private 
International Law’ (1988) 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal 149.  
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the resources of fundamental rights34 but also taking the private seriously on its own 
terms. This last idea implies addressing the expressions of private power through those 
very means of ‘private law’ that govern the mechanics of the global economy within and 
beyond the state.35 On the other hand, while it is essential to assert private international 
law’s planetary dimension, in the sense of being harnessed to a horizon of global good, it 
must not leave the local behind. Governance should remain embedded in its social 
context, so as to leave the various political communities as ‘masters of their own fate’.36 
This paper begins with a genealogy, under which it will first be argued that the 
public/private divide has ‘domesticated’ the body of private international law, confining 
it to a purely ancillary function37 beyond (or beneath) the international political sphere 
and leaving it blind to, or complicit in, the spread of informal empire in the unregulated 
normative space beyond the state (I). Hampered by the constraints inherent in the 
Westphalian doctrine of sovereignty,38 private international law has not been able to 
tether unleashed private interests, protect collective goods of planetary concern, or 
grapple with the myriad black holes opened by the confiscation of transnational 
adjudication and regulation by private entities. The second part of this paper looks at 
the ways in which the domestication of private international law led it to develop its 
own private, closeted epistemology—a form of tunnel vision—which actively 
                                                 
34 However, this does not mean denial of its ongoing constitutionalisation in the European context, 
through human rights, or of the evident regulatory function it has already acquired in certain cases (see 
below, section II).  
35 On the meaning of the ‘private’ in private (international) law, see below, FN 62, 269 and section III -B. 
36 M Koskenniemi, ‘Conclusion: Vocabularies of Sovereignty—Powers of a Paradox’ in Kalmo and Skinner, 
Sovereignty in Fragments (n 3) 242. 
37 From the Latin ancilla, female servant. G Samuel has pointed out, in response to this paper, that the 
closeting effect described here is visible in many other areas of ‘private’ law (PILAGG launching session, 
Sciences-po, 21 November 2011). This is of course entirely true. However, the particulary worry, in 
respect of private international law, is that the stakes are the global governance gaps described above. 
Arguably, the closeting of tort law can be compensated in the domestic scene by other regulatory 
mechanisms designed to pursue the public good, whereas the difficulty of the public/private divide 
beyond the state is that there is not much else out there—meaning no higher regulatory authority to 
ensure the protection of the global commons.  
38 See above, n 14; On the mythology that has grown up around the concept of Westphalian legal order, 
presented as the result of a historical progression towards the assertion of territorial sovereignty, see C 
Thornhill, ‘The Future of the State’ in Kjaer et al (n 26) 357, especially 358, explaining that the gradual 
emergence of the concept of state as an agreggation of institutions that could assume a particular density 
of political authority in one distinct region was not actually about protecting the integrity of state territory 
from the inroads of other states, but articulated power as a resource detached from private status. For an 
excellent account of the historical contingency of the nation state, see Berman (n 15) 444 ff, emphasising 
that only with the Enlightenment did a specific concept of the nation emerge, accompanied by the rise of 
the professional historian as contributing greatly to imagined community (461), with tradition itself 
becoming an invention of modernity (462). 
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contributed to consolidating the legal foundations of the abovementioned informal 
empire (II). This does not mean, however, that private international law is condemned 
to the closet forever and that it cannot rise up to its global governance implications. It 
has, in this sense, its own ‘private’ history, which may help point to its emancipatory 
potential.39 The third, and normative dimension of this paper attempts to understand 
the changes that need to be brought about in legal thinking in the private international 
law field in order for such an emancipator potential to be enhanced. Only then can its 
governance potential be properly enhanced, so as to enable it to reconnect with a 
planetary horizon (III). 
 
I. SCHISM: International Law and Global Private Power 
 
Who (or what form of governmentality?) ensures the transnational regulation of rating 
agencies, prevents vulture funds from syphoning off development aid, prohibits the 
marketing of products manufactured abroad using child slaves, provides status to 
displaced populations, or repairs pollution resulting from multinational oil and gas 
extractive activities? From industrial disasters as in Bhopal to financial scandals as in 
Vivendi or Alsthom, from the toxic trajectory of the Probo Koala to torture and murder as 
in the Kiobel case,40 an autopsy of the recurrent humanitarian scandals and financial 
crises associated with late capitalism41 shows up the ‘gaping holes of global 
governance’42 especially to the extent that cases fall between public and private sources 
                                                 
39 Mills (n 26) 26 ff.  
40 All these cases are sadly familiar to students of private international law, which deals traditionally with 
cases relating to ‘private law relationships’ with ‘international elements’. From this perspective, they raise 
a variety of issues relating to jurisdiction (forum non conveniens, secret injunctive relief, the scope of 
universal civil jurisdiction) and choice of law (the extraterritorial reach of public economic regulation, the 
applicability of public international law to private actors, the availability of a regime of compensation 
beyond the lex loci delicti). They will all be discussed in due course below.  
41 On crisis as the dark side of modernity, see K Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon, 1944, new edn 2001), stigmatising the consequences of 
‘disembeddedness’; cf C Joerges and J Falke, ‘Introduction’ in C Joerges and J Falke (eds), Karl Polanyi: 
Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets (Hart Publishing, 2011) 1 ff; on crisis as 
the dark side of functional differentiation of social systems or steering mechanisms, see Teubner (n 32); 
Picone (n 26) 3 ff.  
42 This term was used by A Krueger, in International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, cited and discussed by E Helleiner, ‘Filling a Hole in Global Financial 
Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt Restructuring’ in W Mattli and N Woods, The 
Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009) 89. 
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of legal discipline.43 Although the very concept of a global governance gap has been 
challenged, in view of the plethora of potentially relevant rules and norms,44 the gaping 
holes are not necessarily the result of inaction on the part of states, nor indeed of the 
lack of specialised private regimes in various areas.45 Rather, these gaping holes often 
cover instances of abuse of power by non-state actors whose claim to private authority 
goes unchecked,46 or the structural bias of international legislation whose content 
supports alliances of strong private interests.47 They illustrate the migration of 
sovereignty to new private sites beyond the state and, equally significantly, beyond the 
ambit of existing sources of governance—all of which appear to be curiously tame, or 
indeed apologetic, when it comes to preventing and sanctioning abuse in the name of 
collective values. What appears deeply problematic, therefore, is not that regulation is 
unavailable, nor indeed that it flows from sources beyond the sovereign state, but that 
whatever rules there are, these rules appear to lack a transcendent horizon of the global 
good, and any sense of connectedness in terms of causal linkages and systemic risks. 
However much formal and informal law exists, it does little to rein in private interests. 
Thus, behind the language of inevitability of globalisation or under its glossy veneer, 
                                                 
43 For an excellent methodology based on autopsy of disasters, see K Pistor and K Millhaupt, Law and 
Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems and Economic Development Around the 
World (Chicago University Press, 2008).  
44 See the challenge posed by T Bartley, ‘Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections 
of Public and Private Standards ’ (2011) 12(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 25. However, a governance 
void may exist despite (and perhaps precisely because of) a plethora of rules of all sorts: see below, 
section III-B and FN 282.  
45 See Shepel’s description of ‘thousands upon thousands’ of private standards in The Constitution of 
Private Governance (n 8) 404.  
46 To a certain extent, of course, an abuse of power by private actors may be seen to be the result of an 
abuse of sovereignty by nation-states. The question may now be whether international law imposes upon 
states a duty of responsible regulation in all or certain fields of common interest: see, on the topical 
question of human rights violations by multinational corporations, O de Schutter, ‘La responsabilité des 
Etats dans le contrôle des sociétés transnationales: vers une convention internationale sur la lutte contre 
les atteintes aux droits de l’homme commises par les sociétés transnationales’ in I Daugareilh (ed), 
Responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise transnationale et globalisation de l’économie (Bruylant, 2010) 707. 
More generally, the concept of abuse of sovereignty by self-seeking governments needs further 
articulation: see, in the context of land-grabbing, T Ferrando, ‘Private Legal Transplants’ (2011), 
blogs.sciences-po.fr/pilagg.  
47 In the field of private international law, on the telling example of international maritime conventions on 
the allocation of responsibility as among the cargo and the carriers, behind the equally conflicting 
interests of developing countries versus the great seafaring Western nations, see C Hooper, ‘Forum 
Selection and Arbitration in the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods 
Wholly or Partly by Sea, or the Definition of Fora Conveniens Set Forth in the Rotterdam Rules’ (2009) 44 
Texas International Law Journal 417. More widely, on the impact of private lobbies on intergovernmental 
negotiations, see D Fernandez Arroyo, ‘Normativité et légitimité dans la gouvernance globale: le rôle et les 
mécanismes des acteurs non-étatiques dans les organisations internationales productrices de droit’ 
(2011) PILAGG Workshop, Sciences-po (publication forthcoming). 
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these private interests work to the detriment of the planet both physically and 
metaphorically, in terms of the adequate distribution and protection of ecological and 
economic resources. 
With its focus on the ‘private’, its traditional function in dealing with diverse claims to 
authority in the international arena, its methodological attention to linkages and inter-
legalities, and its ethos of pluralism,48 private international law might have been 
expected to contribute some of the tools needed in this ‘global disorder of normative 
orders’49 to ensure that expansion of informal empire is accompanied by appropriate 
safeguards, counterweights and responsibilities in the name of the global good. Yet its 
governance potential is clearly inhibited, and indeed, rarely articulated in contemporary 
accounts of private international law.50 The explanation seems to lie in the separation 
that occurred when modern public international law emerged as a specific disciplinary 
field devoted to the interactions between sovereign public actors, while the governance 
of the informal economy—private international law—was relegated to the domestic 
sphere, to be managed distinctly by each national polity. At this point, when politics of 
the global legal order were constructed as separate from the transnational market,51 and 
framed as the relationships between sovereign states, private international law was 
simultaneously disqualified and disarmed.52 The conceptual divide between 
international politics and global market led to the immunity of cross-border private 
economic expansion from the moral and legal constraints previously carried by the ius 
                                                 
48 For an influential account of the values and methods of modern private international law in continental 
Europe, in which this field is seen to focus on justice for individuals through appropriate coordination of 
legal systems, see H Batiffol, Aspects philosophiques du droit international privé (Dalloz, 1957). For an 
account of private international law as devoted to the management of pluralism, see P Francescakis, 
Preface to the French translation of Santi Romano, L’ordre juridique, P François and P Gothot (eds) (Dalloz, 
1975). For a critical analysis of the supposedly coordinating function of private international law, see 
Picone (n 26).  
49 N Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative 
Orders’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 373. 
50 See, however, the contributions to new thinking in Filho (n 9). 
51 In this representation, the market itself is of course framed as a natural phenomenon (as opposed to 
being a social construct), in the same way as economics is presented as distinct from politics.  
52On the ‘liberal art of separation’ of the political from the economic, see M Walzer, ‘Liberalism and the Art 
of Separation’ (1984) 12(3) Political Theory, 315; Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (n 10) 16. The 
revelation of the power structures under the surface of the law is of course one of the great war horses of 
legal realism (see, for example, the clear account in J Singer, ‘Review Essay’ (1988) 76 California Law 
Review 465). This is a point that may be useful to emphasise, as Europeans are not necessarily ‘all legal 
realists now’ (for the reasons why they are not, see the excellent account of the domestication of legal 
space in France in the first half of the 20th century, by P Jestaz and C Jamin, La Doctrine (Dalloz, 2004) 120 
ff). 
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gentium.53 By the time nineteenth century liberal ideals had taken a neo-liberal turn into 
twentieth century global finance, the relationship between public authority and private 
power beyond the pale of the nation-state had reversed.54 
The abuses equated with informal empire therefore result to a large extent from the 
schism that took place within international law and the subsequent inhibitions affecting 
the sole source of governance that was fitted to apply to private, or non-state, power.55 
Private international law became curtained-off from the political scene, and the only 
international site of the political was the interaction between sovereign states. 
Developing thereafter within a subordinate and supposedly apolitical framework, the 
methodological content of private international law gradually interiorised its own 
domestication.56 It enthusiastically asserted its own independence from politics and its 
correlative impotence to tether the private interests that gradually soared over the 
reach of national regulation. Circumscribing its own object and scope so as to exclude 
the protection of public goods or collective values, turning a blind eye to the ‘dismal 
sites’ of production, and ignoring the exercise of private power, private international law 
thereby made its own contribution to the chaos of the globe.57 It is proposed here to look 
at the genesis of the schism58 within international law (A), in order to understand the 
deep-seated denials that have now undermined the theory of sovereignty (B). 
 
                                                 
53 Koskenniemi (n 1). 
54 On the mechanics of this reversal, see below, section II-B-a. 
55 Unsurprisingly, in the wake of the schism, the structure of legal argument remained similarly 
constrained in both areas between the two opposite poles of ‘utopia’ (divorced from reality) and ‘apology’ 
(aligned on existing allocations of power in the international arena): see on this point below, sections I-A 
and II-A. In the same way, the ‘four specific European biases’ that founded international law—geographic 
Europe as the centre, Christianity, mercantile economics and political imperialism—(according to M 
Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’ (2001) 42 Harvard International 
Law Journal 201, 214)—apply equally well to private international law.  
56 The same can of course be said for domestic private law in general, in Continental European legal 
thinking (see D de Béchillon, ‘L’imaginaire d’un code’ (1998) 27 Droits 173; H Muir Watt, ‘Le discours du 
Code. Regard comparatiste’ (2005) 42 Droit 49). A similar rhetoric, designed to dissolve politics in science 
or technique, can now be found in the area of global private governance through standardisation: see 
Büthe and Mattli (n 8) especially 200; Shepel, The Constitution of Private Governance (n 8).  
57 On the tragedy of the global commons from the perspective of private international law, see H Muir 
Watt, ‘Aspects économiques’ (unclear whether book, journal, report, etc) 273 ff. It is a series of lectures in 
book form (the Recueil des cours de l’Académie de la Haye) 
58 The reference is to Lacan’s psychoanalytical theory of the severance (‘la Schize’) of the conscious and 
the unconscious. The image is used here to emphasise the split that took place within the body and psyche 
of international law, while emphasising the importance of language (the rhetoric of international law) in 
constituting its schizophrenia.  
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A. Genesis of the Schism: When the International Legal Order became Severed 
from Politics 
 
The domestication of private international law—that is, the loss of its governance 
function—appears to have taken place when modern public international law emerged 
separately, in the course of the nineteenth century, as the great European apology for 
colonialism.59 Since this apology required that the (Western) sovereign state should be 
the sole protagonist of international politics, its monopoly was then represented as 
inherent to the Westphalian legal ordering.60 Private actors, their status, transactions 
and conduct, previously subject in the transnational sphere to the ius gentium, were 
accordingly excluded from the remit of public law and relegated to the private.61 
Through the early years of the twentieth century, the apolitical neutrality of the conflict 
of laws progressively developed as a dogma, largely due to its supposed affiliation with 
natural reason, rising above the contingencies of politics.62 There is little need to point 
out that this schism was anything but mandated by the natural course of things. Indeed, 
in an interesting twist, ‘private international law’ was first coined as a name in a largely 
contemporaneous effort by Joseph Story63 to mediate between violently conflicting 
                                                 
59 Koskenniemi (n 6) explains how modern public international law emerged when the European powers 
were dividing up ‘le grand gâteau de l’Afrique’. Comp. Andrew Fitzmaurice “Liberalism and Empire in 
Nineteenth-Century International Law,” American Historical Review (Feb. 2012). 
60 On the mythology that has grown up around the concept of Westphalian legal order, see generally n 30. 
61 On the ‘private history’ of (private) international law, see Mills (n 26) 26 ff. 
62 The supposed ‘naturality’ of the principles of private international law owes an initial debt to Von 
Savigny’s great Treatise of Roman Law System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, 1849, whose famous chapter 
VIII is believed to be the fount of modern conflicts methodology. On the mythology involved in such a 
reading of the text, see P Gothot, ‘Simples réflexions à propos du saga des conflits de lois’ in Mélanges en 
l’honneur de Paul Lagarde (Dalloz, 2005) 343. On the parallelism between Savigny and Thibaut in the 
battle against codification, see M Bussani and U Mattei, ‘Le fonds commun du droit privé européen’ (2000) 
52 Review Internationale Droits Comparatifs 29. Curiously, Savigny’s belief in the naturality of the essence 
and thereby of the ‘seat’ of legal relationships was then compounded in an analogous belief as applied to 
the great codes, which were also considered the depositories of natural reason (see generally n 53). For a 
critique of the public/private divide on the European side, see N Reich, ‘The Public/Private Divide in 
European Law’ in H Micklitz and F Cafaggi (eds), European Private Law after the Common Frame of 
Reference (Edward Elgar, 2010) 56. On the ambivalence of the ‘private’ in the global context, see Jansen 
and Michaels, ‘Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization’ (n 4). These 
authors show (857) how the debate about the public/private divide takes on a different significance either 
side of the Atlantic, since it is really about the role of the state in respect of society.  
63 See J Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic (1834), stating that ‘this branch 
of public law may fitly be denominated private international law, since it is chiefly seen and felt in its 
application to the common business of private persons’ (10); compare, for authentification of this claim, F 
Juenger, ‘Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws’ (Brill, 2001) 28; A Watson, Joseph Story and the Comity of 
Errors: A Case Study in Conflict of Laws (University of Georgia Press, 1992). 
 16 
societal policies in the young American Republic.64 But the political potential of private 
international law in governing jurisdictional claims in the medieval world of multiple 
princedoms and city-polities, customary norms, and overlapping allegiances,65 had 
largely preexisted the emergence of the nation-state. As Martti Koskenniemi explains, 
the Scholastics themselves had acted as articulators and ideologues of a global system of 
trade and finance.66 At this early stage, conflict of laws was invested with a largely 
political mandate in supporting the territorial framework of local power in pre-
revolutionary France.67 The Dutch School also seized upon this set of rules to wall off the 
new independent polity from the universalising authority of the Catholic Church while 
using its content to further the imperial interests of private trading companies.68 
However, this eminently political function of private international law became 
‘pasteurised’69 with the emergence of modernity. The public international law that was 
devised at the time of the dividing of the ‘great pie of Africa’ by the European powers 
was equated with the proper allocation of jurisdiction as among sovereign states, to 
which it then left the exclusive regulation of the local territory, community and public 
goods. The promotion of the informal transnational economy was thereby deputised to 
private interests,70 which expanded largely unchecked transnationally, because of the 
inherent territorial limitations in the reach of the jurisdiction of the Westphalian state. 
                                                 
64 See J Paul, ’Comity in International Law’ (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal 1. Indeed, the 
political dimension of Story’s doctrine is visible in the importance he attached to the concept—borrowed 
from the (public) law of nations—of comity: ‘Story’s intention in formalizing the doctrine [of Comity] was 
to enshrine comity as a mediating principle between free and slave states and thereby save the republic’ 
(19).  
65 The rise of conflict of laws during this period, based on a glose and post-glose of Roman law, is well 
documented throughout European private international law literature (see, for an account and references, 
D Bureau and H Muir Watt (2010) 1(357) Droit international privé (PUF, 2nd edn)). For an analogy 
between this pre-national period and contemporary post-national rule-making, see S Kobrin, ‘Economic 
Governance in an Electronically Networked Global Society’ in R Hall and T Biersteker, The Emergence of 
Private Authority in Global Governance (n 10) 43, 64, predicting that the post-modern future may well 
resemble the medieval past (with its overlapping authority and multiple loyalties), more than the more 
immediate organised world of national markets and nation-states. 
66 See Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and International Law (n 6) 16 ff, explaining how international law had 
initially served the ends of peaceful commerce, banking and succession in the newly cosmopolitan context 
of trade fairs.  
67 Illustrated in the territorialist doctrine of Bertrand D’Argentré (1519–90), known for his Glose of Article 
218 of the Breton Custom, De Statutis Personalibus et Realibus. 
68 Grotius, the Father of modern international law, did not hesitate to use ideas of independence and 
sovereignty, imputed to the ius gentium, to plead for the interests of the Dutch East India company. See 
Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and International Law’ (n 6) 32.  
69 For the metaphor of pasteurisation, used to denote a flattening effect, see M de S-O-l’E Lasser, ‘The 
European Pasteurization of French Law’ (2004–5) 90 Cornell Law Review 995.  
70 On colonialism and private empire, see A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 17 
The essential consequence of this split between the public and the private international 
arenas was the dissolving of the ius gentium as an overarching system of legality and 
morality, integrating relations as between both princes and merchants.71 International 
trade, finance. and investment, duly separated from the political, were no longer 
subjected to any common horizon of public values.72 
The fundamental paradox of international law is that the supremacy of its public 
dimension, dealing with relationships between its sovereign subjects, has led to an 
extraordinary empowerment of the private, demurely masked all the while by its 
neutral, apolitical stance. Whereas private international law might, conceivably, have 
continued after the schism to articulate the legal and moral limits for the functioning of 
the global market beyond the state, it was inhibited in both scope and ambition by the 
imperious requirements of the public international legal ordering. In turn, it became 
doubly disempowered. It could neither provide an appropriate transnational regime to 
discipline private actors, nor subject non-state normative regimes73 to principles of 
transparency and accountability. Its mimicry of public international law’s exclusions—
generally known as the ‘public law taboo’74—thereby facilitated the expansion of 
informal empire.75 This is notably because, in separating the subjects of public or private 
international law, on the one hand, and, on the other, in attributing to state 
sovereignty—in its double external and internal dimension76—a prescriptive monopoly 
in either sphere, the liberal model has induced a denial of private authority and law-
making in the global arena.77 
 
B. Subsequent Denials: The Internal Inconsistencies of Sovereignty 
                                                 
71 Koskenniemi (n 6) explains how initially, the central concept of dominium within the ius gentium had 
served as a legal foundation to both private property and territory. 
72 The market was itself portrayed as a naturally free space within the ultimate constraints laid down by 
the liberal sovereign (or, in the field of transnational trade, by the community of liberal sovereigns). On 
the reassuring liberal assumption that the state had the last word over the market, see Jansen and 
Michaels (n 3). 
73 For a sample of the new transnational private regime literature, see F Cafaggi, ‘New Foundations of 
Transnational Private Regulation’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 20.  
74 W Dodge, ‘Breaking the Public Law Taboo’ (2002) 43(1) Harvard International Law Journal 161. 
75 While private international law mimics its public counterpart in its apology of politics (on this apology, 
see Koskenniemi (n 1) 35 ff), it actually deepens this apology as far as private power is concerned (as will 
be shown below). 
76 On these two ‘faces’ of sovereignty, internal and external, expressed respectively in the domestic and 
international spheres, see S Lemaire, Les contrats internationaux de l’administration (LGDJ, 2005).  
77 Private authority or private rule-making are, within the confines of the liberal model, an ontological 
impossibility. See Cutler (n 10) 64. 
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No doubt the most notable result of the schism within international law was the creation 
of a waterproof boundary between the two bodies of legal principles applicable 
respectively to sovereign and private actors.78 Diagonal relationships (between private 
actors and foreign states) defied classification in either category and were therefore off 
the legal map.79 In terms of substantive content, the two separate spheres were hardly 
differentiated initially, since much of customary public international law replicated 
liberal contract theory. Tensions and contradictions in liberal international theory 
became apparent however in the last years of the twentieth century, when ‘providential’ 
public international law80 came to comprise a growing set of human rights norms—
possibly unrecognised in domestic constitutional law—which could be invoked 
individually or collectively as against sovereign states. The new status of individuals as 
right-holders disturbed the rarefied atmosphere of public international law,81 but, 
                                                 
78 While liberal public international law refused status to private actors, civil society and its 
representatives (in the form of NGOs—which now have standing before the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights), or other collective interests (on the contemporary evolution of international law towards 
the recognition of various categories of collective rights, such as those of indigeneous peoples, see D 
Newman, Community and Collective Rights: A Theoretical Framework for Rights Held by Groups (Oxford 
University Press, 2011), private international law traditionally mirrored these exclusions, by abdicating 
any claim to regulate governmental actors (hence ‘the public law’, which prohibits courts from enforcing 
foreign criminal, tax, antitrust, and securities laws and judgments—on which see Dodge (n 74). 
79 On the (legal acrobatic) elaboration of a legal regime for ‘state contracts’—that is, contracts between 
states and foreign private actors—see below, section I-B-b. For the current focus of attention on ‘diagonal’ 
conflicts, see C Joerges, ‘The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New 
Legal Discipline’ (2004) 14 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 149; C Schmid, ‘Vertical 
and Diagonal Conflicts in the Europeanisation Process’ in C Joerges and O Gerstenberg (eds), Private 
Governance, Democratic Constitutionalism and Supranationalism (Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1998) 155; Heymann, Le droit international privé à l’épreuve du federalism 
européen (n 30) 24. 
80 On the ‘providential’ function of public international law, see E Jouannet, Le droit international libéral-
Providence. Une histoire du droit international (Bruylant, 2011). Providential international law not only 
trumped less favourable domestic constitutional law, but had the advantage, as compared to its domestic 
counterpart, of a plausible claim to universal application. 
81 While the ius gentium had applied universally, so as to include the Indians discovered by the 
conquistadors (on the debate over the status of the indigenous population among the Spanish Scholastics, 
see Koskenniemi (n 6), the exclusionary ethos of sovereignty led modern liberal international law to 
preclude ‘non-civilised’ peoples from attaining legal status. The same peoples beyond the pale of Western 
civilisation were likewise prevented from participating in the formation of customary international law, 
which unsurprisingly reflected European values and indeed tended largely to mimic European private 
law. These were the same values of the ‘community of laws’ on which Continental European conflict of 
laws were grounded, with a similar exclusionary ethos. Shadowing these exclusions, private international 
law operated an analogous selection when relying on a state-focused connection that did not exhaust 
personal affiliations, or mapped territory along geographical lines that crossed through cultural 
communities. Once again, the domestication of private international law has prevented it from venturing 
to map jurisdiction otherwise than as dictated by public international law, although it may oppose a 
discrete but firm resistance from time to time on issues of private dimensions of citizenship (K Knop, 
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instead of redesigning its boundaries so as to extend the reach of public discipline, it has 
instead condoned a series of outcomes which tend to work one-way only, to protect or 
liberate private sovereignty. Although there are many other possible illustrations of the 
internal inconsistencies of the classical theory of sovereignty,82 the following three 
examples are designed to show important instances in which the schism between the 
public and the private in international law has left private economic power 
unrecognised and therefore supreme in confrontations with public sovereign authority. 
Thus, corporate entities exercising private economic power have remained 
unaccountable under the principles applicable to states (a), while, conversely, states 
may find their sovereignty clipped in relationships with private investors, either in the 
name of public international law (b), or indeed under the private law of debt (c). None of 
this makes any sense in terms of either principle or policy. 
 
a. Private Power without Public Duties 
 
The most spectacular convergence of denials by public and private international law 
concerns the forms of private power exercised in the global economy by non-sovereign 
entities such as multinational corporations or rating agencies. In spite of their significant 
role in the shaping of the global market, these entities escape any credible form of public 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Citizenship, Public and Private’ in K Knop, R Michaels and A Riles (eds), Transdisciplinary Conflict of Laws 
(2008) 71 Law and Contemporary Problems 309), or on law-making authority over non-recognised 
territories (see Karayanni (n 30)).  
82A notable example can be found in the ICJ’s recent judgment Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
(Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) of 3 February 2012, holding that customary international law does 
not admit any exception to foreign sovereign jurisdictional immunities in the case of human rights claims 
based on the violation of a norm of ius cogens. The contradiction was described thus (by Judge Antonio 
Cançado Trindade in his dissent in ICJ Germany v Italy, § 179): ‘No State can, nor was ever allowed, to 
invoke sovereignty to enslave and/or to exterminate human beings, and then to avoid the legal 
consequences by standing behind the shield of State immunity. There is no immunity for grave violations 
of human rights and of international humanitarian law, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Immunity was never conceived for such iniquity. To insist on pursuing a strictly inter-State approach in 
the relationships of responsibility leads to manifest injustice.’ This line of argument did not convince, 
however. Among other inconsistencies, there may be private champions behind the sovereign veil in 
international arenas such as the WTO or the UN (see D Arroyo, ‘Private Interests in International 
Negotiations’, PILAGG workshop, Sciences-po 2012 (publication forthcoming). On regulatory capture by 
private actors within the UN system, see B Chimni, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A 
Critical Third World Approach’ (2007) 8(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 499). For 
contemporary reflection on the inconsistencies affecting both the concept and the practice of state 
sovereignty, see Kalmo and Skinner, Sovereignty in Fragments (n 3).  
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accountability or private responsibility.83 Public international law has traditionally been 
constructed, by national and international courts alike, as ignoring (private) corporate 
actors, to which it denies the status of subjects and prevents their being called to 
account under the law of nations.84 Such denial has been seen to persist even since 
individuals and groups have gained access to the international liberal order for the 
protection of their fundamental rights.85 Change may now be on its way, in the aftermath 
of the highly controversial Kiobel decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. The Court held corporate defendants to be non-justiciable under 
international law—at least from the perspective of the Alien Tort Statute86—for human 
rights violations abroad.87 Beyond the politics88 and the economics89 of this refusal, its 
                                                 
83 Cutler (n 10) 14; D Danielson, ‘How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power Seriously in 
Transnational Regulation and Governance’ (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 411. From the 
perspective of public international law, Martti Koskenniemi similarly observes that the current state of the 
international legal ordering tends to serve powerful corporate actors and marginalises regulation: The 
Politics of International Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 246. On the rise of private financing of international 
investment arbitration, see P Pinsolle, ‘Le financement de l’arbitrage par les tiers’ (2011) 2 Revue de 
l’arbitrage 385. The use of the term ‘power’ rather than ‘authority’ (see Hall and Biersteker, The 
Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (n 10)) denotes a lack of any specific claim to its 
exercise within the parameters of legitimacy as applicable to state-centred power.  
84 Traditionally, corporate liability is a double derivative of state liability in international law. Thus, a state 
may exercise diplomatic protection and sue another state on behalf of a national (see Case Concerning 
Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Ltd (Second Phase) International Court of Justice, [1970] 
ICJ Rep 3); then it is up to the defendant state to deal with the offending private actor. Similarly, a 
sovereign state may be sued by a citizen for violation of a human rights norm in an appropriate forum 
(such as a regional human rights court); however, its liability is only engaged transnationally through the 
conduct of its officials abroad, and is therefore of limited use in situations involving private corporate 
misconduct outside the territory of the defendant state. Horizontal effects of human rights norms 
reproduce these limitations (on all these points, see below, section III-A). One of the potential avenues for 
change would therefore be to institute state liability for corporate misconduct abroad: see O de Schutter, 
‘La responsabilité des Etats dans le contrôle des sociétés transnationales: vers une convention 
internationale sur la lutte contre les atteintes aux droits de l’homme commises par les sociétés 
transnationales’ in Isabelle Daugureilh (ed), Responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise transnationale et 
globalisation de l’économie (Bruylant, 2010) 707. This would be one way of ‘piercing the veil of sovereign 
authority’ in transnational situations (see S Gardbaum, ‘Human Rights and International 
Constitutionalism’ in J Dunoff and Joel Trachtmann (eds), Ruling the World? (n 2) 233, 235). 
85The status of non-sovereign infra-state or trans-state groups or communities such as unrecognised 
states, protectorates, tribes, religious communities and indigeneous tribes remains uncertain today, 
despite the move to recognise collective rights in international law: see D Newman, Community and 
Collective Rights: A Theoretical Framework for Rights Held by Groups (Oxford University Press, 2011).  
86The Alien Tort Statute grants federal district courts jurisdiction over ‘any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’: 28 USC § 1350. This 
reference to (customary) public international law has been perceived as problematic because of its 
indeterminacy and the subsequent risk of extension of the jurisdiction of the US courts, against which the 
Supreme Court warned in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004), where it limited the statute’s scope 
to those ‘customs and usages of civilized nations’ (542 US at 734) that are ‘specific, universal, and 
obligatory’ (542 US at 732). 
87Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 621 F 3d 111, 142 n 44 (2d Cir. 2010). The literature on this case is 
already so voluminous, particularly given the numerous other—dissonant—decisions that have been 
handed down more recently in other circuits, that, since certiorari has now been granted by the Supreme 
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legal foundations are hotly contested in other Circuits90 and an appeal is now pending 
before the Federal Supreme Court.91 Yet while the resulting impunity of multinational 
                                                                                                                                                        
Court, it is no doubt wiser to direct the attention of non-US readers to the various amicus briefs, including 
the brief for the US government in support of the petitioners. See, for an update on the multiple 
procedures pending, S Symeonides, ‘Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2011: Twenty-Fifth Annual 
Survey’ (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 64, and for a synthesis in French of the litigation 
and the various legal issues involved, H Muir Watt, ‘Les enjeux de l’affaire Kiobel devant la Cour Suprême 
des Etats-Unis: la responsabilité des personnes morales au regard des droits de l’homme’ (2012) Comité 
français de Droit international privé (forthcoming). While the debate rages in the US, where the Alien Tort 
Statute has encouraged collective transnational corporate responsibility litigation through the promise of 
universal civil jurisdiction, other countries are beginning to experience the arrival of such claims. Thus, 
the 2005 Dutch Collective Settlement Act provides a specific framework for judicial approval of pre-
negotiated settlements (on its economic implications see R Nagareda, ‘Aggregate Litigation across the 
Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism’ (2009) 62 Vanderbilt Law Review 1. Closer to the 
Kiobel model, the English courts have also been seized with an environmental claim grouping 69,000 
individual claimants against Shell, related to Nigerian oil spills. An agreement was announced in the media 
in August 2011 (see Financial Times, 3 August 2011) under which a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell plc 
accepted its liability and conceded to the jurisdiction of the UK High Court. The parent company is thereby 
released. Whether or not the subsidiary is sufficiently capitalised to be able to provide compensation were 
it to be held liable is of course another question. The most notable point, however, is that the agreement 
appears to bind the parties to the application of Nigerian tort law. The outcome is therefore likely to be 
limited (on the way in which the lex loci delicti serves to limit transnational liability, see H Muir Watt (n 
57) 206 ff).  
88 Among the political issues raised by this statute, it may be asked whether it is appropriate for the courts 
of the United States to be dictating the social policy of other governments, by sanctioning violations of 
Western standards of social protection within the territory of other sovereigns. See the words of the 
District Court in the Firestone (Liberia rubber plantations) litigation (United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana, Case n° 1: 06-cv-0627-DFH-JMS, p 62): ‘The court is confident that 
improvements in those wages and working conditions for many millions of people would make the world 
a better place. Yet federal courts in the United States must also keep in mind the Sosa Court’s caution 
against having American courts decide and enforce limits on the power of foreign governments over their 
own citizens … How much more intrusive would American law be if American courts took it upon 
themselves to determine the minimum requirements for wages and working conditions throughout the 
world?’ The answer might of course be that the US courts are merely holding US-based corporate groups 
to such standards.  
89 Among the economic issues, there are opposing views on whether the obligation for foreign investors to 
respect human rights over and above the requirements of local legislation constitutes a competitive 
disadvantage for non-complying actors, or, conversely, whether non-compliance by some is an unfair 
competitive advantage gained over compliers. The latter position is held by Judge Posner in Flomo v 
Firestone Natural Rubber Co, llc (United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, n° 10-3675, p 15). 
Another issue is whether the plight of the local population (children, in the Firestone case) who are not 
employed by the defendant multinational should be taken into account in determining whether there has 
been a human rights violation. See, again, Judge Posner, at 22, on the necessary trade-off between family 
income and child labour and our ignorance of the net effect of plantation work on welfare. Yet another 
issue is whether it makes sense in the first place to subject corporate entities (without souls) to criminal 
liability. See again, for an economic justification, Judge Posner for the Court, in Flomo v Firestone Natural 
Rubber, 9.  
90 United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, John Doe viii v Exxon Mobil 
Corporation, 25 January 2011; United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Flomo v Firestone Natural 
Rubber Co, llc, 11 July 2011. 
91In Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on 17 October 
2011, No 10-1491. The oral hearing took place on 28 February, but on 5 March a rehearing was ordered 
on the issue of extraterritoriality. The implication is that the Alien Tort Statute is not an instance of 
universal jurisdiction as is commonly thought. If this view prevails, the Alien Tort Statute would come 
closer to the European model of jurisdiction founded upon a denial of justice, which requires a link to the 
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corporations has been widely criticised,92 judicial disagreement with the Kiobel majority 
is also expressed to a large extent as a methodological issue. Framing the reference to 
international law as an  issue of remedies (does international law recognises civil 
liability of corporations?) is mistaken, since international law deals exclusively with 
conduct-regulation, leaving the means of its own implementation (civil or criminal law 
remedies) to the initiative of individual states.93 Such a critique can only delight 
specialists in conflict of laws, which has long mediated between different legal orders in 
allocating issues of loss-allocation/remedies and violation of rules of conduct, or in 
engineering ‘windows’ within domestic law in order to import norms from other 
(foreign or international) legal systems.94  
On the other hand, the wider dissymmetry in rights and duties created by the 
public/private divide as between corporations and sovereign states does not appear at 
present to be at the centre of the debate. Indeed, public international law has been kept 
at bay as a source of liability for violation of human rights norms by corporate actors. In 
the meantime, private international law—which might have been expected to emerge in 
order to fill the void and ensure the tethering of corporations and the regulation of their 
conduct in the private economy—has stepped down. Outside the confines of competition 
law,95 multinational corporations (it is said) are an economic, not a legal concept.96 Only 
by piercing the corporate veil can the legal entity be reached through the private law 
                                                                                                                                                        
local Community (for example allowing exceptional access to the French courts in a fundamental rights 
case, on the basis of such a link: see Cass Soc, 10 May 2006, Époux Moukarim, Bull 2006 V n° 168 P 163; 
RCDIP 2006 P 856, note É Pataut and P Hammje; JDI 2007 P 531, note J-M Jacquet; JCP 2006 II 10121, note 
S Bollée; D 2006 IR P 1400, obs P Guiomard). However, an important point is made by Judge Posner in 
Flomo v Firestone Natural Rubber Co, p 24, on the subject of the Alien Tort Statute: ‘Deny extraterritorial 
application, and the [Alien Tort Statute] would be superfluous, given the ample tort and criminal remedies 
against, for example, the use of child labor (let alone its worst forms) in this country.’ 
92 This extraordinary impunity of corporations was the focus of Judge Laval’s dissent in Kiobel: ‘The 
majority’s interpretation of international law … accords to corporations a free pass to act in contravention 
of international law’s norms (and) conflicts with the humanitarian objectives of that body of law.’ 
93 See Judge Laval’s strong methodological point in Kiobel, and similar arguments used by the majorities in 
Exxon and Flomo. The methodological point is articulated either as a distinction between procedure (civil 
or criminal remedies) and substance (the human rights standard) or as one between conduct-regulation 
(human rights standards) and modes of implementation (civil or criminal remedies).  
94 In terms of Continental conflicts technique, this would no doubt be a case of incidental application or 
‘prise en considération’ of legal norms which, for one reason or another, could not otherwise be given 
direct effect (see Bureau and Muir Watt (n 65) 436). See too below, section III-B- b (ii). 
95According to European Continental private law orthodoxy, competition law is not ‘law’, to the extent that 
it is but a (mere) form of economic engineering rather than the product of natural reason: see, for an 
emblematic example of such a position, B Oppetit, ‘Droit et économie’, Archives de philosophie du droit 
(Sirey, 1992) 19–28. 
96 On the attempts of labour law to define a corporate group as employer, see M Moreau, Normes sociales, 
droit du travail et mondialisation (Dalloz collection, 2006). 
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categories of jurisdiction and tort law. However, and even then, victims may be 
disempowered through forum non conveniens or territorialist principles of choice of 
law.97 On the other hand, the lack of an adequate legal status for the corporate group 
does not prevent multinational firms from taking advantage of the economic freedoms 
guaranteed to capital and services in cross-border markets. Thus, these firms would try 
to choose the corporate charter, ie the jurisdiction with the least shareholder regulation 
or the least costly stakeholder protection.98 The plight of the many victims of industrial 
disasters in cases such as Bhopal99 and Lubbe100, along with the many other helpless 
claimants under the Alien Tort Statute—whom the European Union has as yet done 
nothing to help101—bear ample witness to the governance void. 
 
b. Private Power Trumps Public Sovereignty 
 
Another instance of the public/private divide—supposedly designed to subordinate 
individual interests to the common weal—that has been turned on its head in the 
transnational context can be found in the area of foreign investment.102 Here, the local 
resources or industries in developing countries, acquired or controlled by multinational 
                                                 
97 For a more detailed account of the ways in which jurisdictional and choice of law principles have 
consolidated a race to the bottom among host countries competing for private investment through lower 
(and cheaper) social, environmental and tort protection, see Muir Watt, ‘Aspects économiques’ (n 57) 228 
ff.  
98 For a recent study on the impact of economic freedoms in the EU at the level of social protection for the 
workers of mobile corporate employers, see S Migliorini, L’interaction entre la mobilité des sociétés et les 
règles européennes de conflit de juridictions: l’exemple des relations internationales de travail, PhD thesis, 
IUE Florence, 2011. 
99 Re Union Carbide, 809 F 2d 195 (2d Cir 1987), cert denied 108 S Ct 199 (1987). 
100UK House Of Lords, Lubbe v Cape plc [2000] UKHL 41 (20 July 2000).  
101 See however the Falbr Report of 20 April 2011 on The External Dimension of Social Policy, Promoting 
Labour and Social Standards and European Corporate Social Responsibility (2010/2205(INI)), in favour 
(inter alia) of a European forum for extraterritorial human rights violations by corporations 
headquartered within the EU.  
102 See J Alvarez, ‘Contemporary Foreign Investment Law: An Empire of Law or Law’s Empire?’ (2008) 60 
Alabama Law Review 943; M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge 
University Press, 3rd edn 2010), emphasising the contemporary reversal under which Western states, 
previously exporters of capital and now the largest recipients of foreign investment, are becoming wary of 
the legal arguments and tools developed within 20th century investment law (see p 25, citing examples of 
contestation, in the context of arbitration or multilateral dispute resolution, by Canada and the United 
States, of facets of foreign investment regimes which they had initially crafted, particularly those which 
hamper the regulatory power of the host state). 
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corporate actors, range from oil and gas to biofuels and agriculture.103 Liberal 
international trade and investment regimes, combined with local private and public law 
governing oil concessions, title to land, or indeed contract and tort, come together to 
create a watertight corridor in which production and exportation can take place with 
little interference from either local regulatory barriers or international standards. These 
happen to be the areas that give rise most frequently to allegations of various human 
rights violations, environmental damage, land-grabbing or economic migrations.  
During the first wave of concession agreements relating to natural resources by third 
world countries after decolonisation, the host state tried to regulate or reclaim natural 
resources in the name of the local public good.104 However, such attempts were 
neutralised105 by various contractual devices such as ‘stabilisation clauses’.106 In other 
words, legislation by the local sovereign designed to promote local public policy was apt 
to be qualified as a breach of the investment agreement contracted with the private 
investor.107 Moreover, international commercial arbitration was designed to avoid state 
courts, which are viewed as inappropriate, as it is unacceptable to the investor if they 
are the host state’s, and unacceptable to the host state if they are not. Therefore, 
international commercial arbitration has worked ingeniously to fill the theoretical void 
between public international laws—inapplicable when one of the parties is not a 
subject—and domestic laws, inappropriate for the very same reasons that disqualify 
state courts. Thus, by a judicious choice of law and with more than a little help from the 
wondrous doctrine of the Grundlegung,108 investors in foreign lands could hoist 
                                                 
103 On the various sectors most affected by foreign investment by multinational corporations in 
developing countries (natural resources, plantations, manufacturing, finance, intellectual property), see 
Sornarajah (n 102) 38 ff. For a precise overview of the areas of greatest impact in the agrifood sector, see 
K Cordes, ‘The Impact of Agribusiness Transnational Corporations on the Right to Food’ in O De Schutter 
and K Cordes, Accounting for Hunger (Hart Publishing, 2011) 27.  
104 Of course, some of these attempts to regain supremacy over natural resources may be the doing of 
corrupt local elites pursuing personal profit. However, it is as wrong to disqualify all local claims on this 
basis as it would be to similarly stigmatise all corporate investors.  
105P Mayer, ‘La neutralisation du pouvoir normatif de l’État en matière de contrats d’État’ (1986) 1(5) 
Journal du droit international 12. 
106 And more generally by the principles of liberal (private) contract law. See Sornarajah (n 102) 279 ff: 
‘Contractual devices for foreign investment protection’.  
107 Of course, the essence of such agreements is to provide legal security to the foreign investor; this 
function was progressively reinforced by the addition of bilateral investment treaties. Now, however, that 
the spectacular rise of foreign investment in developed states has led to a questioning of the very 
protection they engineered (Sornarajah (n 25)).  
108 The doctrine of the Grundlegung (‘ordre juridique de base’) was developed to justify the 
internationalisation of state contracts, that is, their ‘natural’ elevation to the status of contracts governed 
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themselves by virtue of the doctrine of ‘internationalised state contracts’ into the 
hospitable atmosphere of international law.109 After all, pacta sunt servanda. 
Subsequently, the ICSID Convention110 and its network of bilateral investment treaties 
(BIT) endorsed this upward mobility, so that private investment is protected from 
pressure for change of all kinds by the host state—expropriations, nationalisations, 
adjustments in local public policy. While contract claims and treaty claims are 
theoretically distinct,111 the use of ‘umbrella clauses’112 works to bring the contract 
claim within the ambit of international law. This technique thus ensures the right of the 
private investor to appeal directly to the higher values of international legal security 
when the host state attempts to assert its sovereignty over its natural resources. In 
short, the BIT arbitrator will be called upon to ensure the enforcement of private 
contractual rights under public international law.113 Such an arbitral award may well be 
                                                                                                                                                        
by international law, despite the presence of a private party, and not subject to international law. See P 
Weil, ‘Droit international et contrats d’etat’ Mélanges Reuter (Pédone, 1981). However, the consequences 
of such internationalisation are surprising: once the Grundlegung is identified, it is then supposed to make 
a (secondary) reference to the set of legal rules governing the contract. Denouncing the Grundlegung as 
myth, see P Mayer, ‘Le mythe de l’ordre juridique de base ou Grundlegung’ in Etudes offertes à Berthold 
Goldman (Litec, 1983) 217.  
109 On this device, see Sornarajah (n 102) 289 ff. 
110 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), created on the initiative of the 
World Bank, is, according to its own description, ‘an autonomous international institution established 
under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, with over one hundred and forty member States … The primary purpose of ICSID is to provide 
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international investment disputes.’ Its Administrative Council 
is chaired by the President of the World Bank. It has fostered the proliferation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs), which contain advance consents by governments to submit investment disputes to ICSID 
arbitration. Practically, this means that a host state that has signed a BIT with the state of origin of the 
private investor makes a permanent offer of arbitration, which the investor may take up in case of an 
investment dispute. While this is, in essence, similar to the 1958 New York Convention on the recognition 
and enforcement of (commercial) arbitration awards, it contains a more effective device to ensure 
enforceability. While the New York Convention requires recognition and enforcement by courts of the 
enforcing forum, an ICSID award is directly enforceable in the courts of Contracting states, as if it were a 
final judgment of a court in that state.  
111 I Alvik, Contracting with Sovereignty, State Contracts and International Arbitration (Oxford University 
Press, 2011) 177. 
112 On ‘umbrella’ clauses (and the variations on this theme clause) see Alvik, ibid; S Lemaire, ‘La 
mystérieuse “umbrella clause” (interrogations sur l’impact de la clause de respect des engagements sur 
l’arbitrage en matière d’investissements)’ (2009) Revue de l’Arbitrage 479. The hoisting device is simple: 
the host state is bound by the bilateral treaty (governed by international law) to protect the (private) 
rights of the (private) investors from the other state party. If the private contract is breached, then the 
treaty is also violated.  
113The Chevron saga makes for an excellent illustration. An arbitrator acting under the aegis of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague ordered provisional measures to prevent the enforcement of 
the judgment of Ecuador, the sovereign party, to the extent that its award of damages to indigenous 
peoples dwelling at the site of the oil and gas extraction interfered with the protection of a private 
property right guaranteed under the bilateral agreement. See Permanent Court of Arbitration at the 
Hague, Interim Award of 9 February 2011. On 25 January 2012, the same tribunal asserted its jurisdiction 
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formally justifiable under the terms of the treaty. Yet, this observation is not enough to 
dispel the impression that the power of the corporate actor to lever the application of 
international law to its own advantage is curiously out of step with the lack of 
correlative duties incumbent upon it under international law. One might wonder what 
has happened to the ‘parallelism of forms’, the requirement of legal symmetry that 
liberal doctrine usually requires. 
 
 C. Sovereignty Subject to Private Law 
 
Indeed, to a large extent, the firewall separating the world of sovereign states from that 
of ‘ordinary private actors’ appears to work one-way only. The public/private divide 
does not prevent the commodification of sovereignty when the market so requires it. An 
illustration114 taken from the field of sovereign debt shows how the same corporate 
actors (or their avatars, such as vulture funds115) that are immune from accountability 
by reason of their private status, are able to gain leverage through the rules of domestic 
private law against sovereign states, these state being considered as acting ‘not as a 
regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within that market’116 and 
thus despite their sovereign status. Of course, the loss of sovereign protection is 
apparently irrefutable as it proceeds from the very core of the ‘relative’ sovereign 
                                                                                                                                                        
to decide on the company’s liability under an investment treaty. Then a global anti-suit injunction was 
ordered in favour of Chevron, only to be lifted a year later (see District Court, Southern District of New 
York, Orders of 6 February and 7 April 2011; Federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judgment of 
17 March 2011). On 26 January 2012, Judge Gerard Lynch of the US Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit said that such an injunction could only be sought ‘defensively, in response to an attempted 
enforcement’. In the present case, the Ecuadorean plaintiffs ‘made no effort to enforce their judgment in 
New York (nor indeed, in any other jurisdiction)’. The Ecuadorian judgment was handed down by the 
Court of Sucumbíos, Lago Agrio, Ecuador, on 14 February 2011. On the whole saga, see H Muir Watt, 
(2011) Rev crit DIP 339. The arbitration under the BIT here was a United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration, but the legal devices used are those described in the 
text.  
114 There are many other well-documented examples of the use of private law as a leveller of sovereign 
interests, for instance in the case of development projects (see below section II-B-c and FN 214,367).  
115 The examples that follow tend also to involve corporations engaged in oil and gas operations in 
developing countries. As J Lippert recounts in ‘Vulture Funds: The Reason Why Congolese Debt May Force 
a Revision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’ (2008) 21 New York International Law Review 1, at 
the outset, multinational corporate actors induce and recycle sovereign loans, backed by local (oil and gas) 
production. The proceeds of local production are then lent back through corporate screen lenders to the 
developing country at artificially high interest rates, ultimately generating more loans and worsening 
debt, and increasing the likelihood of sovereign default. The vulture funds then step in to buy up 
distressed sovereign debt and then deploy the strategies described below. 
116 Republic of Argentina v Weltover, Inc, 504 US 607 (1992). 
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immunity doctrine.117 When states take advantage of the market iure gestionis, there is 
no reason why they should not be subject to the rules of the game applicable to private 
players. However, the analogy is seen to implicate ‘logically’ a further step. Thus, under 
section 1603(d) of the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, whether or not a state 
actor should benefit from sovereign immunity depends upon the ‘nature’ of the act or 
conduct: if it is one that a private actor could have done, then it is not immune. The 
criterion of the ‘nature’ of the act—carefully distinguished from ‘purpose’—is largely 
synonymous with the use of private law technique. Therefore, the issuing of sovereign 
bonds with a view to rescheduling sovereign debt is—whatever its purpose, or its 
importance for the local economy—a private act for which sovereign immunity is 
unavailable.118 
But, then, if sovereigns acting as private parties must be subject to private law, a similar 
legal ‘logic’ would seem to require that, conversely, when corporations exercise a rule-
making authority analogous to private sovereignty, they should be subject by the same 
token to the discipline imposed by international law upon sovereign states. Apparently, 
however, the analogy does not work in that direction. One notable consequence is that 
‘vulture funds’119 are able to syphon off development aid allocated to highly 
                                                 
117 The emergence of the ‘relative’ immunity doctrine, first embodied in the US Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act 1976, sparked analogous restrictions of sovereign immunity throughout the western world. 
See, for example, the UK State Immunity Act 1978. The account below is representative of the position of 
these legal systems, although the particularly formalistic reading of the ‘nature’ (exclusive of ‘purpose’) of 
a given private act may explain why vulture funds have honed in on the US more than, say, a jurisdiction 
like France, where the case law may not have closed the doors entirely to purpose (see Cass Civ 1re, 25 
February 1969, Société Levant Express JDI 1969, 923, P Kahn, Rev crit DIP 1970.98, note P Bourel) 
118 Thus, in Republic of Argentina v Weltover, Inc, ‘the sovereign bonds were, in almost all respects, garden-
variety debt instruments, and even when they are considered in full context, there is nothing about their 
issuance that is not analogous to a private commercial transaction. The fact that they were created to help 
stabilize Argentina’s currency is not a valid basis for distinguishing them from ordinary debt 
instruments, since, under 1603(d), it is irrelevant why Argentina participated in the bond market in the 
manner of a private actor. It matters only that it did so.’ (Opinion of the court per Justice Scalia, 504 US 
607 (1992), 4–9).  
119 These funds have been described as ‘egregious predatory funds targeting the world’s poorest nations’ 
(J Goren, ‘State-to-State Debts: Sovereign Immunity and the “Vulture” Hunt’ (2010) 41 George Washington 
International Law Review 681, 689). Typically, ‘vulture funds’—a particular variety of hedge fund usually 
incorporated in tax havens for the purpose of one particular purchase—purchase ‘sovereign distressed 
debts’ of a highly impoverished country for a reduced price; these are bonds corresponding to loans on 
which the borrowing sovereign has defaulted, which can be bought at far less than their face value on the 
secondary market. The vulture funds then invest in extensive litigation in national courts—generating 
precedent on the way, in support of restrictions of sovereign immunity—for the full value of the claims 
(that is, the full nominal amount with the unpaid interest). On this strategy see J Blackman and R Mukhi, 
‘The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna’ (2010) 
73 (Fall) Law and Contemporary Problems 47, 49. 
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impoverished countries,120 having bought up distressed sovereign debt under the 
private law regime governing the secondary market. They may do so by suing the 
sovereign borrower directly, and then shopping for the most hospitable forum for 
enforcement. At this stage, they will typically play a non-cooperative hold-out game 
during restructuring negotiations for distressed debt. Alternatively, they may garnish 
royalties due to the host country by foreign corporations conducting oil and gas 
operations within its territory.121 Such a result may well seem singularly immoral, unfair 
and certainly contrary to the purpose of international aid to impoverished countries. 
However, in the words of the English High Court, when deciding upon the claim for more 
than $55 million by a British Virgin Islands-based hedge fund against Zambia, such 
disputes must be approached as ‘legal questions’ and not as ‘questions of morality or 
humanity’.122 
Indeed, hold-out litigation by predatory hedge-funds paralyses debt rescheduling 
agreements, and generates additional bounties provided by private contract law. 
Sufficient investment in adversarial litigation (and thereby in the creation of favourable 
precedent)123 can ensure that contractual clauses in international loan agreements are 
                                                 
120 For a clear account of the problems raised by vulture funds, with numerous references, see Human 
Rights Council, 14th Session, Report of the Independent Expert Cephas Lumina on the effects of foreign debt 
and other related international financial obligations of states on the full enjoyment of all human rights, 
particularly economic, social and cultural rights, 29 April 2010 (A/HRC/14/21). Courts of the common law 
tradition have traditionally made hospitable fora, but courts belonging to the civilian tradition are also 
joining the game (Brussels and Frankfurt have proved equally open to vulture claims: see, for instance, 
Elliott v Peru, n 124 below).  
121This strategy also requires bypassing potential obstacles under the FSIA linked to the destination (that 
is, the intended uses) of the royalties. An illustration can be found in the notorious Af-Cap cases, in which a 
vulture fund purchased a loan to the Congo at a ‘bargain basement’ price and then obtained garnishment 
of the royalties and taxes owed to the Congo by a group of Texan oil companies. See Af-Cap, 462 F 3d at 
421; cf FG Hemisphere, 455 F 3d at 580. 
122 Donegal v Zambia [2007)] EWHC 197 (Comm). 
123 Vulture tactics have generated a wealth of precedents eroding sovereign immunity throughout the 
Western world in connection with sovereign debt restructuring. A recent trend seems to be more 
restrictive, however, and may accelerate vulture flight towards investment arbitration described below.  
See the various immunity cases litigated by NML Capital against Argentina (in the US: NML Capital v Banco 
Central (2d Cir 2011)), in which the Second Circuit held that the assets of the Argentine Central Bank on 
deposit with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York were immune from attachment under 28 USC § 
1611(b), but then in NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentina (2d Cir 2012), 10-4450-cv (L), it was judged 
that the bank account of a scientific research institution and instrumentality of Argentina, the Agencia 
Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnólogica, was not immune from attachment under the FSIA. 
‘Argentina’s asserted eleemosynary or governmental motives do not change the fact that the ANPCT 
Account is used to purchase scientific equipment.’ The very fact that the funds are for market use, 
whatever the purpose, is enough to set aside sovereign immunity. In France, see Cour de Cassation 1re Ch 
Civ, 28 September 2011 n° 09-72057, maintaining immunity from enforcement against Embassy 
assets. However, the UK has been decidely more welcoming to the vulture; see NML Capital Ltd v Republic 
of Argentina (UKSC 2011 31). Does any of this indicate that adversarial litigation consolidates efficient 
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made to say what they do not necessarily mean.124 Other tools of private law—including 
such niceties as the situs of the debt in private international law—can be seen to serve 
the interests of predatory funds.125 Currently, although the case-law hardly encourages 
any optimism,126 change may be in view either as a result of alliances of wider public 
and private interests in order to fend off more intrusive legislation (in the form of 
contractual practices such as collective action clauses),127 or as a result of militant action 
by NGOs (which has led, exceptionally, to protective legislation for highly impoverished 
sovereign debtors, such as the UK Debt Relief Act 2010128). However, this has not 
prevented a renewed air raid by vulture funds sweeping down in the early months of 
2012 on Greek sovereign debt.129 Moreover, were the courts to become less hospitable, 
                                                                                                                                                        
rules (within the meaning given by R Cooter and L Kornhauser, ‘Can Litigation Improve the Law Without 
the Help of Judges?’ (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 139)? 
124 The vulture Elliott acquired debt issuing from a 1983 loan on which Peru had defaulted, and then 
refused to participate in an exchange or rescheduling agreement involving other creditors. It obtained a 
more than substantial award against Peru in the United States from the Court of Appeals of the Second 
Circuit (Elliott Associates, LP v Banco de la Nacion and The Republic of Peru, 194 F 3d (2d Cir 1999)), which 
refused to entertain the champerty defence raised by the sovereign. It then applied successfully to the 
Court of Appeals of Brussels (at the location of Euroclear) in order to block payments by Peru to the other 
(participating) creditors on the basis of the pari passu clause (Elliott Associates LP, General Docket No 
2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeals of Brussels, 8th Chambers, 26 September 2000). It obtained an ex parte 
order on the grounds that the pari passu clause—which was made to work rather like a most favoured 
creditor clause—gave the vulture funds, as holders of the rescheduled debt, the right to participate pro 
rata in Peru’s payments to other foreign creditors. Since then, vulture investors have repeatedly used this 
strategy. It is not clear, however, that pari passu really does anything more than ensure that the creditor’s 
loan will not be subordinated to the claims of other creditors in the event of the borrower’s bankruptcy; it 
does not mean that the solvent borrower must make pro rata payments to all its creditors.  
125 See, in the Royal Court of Jersey, FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v Democratic Republic of Congo [2010] 
JRC 195, where an order of $100 million payable to a vulture fund depended upon the situs of a debt in 
private international law. 
126 See, for example, an attempt in the UK by the Court of Appeal to maintain Argentina’s sovereign 
immunity against the Vulture NML: NML Capital Ltd v The Republic of Argentina [2009] EWHC 110 
(Comm), but then, allowing the appeal, UK Supreme Court, NML Capital Limited v Republic of Argentina 
[2011] UKSC 31. 
127For an account of unlikely (or unholy?) alliances in respect of the treatment of sovereign debt, see M 
Helleiner, ‘Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring’ in Mattli and Woods, The Politics of Global Regulation (n 42) 89. Collective action clauses in 
loan contracts seem to have come into favour with both sovereign debtors and private creditors in order 
to forestall any more peremptory form of collective discipline.  
128 The UK Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010 put a ceiling on the amounts recoverable against 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries before UK courts. It contained a sunset clause under which the Act was to 
expire after one year (on 7 June 2011); new legislation was passed in order to prolong its effects, on 16 
May 2011. Consequently, the Vultures seem to have moved to other more hospitable fora, such as 
Jersey (see FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v Democratic Republic of Congo [2010] JRC 195). However, Jersey 
is now considering action; see the Jersey Consultation Green Paper (R.114/2011). 
129P Aldrick, ‘Vulture Funds to Profit from a Second Greek Bailout’ The Telegraph, 25 June 2011. These are 
funds such as Loomis, Sayles and Blackrock, which have already bought up hundreds of millions of euros 
of Greek sovereign debt. The latter appears to be governed very largely by Greek law, a fact that has 
potentially significant economic implications. Thus, while Greek sovereign debt appears to have been 
rated indistinctly, markets factor in the ‘hold-out premium’ linked to the choice of English or New York 
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international investment arbitration now appears ready to open its doors to holders of 
sovereign bonds. This new Pandora’s box130 is largely the consequence of the abdication 
of private international law, illustrative of its progressive but thorough domestication. 
 
II. CLOSET: The Domestication of Private International Law 
 
These inconsistencies show how the schism between the public and private bodies of 
international law has allowed private economic power to acquire an informal sovereign 
status, without the duties attached to statehood. However, not only has private 
international law become impotent to rise to the challenge of private power, it has also 
been largely complicit in developing the very tools by which states are ‘losing control’131 
and private actors engineering their own ‘regulatory lift-off’.132 In other words, as a 
direct consequence of the separation between the micro-world of legal technique and 
the macro-world of politics, the domestication of private international law led it to 
develop its own closeted epistemology—a form of tunnel-vision which actively 
contributed to consolidating the legal foundations of informal empire. Unable or 
unwilling to assume its governance implications in the global economy, it began to suffer 
from denial when confronted with the expansion of informal power. This denial could 
amount to a form of self-censorship linked to the dominant role that liberal theory 
confers on public international law in taming international politics. Indeed, it was proud 
to assert the axiologial neutrality of its process-based focus.133 This neutrality led 
                                                                                                                                                        
law, seen to provide greater protection to creditors not only against any unilateral changes in the law by 
the sovereign debtor, but also more specifically against restructuring initiatives (see S Choi, M Gulati and E 
Posner, ‘Sovereign Debt Contracts: A Greek Case Study with Implications for the European Crisis 
Resolution Mechanism’ Chicago Working Paper Series Index, February 2011, 
www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html (accessed 2 May 2012).  
130 M Waibel, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration’ (2007) 101 American 
Journal of International Law 711. The box has now been open since August 2011. A widely awaited and 
debated ICSID arbitration award, applying the Argentine-Italian BIT, has accepted that the acquisition of 
sovereign debt on the secondary market is indeed an ‘investment’ within the meaning of Article 25 ICSID. 
A sophisticated dissent argues, like Michael Waibel, that investment within the meaning of the treaty 
requires a real (and perhaps even territorial) link with the economy of the host country. See Abaclat et al v 
The Argentine Republic (August 2011), and the dissent filed in October 2011 by arbitrator Georges Abi-
Saab.  
131 Sassen (n 17). 
132 R Wai, ‘Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private 
International Law in an Era of Globalization’ (2002) 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 209.  
133 This neutrality was a characteristic of its ‘signpost’ rules, which directed the court towards the 
governing legal system on the basis of a (usually territorial) connecting factor, such as the place of the tort. 
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private international law—largely in the image of civilian private law doctrine—to 
protect itself from any suggestion of contamination by international politics, or—more 
surprisingly still—from policy considerations, believed to belong to the realm of public 
law.134 Relegated to the ‘domestic’ sphere,135 where in the shadow of the ‘Comity of 
princes’136 or the ‘clash of titans’,137 private international law, with its modest—
decorous,138 decorative139 and homely140—scheme of governance of crossborder private 
transactions, was then equated with the merely national and the meekly apolitical. Its 
horizons were—and still remain to a large extent—strictly and variously delineated by 
various doctrines such as territoriality, the ‘public law taboo’, the doctrine of political 
questions, sovereign immunity. This doctrinal frame ensured that the domestic arts of 
private law—responsibility, compensation, reliance and equality, all exclusive of bias 
and privilege—never interfered with issues of international policy or encroached on the 
field of informal power beyond the state. Here again, understanding how the closet came 
to be constructed (A) helps to reveal the implications of its epistemological tunnel-vision 
(B). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
A comparative and historical account of this methodology, familiar to students of conflict of laws, can be 
found in Bureau and Muir Watt (n 65) 329 ff.  
134 This denial of policy in private law is illustrated by Gerhard Kegel’s vehement rejection of American 
functional, policy-driven methods in the 1960s in ‘The Crisis of the Conflict of Laws’ (1964) 112 (II) 
Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye 95. 
135 The vocabulary is of course, significant: ‘domestic’ is the term used by public international lawyers to 
designate national, as opposed to international, law. It suggests that this body of the law deals with private 
matters (such as family law, under a civilian categorisation) that are considered to be unimportant in the 
political economy.  
136 See Paul (n 64). 
137 The image of the ‘clash of the Titans’ is often used to characterise transatlantic regulatory or public 
economic law conflicts. See, for instance, M Sterio, ‘Clash of the Titans: Collisions of Economic Regulations 
and the Need to Harmonize Prescriptive Jurisdiction Rules’ (2006–7) 13 University of California, Davis 
Journal of International Law 95. 
138 The ethos of private international law, expressed through a special concept of ‘conflicts justice’, is 
traditionally considered to be harmony, coordination and order (see eg Mills (n 26) 16 ff).  
139 Choice of law rules were merely decorative, in the sense that it was (and still is, to a large extent) left to 
the parties’ discretion whether to raise the conflict of laws before the court. Courts were usually 
precluded from bringing up the existence of a conflict of laws of their own motion, even in civilian 
inquisitorial legal systems where more initiative might have been expected. In France, for instance, the 
debate goes on today as to the procedural status of choice of law rules: see Bureau and Muir Watt (n 65) 
360 ff.  
140 Classical private international law in the civilian tradition evolved in the field of family disputes and 
personal status (personhood), where the legal tradition, largely inspired by canon law, appeared apolitical 
or ‘natural’. For example, in France, the first private international law decision handed down after the Civil 
Code of 1804 was an interesting case regarding the validity of the marriage of a de-frocked Spanish monk: 
see Cour royale de Paris, 1re et 2e ch réunies, 13 juin 1814, Busqueta, Sirey 1814.2.393, reported in B 
Ancel and Y Lequette, Grands arrêts de la jurisprudence de droit international privé (Dalloz, 5th edn 2006) 
1. 
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A. The Construction of the Closet 
 
For a time, although private international law had taken up its place in the shadow of 
public international law, the two spheres nevertheless remained connected.141 At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the ‘gentle civilizer’ that was modern public 
international law142 translated, in private international law, into the universalist ideal 
which led to the creation of the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the 
drafting of numerous conventions unifying the rules of conflict of laws.143 A worldwide 
network of ‘signpost’ rules,144 designed to transcend the dissonant idiom of substantive 
laws, was made available to courts dealing with private law disputes involving 
international succession or matrimonial property, crossborder contracts or multistate 
torts. ‘International harmony’—meaning recourse to similar conflict of law rules 
whatever the forum seized of the dispute—was proclaimed to be the ethos of private 
international law, fin de siècle. After all, since only private interests (no policies, no 
politics) were supposedly involved in such conflicts, the peaceful development of world 
society turned largely upon the appropriate design for private dispute resolution. 
Sharing similar ideals, and as such resolutely oriented towards the search for 
commonalities among legal systems,145 comparative law would lend its resources to 
                                                 
141 The great international lawyers of the first half of the 19th century were no respecters of the 
public/private divide. A significant example is Roberto Ago, who served as a judge in the International 
Court of Justice from 1979 until 1995, and who was professor (in Rome, at the end of his career) of both 
private and public international law. He lectured at the Hague Academy in 1936, 1939, 1956, 1971 and 
1983, on the most controversial topics of both fields.  
142 See M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
143 As explained on the Hague Conference’s website, since 1893 it has constituted ‘a melting pot of 
different legal traditions’, developing and servicing conventions which correspond to ‘global needs’ in the 
areas of protection of children, family and property; international legal cooperation and litigation; 
international commercial and financial law.  
144A “signpost” rule is a so-called multilateralist choice of law rule that uses an ostensibly objective 
(usually territorial or personal) circumstance (or connecting factor) to connect facts belonging within a 
given legal category to the governing law. For instance, issues identified as ‘tort’ are governed by the lex 
loci delicti, or the place where the harm occurred. See above, n 133. Such rules were rejected by the US 
functionalist ‘revolution’ of the 1960s, but have survived in the European tradition, in a more flexible 
version, often framed in terms of the ‘closest connection’ (on this evolution see S Symeonides, ‘Choice of 
Law in American Courts: Today and Tomorrow’ (2003) 298 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit 
International de La Haye 13; S Symeonides, ‘The American Revolution and the European Evolution in 
Choice of Law: Reciprocal Lessons’ (2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1741–99). On the view of such rules as 
forming a peer network of international thrust, see Mills (n 26) 107.  
145 The private international law unification movement went hand in hand with the enthusiastic use of 
comparative law as a means to overcome local differences. On this bias in comparative studies towards 
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ensure uniform judicial interpretation of private law categories and concepts.146 And 
when, accidentally, a source of international disagreement arose, benevolent liberal 
courts would act with regard for international Comity,147 counting on the delightful 
intricacies of renvoi and incidental questions to help smooth the path towards 
harmony.148 However, by the time it was discovered that legal cultures were neither 
convergent149 nor indeed converging,150 the universalist ideal had been swept away in 
the wake of the nationalisms prior to the Great War. But subsequent disillusionment 
with the discourse and mechanics of harmony and universalism did not lead, as it might 
have done, to the reconnection between the micro-legal perspective adopted by private 
international law and its wider environment of international politics, economics and 
social conflict, which was progressively to introduce profound contestation into the 
public international legal field. 
Indeed, gradually disconnected from the substance of public international law while 
espousing the limits it prescribed, private international law closed in on itself. Inhibited 
from interfering with interstate clashes of power, it continued to focus on private and 
domestic issues, developing for that purpose a specific methodology which consolidated 
its axiological neutrality and widened the breach between itself and international 
                                                                                                                                                        
discovering commonalities, see P Legrand, ‘The Same and the Different’ in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), 
Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
146 E Rabel (whose comparative treatise was published in four volumes at Tubingen between 1965 and 
1971; cf, in English, his ‘Private Laws of Western Civilization’ (1949) X Louisiana Law Review 1) was the 
greatest adept of the use of comparative law to create transcendent categories for a common private 
international law: The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study (U Drobnig, 2nd edn 1958) 558. For an 
instructive account of Rabel’s comparative methodology, see D Gerber, ‘Sculpting the Agenda of 
Comparative Law: Ernst Rabel and the Façade of Language’ in A Riles (ed), Rethinking the Masters of 
Comparative Law (Hart Publishing, 2001).  
147 The traditional use of ‘comity’ reminds us that courts have always been aware of the presence of the 
political factor in international conflicts: see Paul (n 64). This may seem less true of the civilian tradition, 
where the public/private divide has always had a stronger hold. However, the omnipresence of public 
policy or ordre public, used similarly as a bridge and a wall (as Joel Paul describes), belies the official 
apoliticism.  
148 On these devices (and their inherent methodological contradictions) see Bureau and Muir Watt, Droit 
international privé (n 65) 359 ff. On the coexistence of this ‘smooth’ narrative of transnational law and a 
hidden, ‘rough’ version, see R Wai, ‘Private v Private: Models of Private Governance in Private 
International Law’, PILAGG paper (November 2011), http://blogs.sciences-po.fr/pilagg.  
149 This discovery heralds ‘conflicts of characterisation’, simultaneously theorised in Germany in 1891 by 
F Kahn (891 Jherings Jahrbücher 1), and in France in 1897 by E Bartin ((1897) Journal de droit 
international 225); these stem from different categorisations of legal institutions as between different 
legal systems, and specifically as between the law of the forum and the foreign law designated by the 
forum’s choice of law rules on the basis of its own categories. This leads to a dilemma in legal logic: how 
can the law designated as the ‘law of the tort’ be applied against its own will, if it does not provide a 
solution in tort law to the dispute but frames the question in terms, say, of contract?  
150 Legrand’s contemporary analysis of non-convergence applies equally well to this period: ‘European 
Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 45, 52–81.  
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politics. Yet to a large extent, both fields evolved under the sway of the same liberal and 
positivist precepts, covered economic imbalance with sovereign equality and served 
parallel imperial projects. Both claimed the neutral axiology of legal discourse. 
Moreover, indeterminacy works out similarly in legal argument on both sides of the 
divide, so that, like its public counterpart, modern private international law has always 
oscillated between apology and utopia.151 Thus, modern public international law, while 
dealing with the relationships between European powers, refused to inject substantive 
values into the rule of law, unless dealing with outsiders beyond the pale of 
civilisation.152 Shadowing these limits, private international law was equally indifferent 
to substantive outcomes, except when the foundations of civilisation were threatened; 
such neutrality was justified by the reality, then the fiction, of a commonality of private 
laws.153 It has been asked whether the indeterminacy of public international law has 
opened it to various uses—both good and bad—or whether there is an inherent bias in 
its indeterminate technology.154 There are certainly grounds for similar questioning in 
private international law. The sanctuarisation of the public sphere and the correlative 
domestication of the private has led ultimately to the autonomy of the latter and to a 
reversal of the dominance of private interests over the public. 
Politics, then, were squeezed out of liberal private international law,155 at the same time 
as its links were severed with public international law and the heritage of the ius 
gentium.156 Beyond its supposed indifference to substantive outcomes, proclaimed 
                                                 
151 This characterisation of the indeterminacy of public international law is M Koskenniemi’s; see Between 
Apology and Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Helsinki, 1989). The often-used image 
of the swing of the pendulum in private international law describes its constant oscillation between an 
ideal world-design (multilateralism) and attention to concrete or effective reality (pluralism). For a 
historiographical account, see Bureau and Muir Watt (n 65) 332. 
152 International law required equality only as between the European states: see Koskenniemi (n 1) 59; on 
the European-centred history of international law, cf A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005). On the analogous reference to civilisation as a 
measure of the threshold of tolerance of public policy in private international law, see, notably, D Boden, 
L’ordre public: limite et condition de la tolérance. Recherches sur le pluralisme juridique, Paris I, 2002, notes 
54, 1105, 1112 and 1119. 
153 Von Savigny’s ‘invention’ of multilateral conflict rules was accompanied by an explicit caveat that this 
methodology was workable only within the Romano-Christian cultural community composed of the 
various German princedoms.  
154 See U Mattei and L Rossi, ‘The Evil Technology Hypothesis: A Deep Ecological Reading of International 
Law’ (2011) Cardozo Law Review de Novo, http://works.bepress.com/ugo_mattei/42. 
155 It could be said that private international law became resolutely ‘micro-legal’ as opposed to ‘macro-
legal’, according to a terminology suggested by B Frydmann, ‘Le droit global’ (9 February 2012) PILAGG 
paper (forthcoming).  
156 The parallelism with the evolution of the public international sphere on the other side of the schism is 
significant but of course unsurprising. Thus, Koskenniemi (n 1) 37 describes how, in the 19th century, 
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apoliticism of private international law, like that of public international law, served—
and still serves, in the European tradition157—to hide the profoundly political nature of 
social conflicts—even when they do not, by definition, involve institutionalised public 
actors, or implicate the arbitration of collective interests.158 Deprived of any systemic 
vision, private international law settled down to a homely life, viewing the field of 
informal international economy through the micro-legal lens of private domestic law—a 
lens which, in Europe, was progressively shaped by the legacy of the great Codes, and 
which in the United States had not yet been shattered by the onslaught of legal realism. 
It was only during the second half of the twentieth century that the conflict of laws in the 
United States shed its European heritage and turned over (or back?) to functionalism.159 
And it was half a decade later still that the regulatory nature of the new European Union 
‘private’ law began to lead to a reconsideration of the place of politics and economics in 
private international law.160 However, in both cases—either in the United States or in 
the European Union—the turn from the dogmatic to the functional, from the private to 
the regulatory, led rather to the instrumentalisation of the field in the wake of domestic 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘[t]he fight for an international rule of law is a fight against politics … [Thus] as contemporaries saw 
Europe as a “system” of independent and equal political communities (instead of a republica Christiana), 
they began to assume that the governing principles needed to become neutral and objective—that is, that 
they should be understood as law.’  
157 For a denial see P Mayer (n 18) especially 163 ff. 
158 Indeed, the implication of the public/private divide, justifying private law’s claim to political neutrality, 
is that private law articulates social conflict as individual litigation, and then brings to bear a supposedly 
unchanging—immemorial or ahistorical—set of rules based on reason (in the Enlightment tradition of the 
great Codes) or common sense (in the common law tradition). It would, however, be inaccurate to infer 
that proportionality or balancing, usually framed as the exact opposite of private law (meaning deductivist 
or syllogistic) reasoning, does not equally shy away from political or distributional issues (see D Kennedy, 
‘A Transnational Genealogy of Proportionality in Private Law’ in R Brownsword, H Micklitz and L Niglia, 
The Foundations of European Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 185). More generally, on the 
fortunes and functions of the public/private divide (in the US), see D Kennedy, ‘The Stages of the Decline 
of the Public/Private Distinction’ (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1349; W Wiecek, The 
Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886–1937 (Oxford University Press, 
1998); M Horowitz, ‘The History of the Public/Private Distinction’ (1982) 130 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1423.  
159 On this turn see S Symeonides, ‘The American Revolution and the European Evolution in Choice of Law: 
Reciprocal Lessons’ (n 144) 1741. 
160 Evidence of this turn appears in various recent EU instruments (see eg the ‘Rome II’ Regulation, 2008, 
recital 20: ‘The conflict-of-law rule in matters of product liability should meet the objectives of fairly 
spreading the risks inherent in a modern high-technology society, protecting consumers’ health, 
stimulating innovation, securing undistorted competition and facilitating trade’). On the regulatory nature 
of European private law, see F Cafaggi and Muir Watt, The Regulatory Function of European Private Law 
(Edward Elgar, 2009); on the incidence of this regulatory perspective on choice of law, see Muir Watt (n 
57) §§ 206 ff.  
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policy than to the elaboration of a wider project of global governance.161 If anything, the 
impact of federalism (US) or quasi-federalism (EU) was to pay greater attention to the 
needs of the community of Sister or Member States, but closed off the global horizon 
more deliberately than the previous unilateral attempts to fulfil an ideal of worldwide 
Comity. 
The inward-looking turn taken by European private international law during the first 
decades of the twentieth century, while its US counterpart still struggled with the 
mechanical dysfunctionality of a borrowed heritage,162 is largely reflected in its 
increasingly complex technical content.163 Curiously enough, this content, which led 
ultimately to the American conflicts revolution and its distaste for dogma and 
mechanical rules, was attributed under romantic European lore to the ‘Savignian 
tradition’. Thus, Savigny’s seminal revisiting of Roman law, harnessed to the 
(conservative) political ideal of spontaneous cultural ordering, became a song to 
modernism and positivism, through an extraordinary narrative of progress and 
enlightenment.164 Its key feature, shared with comparative law during the same period, 
was a narcissistic world-vision, a propensity to reduce the Other to one’s own image:165 
this meant that all legal institutions either had to fit into Romano-Germanic categories, 
                                                 
161 American functionalist choices of law principles are based on domestic policy-driven analysis, but this 
methodology has however, lacked wider horizon. See s Symeonides, ‘A New Conflicts Restatement: Why 
Not? ’ (2009) 5 Journal of Private International Law 383. Contemporary European private international 
law has tended to be subordinated to the requirements of the construction of the internal market. See 
Muir Watt, ‘Aspects économiques’ (n 57) § 134 ff. 
162 The realist critique of choice of law methodology at the time of the First Restatement on the Conflict of 
Laws (1934) was articulated by D Cavers, ‘A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem’ (1933) 47 Harvard 
Law Review 173. The traditional methodology, dogmatic and mechanistic, was perceived to be the legacy 
of Continental European territorialism. However, this critique misses the point to a certain extent. The 
Continental European tradition was far less territorialist than its American version; see B Audit, ‘A 
Continental Lawyer Looks at American Choice-of-Law Principles’ (1979) 27 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 589, 590–8. 
163 In particular, European private international law saw the rise of ‘escapes’ (renvoi, conflicts of 
characterisation, preliminary questions) to which academic doctrine devoted considerable intellectual 
energy. Often described as ‘theoretical’, these aspects of private international law are essentially technical 
and have little relationship with the great questions of legal theory.  
164 Gothot, ‘Simples réflexions à propos du saga des conflits de lois’ (n 62). Even more curiously, it appears 
to have been in France, not in Germany, that attachment to the Savignian tradition was the strongest—but 
the supposed ‘Savignian tradition’ as revisited by French internationalists such as Etienne Bartin at the 
turn of the century (according to a term coined by Bertrand Ancel, the ‘Savigniano-Bartinian’ tradition; see 
‘Destinées de l’article 3 du Code civil’ in Mélanges en l’honneur de Paul Lagarde (Dalloz, 2005) 1), was in 
fact anything but that! See, too, Boden (n 152).  
165 See, on this point, the comparative work of Legrand (nn 145 and 150). See too P Monateri, ‘Black Gaius’ 
(200) 51 Hastings Law Journal 479. 
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or were otherwise denied voice in the international legal ordering.166 As Pierre Gothot 
has pointed out, the Savignian mythology created a closed world.167 The claims of 
different legalities were disconnected from their social context, then deviant institutions 
were rejected beyond the pale. The explanation may lie in the fact that Western systems 
of private international law were constituted, to a large extent, in an effort to deal with 
the exotic by-products of colonialism in the field of family law. Ordre public then served 
as a mediating, and often exclusionary, tool to deal with indigenous marriages, 
polygamy, succession claims of unofficial offspring of colonial officers, unknown forms 
of matrimonial property under Muslim law, and so forth …168 
The various doctrines elaborated under the mythological aegis of Savignism barely 
disguised a set of ‘escapes’169 which had become necessary as the world became 
increasingly diverse; the ‘community of laws’ on which the modern European tradition 
relied was beginning to appear extremely fragile. At the same time, the welfare state 
began to weigh heavily on the public/private divide and on the sustainability of a vision 
of private law as politically innocent order and reason. While such a model was rejected 
in the United States in the sway of legal realism,170 European methodology dealt with 
tensions within the classical vision by allowing an increasing number of exceptions to 
the multilateralist scheme.171 This resulted in an increasing mismatch between the 
theoretical model of private international law and the evolution of European private 
law, now essentially geared to market regulatory policies (including consumer 
protection) and human rights. Multilateralist conflicts of law rules, while presented as 
the dominant methodological framework, were frequently trumped by a series of 
devices, such as derogatory, hyper-mandatory substantive policies (lois de police);172 the 
                                                 
166 Private international law was often used to shore up the family stronghold of colonial administrators. 
The examples, which belong to the field of ‘characterisation’ or ‘ordre public’, are well-known to students 
of conflict of laws. They take the form of non-recognition of polygamous marriages, children born out of 
wedlock, Islamic talak or kafala. Contemporary exclusions concern same-sex marriages, or the adoption of 
children by same-sex couples.  
167 P Gothot, ‘Le renouveau de la tendance unilatéraliste’ (1971) Revue critique droit international privé 1. 
Of course, the creation of closed worlds is not the monopoly of law. On closure in social theory, see K 
Pistor (n 11). 
168 See Boden’s account of colonial interlegality (n 152); see also above, nn 139–42. 
169 These are ‘renvoi’, conflicts of characterisation, preliminary questions; above, n 163. 
170 See above, n 141. 
171 See Bureau and Muir Watt (n 65) 518 ff on the progressive exceptions and adjustments that came to be 
derided by American functionalism as ‘escapes’.  
172A good example is a recent decision in which, for the first time, Article 7(1) of the 1980 Rome 
Convention was actually applied by a court of a Contracting State (Cass com 16 mars 2010, Viol, n° 08-
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old exception of public policy or ordre public; or the international reach of fundamental 
rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).173 Meanwhile, 
the increasing significance of jurisdictional conflicts, the systematic practice of forum 
shopping and the gradual emergence of a ‘global market for judicial services’174 
highlighted, by the end of the century, the overwhelming presence of private and 
political power in transnational litigation. How otherwise are to be understood the far-
reaching implications for the freedom of the press of a judicial super-injunction in the 
toxic tort case of the ProboKoala, to take but one example?175 Nevertheless, and despite 
the increasing opportunities for transnational social contestation and human rights 
norm migration,176 private international law persists in its denial of any involvement in 
the messy arena of global economics or politics, and remains ill-suited in its present 
state de lege lata to affront the enormous regulatory void beyond the state. 
 
B.The Implications of Tunnel Vision  
 
It is to a large extent through the denials of their private international law that states 
have been complicit in the development of the informal empire that now threatens to 
overwhelm them.177 The commodification of sovereignty has clearly required deliberate 
                                                                                                                                                        
21511, Semaine juridique, éd gén 2010.996, note D Bureau and L d’Avout). The case concerned the 
validity/performance of an international maritime contract for the carriage of goods by sea. The Cour de 
cassation directed the lower courts to have regard to an overriding mandatory provision of Ghanan law 
(an embargo on meat imports) designed to protect public health, although it was not the law otherwise 
governing the contract.  
173Clearly, human rights norms are ‘migrating’ to new sites (see Scott and Wai (n 8) 540 ff) and, when 
invoked by or imposed upon private entities, wreak havoc (judged either salutary or subversive). They 
raise the issue of the survival of private international law as a discipline. These tensions will be examined 
below, section III-A. 
174 J Dammann and H Hansmann, ‘Globalizing Commercial Litigation’ (2008) 94 (1) Cornell Law Review 1, 
building on W Landes and R Posner, ‘Adjudication as a Private Good’ (1979) 8 Journal of Legal Studies 235. 
175 Among the signs of the growing presence of power struggles, ‘clashes of titans’ or relationships of 
domination through the courts is the use of energetic and sometimes violent judicial tools such as super-
injunctions in disputes involving corporate social responsibility. The Trasfigura case is infamous for 
having used a super-injunction preventing the public revelation by the Guardian newspaper of a (human 
rights) dispute involving the dumping of toxic waste (carried out by the ProboKoala) in the Ivory Coast 
(see, for an account of the proceedings, (2010) 495 Revue critique Droit international privé). 
176 Scott and Wai (n 8).  
177 Sassen (n 17). As the current financial crisis shows only too well, blaming the markets for the 
inadequacies of public—domestic and international—policies, as if the markets were ‘out there’, skittish, 
autonomous, unshaped by law and policy, and subject to whims of their own invention—is more than 
suspect. As emphasised so forcefully in the domestic sphere by American legal realism, markets are 
social—and therefore, legal constructs, so that not plying discipline is, of course, in itself a form of 
regulation. As Harm Shepel points out, there is no such thing as an ‘unregulated market’. Markets are 
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moves at some point on the part of the governments of countries whose populations and 
resources are now suffering its consequences. Meanwhile, the dwarfing of the public 
sector and the growth of shadow finance have at the very least involved turning a blind 
eye to the increasing claim of private interests to sidestep state regulation. For example, 
while rating agencies are decried as having deleterious effects on interconnected 
markets,178 little has been done to address the whole area of private standardisation, or 
more specifically to prevent conflicts of interests from festering behind the ‘issuer-pays’ 
principle.179 Similarly, while global warming, or the blight of starvation in the third 
world, are core concerns of the world community, no significant move has been made as 
yet to tame multinational corporate misconduct in respect either of environmental 
protection or access of local communities to agricultural land. Yet the tools that might 
have addressed such issues belong to private international law. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that fundamental rights have stepped in to fill some of these gaps.180 While 
such a move can but be welcomed, it does not necessarily suffice to enlarge the tunnel-
vision that still works actively to shelter abusers of private sovereignty. The 
inadequacies of private international law in this respect are the direct result of its 
current apolitical status, which moreover posits them to be inevitable and thus inhibit 
legal change. They comprise the lack of any adequate theory of (public or private) 
conflict (a), the inadequate mapping of the global political economy (b), structural bias 
(c), insufficient attention to ‘private’ rule-making (d), and no sense of systemic linkages 
(e). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
always already regulated, insofar as political intervention into markets is not a question of regulating a 
void, but of how to interact with the wider normative universe that constitutes markets (The Constitution 
of Private Governance (n 8) 406 ff). Indeed, ‘markets have always obscured distributive issues and helped 
diffuse blame for negative economic consequences’ (L Pauly, ‘Global Finance, Political Authority, and the 
Problem of Legitimation’ in Hall and Biersteker (n 10) 76, 77).  
178 See T Sinclair, The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies and the Politics of 
Creditworthiness, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (2005); N Gaillard, ‘Agences de notation: 
responsabilité, régulation ou laissez-faire?’ in Mathias Audit (ed), Insolvabilité des États et dettes 
souveraines (LGDJ, 2011) 165. For a fascinating, although perhaps unsurprising, economic account of the 
incentive structure of (in)accurate certification in unconstrained financial markets, see J Barnett, 
‘Intermediairies Revisited: Is Efficient Certification Consistent with Profit Maximization?’ (2011) 
University of Southern California Law and Economics Working Paper Series 137.  
179 See M Audit, ‘La responsabilité des agences de notation en droit international privé’ (2011) Revue 
critique Droit international privé 581, showing that private international law issues are both rife in this 
field and remarkably untended. 
180 Albeit with a fairly inchoate theory of extraterritorial or transnational effects which frequently 
generates ‘expert’ criticism from within the field of private international law. On these tensions between 
the two disciplines, see below, section III-A. 
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a. Lack of Any Adequate Theory of (Public or Private) Conflict 
 
The misnamed ‘conflict of laws’ has developed, if any, a very tame conception of conflict. 
The break with the pre-modern vision of colliding statutes involved a pasteurisation of 
conflict itself, in which clashes of sovereign authority were watered down. In the 
modern, largely state-centred European tradition, ‘conflicts’ were reduced to the 
abstract availability of multiple private laws, each reputedly complete and largely 
interchangeable.181 In the English common law tradition, a similarly ‘smooth’ account of 
legal ordering was favoured by a private interest focus on commercial dispute 
resolution and business convenience.182 In either perspective, private power became 
invisible through the lens of the principle of party autonomy and private actors acquired 
the freedom to opt out of state regulation, while the ultimate safety net provided by 
derogatory hyper-mandatory rules (‘lois de police’) was gradually eroded through the 
liberalisation of requirements relating to the circulation of foreign judgments and 
arbitral awards.183 By contrast, in the context of the US functional approach, (‘true’) 
conflict came to be defined, less blandly, as the clash of policies—before the insights of 
this approach were swallowed up by over-lax jurisdictional rules and the subsequent 
rise of forum shopping.184 Likewise, while transnational regulatory adjudication 
appeared at one point to be investing the courts with a governance role in the global 
arena,185 such an approach now seems to have lost its bite in a (re)turn to territoriality, 
so that private power may once again slip through the net.186 
                                                 
181The most influential and the most sophisticated contemporary mainstream theory of conflict in 
European private international law was articulated by P Mayer, La distinction des règles et des décisions en 
droit international privé (Dalloz, 1973). Its theoretical underpinnings are largely Kelsenian. According to 
this account, conflicts are the result of the abstract availability, on any given issue, of all the world’s 
systems of private law, each complete, exclusive and potentially able to provide an adequate, 
interchangeable answer. Policy-driven, peremptory norms (‘lois de police’) are of course an 
embarassment, but they are presented as exceptions at the discretion of the (usually reluctant) court, and 
limited to those of the forum (see the careful wording of Article 9 of EC Regulation ‘Rome I’).  
182 For a view representative of this account, see A Briggs, Agreements on Jurisidction and Choice of Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2008). On the existence of a rougher conflictual reality behind the ‘smooth’ 
account, see Wai, ‘Private v Private’ (n 148). The author points out how this smooth approach shies away 
from distributional consequences.  
183 On the rise of party autonomy (that is, freedom to choose the governing law in an international 
contract) as international trade expanded in the first half of the 20th century, and then the gradual loss of 
control through liberalisation of the various control mechanisms, see H Muir Watt, ‘Party Autonomy in 
International Contracts:   From the Makings of a Myth to the Requirements of Global Governance’ (2010) 
European Review Contract Law 1. 
184 On this evolution see Symeonides (n 144).  
185 See H Buxbaum, ‘Transnational Regulatory Litigation’ (2006) 46 Virginia Journal of International Law 
 
 41 
Whatever the reasons, in any of these perspectives the exercise of economic power—
whether public or informal—tends to be kept below the surface in terms of the way 
issues of conflict are articulated. Among the consequences of this flattening of conflict, 
arbitrators are deciding governance issues, and sovereignty-free actors187 are designing 
their own normative space through the tools of contract law, with the approval of the 
courts. Illustrations of both of these trends are abundant and well-known. Recent ones 
include the Chevron saga, in which an arbitration tribunal disqualified the judgment of 
the court of a sovereign state in respect of a private investor’s corporate social 
responsibility, with (more than) a little help from international investment law.188 
Another notorious example is Lloyd’s successful enforcement of judgments and awards 
in the US against investors who had been deprived of the informational protection of the 
Securities Act through a highly sophisticated combination of private legislation, choice of 
law, and jurisdictional side-stepping.189 In both instances, private international law 
actively provides the tools—the wondrous myth of party autonomy, the ‘plug-in’ 
network of international arbitration, the neutralisation of peremptory rules of local 
public policy, the free ‘delocalised’ movement of private awards—through which private 
actors have acceded to unshackle themselves from the constraints prevalent in the 
domestic sphere.190 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
251; C Wyteck, ‘Domestic Courts and Global Governance’ (2009) 84 Tulane Law Review 67.  
186 The overly cautious transaction-focused approach adopted by the US Supreme Court in Morrison v 
National Australia Bank (n 16) may entail losing sight of the politics underlying the conflicts. This point is 
made by Judge Posner in Flomo v Firestone Natural Rubber Co, llc p 24, on the subject of the Alien Tort 
Statute: ‘Deny extraterritorial application, and the ATS litigation currently pending before the [Alien Tort] 
statute would be superfluous’ (let alone its bite, since multinational corporate conduct abroad would 
benefit from impunity). Similarly excessive caution appears in judicial practice in Quebec: see (in respect 
of the cyanide spill allegedly due to corporate misconduct in Guyana) Scott and Wai (n 8) 17. It is true, 
however, that this caution contrasts with other, more aggressive or more intrusive, judicial reactions 
which are not necessarily more desirable, such as recourse to transnational injunctive relief, including 
anti-suit or super-injunctions, or value judgments passed on other countries’ judiciaries in the framework 
of a forum non conveniens analysis. It is rare that this more activist stance works, any more than judicial 
caution, in the direction of the regulation of transnational private power or human rights protection.  
187 Kobrin (n 65) 58 sees two types of actors in the global markets: those who are ‘sovereignty-bound’ as 
subjected to local legislation, and the ‘sovereignty-free’. The latter have regulatory lift-off, to use Robert 
Wai’s term; see Wai (n 132). 
188 On the Chevron saga see above, n 113. 
189See Roby v Corporation of Lloyd’s, 996 F 2d 1353 (2d Cir 1993); Bonny v Society of Lloyd’s, 3 F 3d 156 
(7th Cir 1993).  
190 For a more detailed account, see Muir Watt (n 161); cf Jansen and Michaels, ‘Private Law Beyond the 
State’ (n 3) 873, asking whether, if all law is public in the domestic sphere, it might not be that all law is 
private in the global arena.  
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b. Inadequate Mapping of the Global Political Economy 
 
Through its continued focus on territory, private international law subscribes to a map 
of the world which is clearly out of touch with the global political economy. Such a map 
hinders its ability to capture abuses of economic domination whenever such domination 
occurs ‘extraterritorially’. Indeed, whether formulated in terms of state action doctrine, 
conflicts of laws or the reach of rights,191 territoriality has to a large extent curtailed the 
purview of human rights,192 public economic regulation193 or constitutional 
provisions.194 Current developments within the US Supreme Court illustrate the 
pervasiveness of the territorial paradigm.195 Similarly, in the European context, special 
rules of jurisdiction and choice of law designed to protect weaker parties (consumers, 
workers or insurance policy holders) focus exclusively on European residents, leaving 
residents of third states unprotected in their relationships with European 
                                                 
191 On the striking similarities between these three problematics, see Bomhoff (n 12). 
192 Some of the highest courts (both supranantional and domestic) tend, on the one hand, to be prudent 
about extraterritorial application of forum law (see the US Federal Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, 
penned by Justice Scalia, Morrison v National Australia Bank, 130 S Ct 2869, 2878 (2010), in the specific 
context of F-Cubed class actions in the field of Securities; cf Justice Scalia’s dissent in Boumédienne v Bush 
(US Supreme Court, 12 June 2008, nos 06-1195 and 06-1196), asserting that ‘[t]he writ of habeas corpus 
does not, and never has, run in favor of aliens abroad’). Conversely, they tend to allow few exceptions to 
territoriality in areas such as jurisdictional immunities, where contemporary understandings of justice 
might require some flexibility (see the judgment of the ICJ in Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening. 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, 3 February 2012: rejecting the argument that customary 
international law has developed to the point where a State is no longer entitled to immunity in respect of 
acts occasioning death, personal injury or damage to property on the territory of the forum State, even if 
the act in question was performed jure imperii). On the extraterritoriality of international law (and its 
limits) under the Alien Tort Statute, see above, section I-B-a; on the reach of European human rights, see 
again Bomhoff (n 12) 47 ff. On the way in which law contributes to construct territory, see Berman (n 15) 
311.  
193 See EEOC v Arabian American Oil Co, 499 US 244, 248 (1991); Morrison v National Australia Bank (n 
16). 
194 See, for example, John Roe I v Bridgestone Corp 492 F Supp 2d 988 (SD Ind 2007): ‘Even if the 
Thirteenth Amendment authorized a direct cause of action for damages against a private entity, the 
Thirteenth Amendment bars slavery and involuntary servitude only “within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction.” By its terms, that language does not appear to reach activity in other 
countries.’ For the debate on the applicability of the constitutional prohibition of slavery on foreign soil, 
and strong arguments for extending the Thirteenth Amendment to reach the conduct of US corporate 
employers abroad, see T Wolff, ‘The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global Economy’ (2002) 
102 Columbia Law Review 973. 
195 In the words of Justice Scalia, writing for the Supreme Court in Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd 
(n 16) ‘[t]he results of judicial-speculation-made-law … demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption 
against extra-territoriality’.  
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professionals.196 However, there are two specific examples, of global significance, which 
are particularly worrisome.  
Firstly, it is through the assertion of territoriality as a governing principle that private 
international law has been complicit in preventing the assertion of transnational 
corporate social responsibility. It has kept corporate liability within the limits of 
compartmentalised, local law through both forum non conveniens and the lex loci 
delicti.197 This has encouraged the migration of sites of production to legal environments 
where, behind the sovereign veil, international competition for investment tends to keep 
down both standards of care and levels of compensation. Often combining the economic 
power of the foreign investor and the political power of the local government,198 gross 
abuses of power—in the form of ecological damage, expropriation or land-grabbing, 
forced migration, repression of freedom of expression, mistreatment of workers, child 
labour (and more)—have thus been condoned through the applicability of local law 
whose content is hostage to the desires of the investor.199 It is only recently that a 
challenge of territoriality has emerged in connection with corporate social 
responsibility, showing up extraterritoriality as a way of framing a problem rather than 
an expression of intrinsic limits.200 Thus, there is nothing ‘extraterritorial’ about 
                                                 
196 The European Commission has proposed to extend the scope of EU jurisdiction rules (EC Brussels I 
Regulation) to third states (COM (2010) 748/3). However, the extension seems only to reach defendants 
domiciled in third states, and not to include foreign resident consumers or workers in any form of 
protective regime. Moreover, even this limited extension has met with considerable opposition and is 
currently at the centre of heated debate in the European Parliament (for a very critical view see R 
Fentiman, ‘Brussels I and Third States: Future Imperfect’ (2010–11) 13 Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies 65). On the attitude of EU law and policy towards third states, see more generally M 
Cremona, J Monar and S Poli (eds), The External Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (Peter Lang, College of Europe Studies, 2011). It has been much debated in conflict of 
laws as to whether focusing on local (one’s own) citizens, workers etc is discriminatory or a mark of 
deference (see, defending Currie’s governmental interest analysis on the latter grounds against criticism 
of discrimination, H Kaye, ‘A Defense of Currie’s Governmental Interest Analysis’ (1989) 216 Recueil des 
Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 9).  
197 While the illustrations are legion (see ‘Aspects économiques’ (n 57) 242), the emblematic example of 
the working of private international law to create corporate impunity remains the Bhopal litigation: In re 
Union Carbide, 809 F 2d 195 (2d Cir 1987), cert denied 108 S Ct 199 (1987). 
198 The issue of private corporate complicity in human rights abuses by local governments (or military 
forces) arises frequently in the context of ATS litigation. The Kiobel litigation focuses on whether 
international law governs the identity of the author of the violation of a human rights norm; a connected 
question is whether it governs tort liability for aiding and abetting (see above, n 87 and section I-B-a).  
199 See eg John Roe I v Bridgestone Corp (n 194).  
200The term ‘extraterritorial’ in this context usually signifies that harmful conduct occurs in the course of 
delocalised activities, outside a corporate actor’s ‘home’ state (and the territorial jurisdiction of the court). 
The use of the term is often connoted negatively, particularly when applied to the reach of legislation or 
even fundamental rights provisions (see W Dodge, ‘Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An 
Argument for Judicial Unilateralism’ 39 Harvard International Law Journal 101). However, 
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regulating corporations at the place of their seat, and there is no reason why the state in 
which a corporate group is headquartered should not (and indeed should not be obliged 
to) sanction that group’s delocalised industrial misconduct on the same terms as similar 
domestic misconduct, in tort claims for harm suffered by stakeholders or third parties 
elsewhere. 
A second striking example of the inadequacy of the implicit (territorial) geography of 
private international law when confronted with the political economy of the real world 
is a similar inability to address the structure of the global food supply chain as organised 
by finance-driven multinational ‘agribusiness’.201 The latter have a significant impact on 
the mapping of agriculture throughout the developing world and, by way of 
consequence, on the access to nutrition of a large segment of the world’s population.202 
While the emphasis here is on misguided (or deliberately predatory) policy decisions by 
governments, such market-led decisions are geared to the needs of massive-scale 
investment projects and depend ultimately on the requirements of investing foreign 
capital.203 By levering open state boundaries and commodifying land, the global 
economy has in effect lifted any restraints on the extent to which foreign investment 
should impact upon sovereign decisions over natural resources including agriculture. 
Correlatively private international law has hindered the access of those who suffer the 
consequences locally to any external judicial fora, while freeing the investor from any 
risk of responsibility. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
extraterritorially is far more an issue of how the conflict of laws is framed: there is nothing 
‘extraterritorial’ about regulating corporations at the place of their seat. Currently, the EU is 
contemplating the extension of the Brussels I Regulation to disputes involving defendants domiciled in 
third-party States. The debate is also framed in the controversial terms of the ‘extraterritoriality’ of EU 
law. Whatever the policy arguments for and against such an extension, it is no more ‘extraterritorial’ to 
apply the Brussels I Regulation to out-of-state defendants than it is to apply it to out-of-state claimants.  
201 See Cordes, ‘The Impact of Agribusiness Transnational Corporations on the Right to Food’ (n 103) 27.  
202 Writing on the impact of multinational agribusiness and the current ‘green rush’, on the world 
population’s access to food, Olivier de Schutter has shown the extent to which hunger itself is a legacy of 
policy choices: ‘the single most important proximate cause of structural hunger today is that developing 
countries have either not invested sufficiently in agriculture or have invested in the wrong kind of 
agriculture, with little impact on the reduction of rural poverty.’ See O de Schutter, ‘The Green Rush: The 
Global Race for Farmland and the Rights of Land Users’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 504; 
de Schutter and Cordes (n 103) 2. 
203 This is how the international division of labour as practised during the colonial era (periphery 
supplying the centre with raw materials) has been consolidated since—through the economic push 
towards export-led agriculture and increasing dependence upon highly volatile international markets for 
raw agricultural commodities, with disastrous effects within each developing economy, where rural flight 
has led to an increase in imported subsidised food to feed the urban poor. See de Schutter and Cordes (n 
103) 3.  
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c. Structural Bias 
 
The liberal paradigm favours an approach to legal problems in terms of the ‘micro’204 or 
the individual—individual civil or political rights; private property; discrete contracts; 
non-mass torts. In addition, ‘private’ law adopts a backward-looking perspective, 
providing the tools for solving inter-subjective conflicts ex post, on a case-by-case basis. 
Issues relating to collective goods often tend to be confiscated or occulted by private 
conflicts. Private international law has internalised these limitations and disconnected 
from the macro-perspective which focuses on the surrounding social and political 
context. 
For example, in a dispute involving alleged harm to the environment, private 
international law will tend only to act through individual rights; it is limited by the same 
categories (tort, contract) and procedural constraints (standing, reparable damages) as 
its domestic private law counterpart. Such tunnel-blindness creates significant obstacles 
for the enhancement of the global good, or at least for the consideration of the planetary 
dimension of environmental protection. These obstacles will remain unless the steering 
potential of choice of law rules is unearthed from under the dogma of neutrality.205 This 
has effectively been done, to a large extent, by the EC Rome II Regulation, which ensures 
by means of an option opened for the claimant that the most compensatory—and 
therefore the most pollution-repellant—law will apply206 despite the reluctance of 
conflicts lawyers to accept that the purpose of the choice of law methodology is other 
than aiding the individual victim.207 
Similar micro-bias can be found in the position of private international law with respect 
to the crossborder labour market, as excellently illustrated by the Viking/Laval litigation 
                                                 
204 On the distinction between a micro- and macro-legal analysis see Legrand (n 150). 
205 For the parallel example of crossborder pollution seen from the perspective of public international law 
and approached in terms of the rights and freedoms of sovereigns (to pursue economically beneficial 
activities or to enjoy a clean environment) and a similar conclusion that the conflict framed in such terms 
is insoluble, see Koskenniemi (n 1) 50. However, at least as far as the experience of private international 
law is concerned, the question of structural bias is whether an individual rights analysis will not tend to 
skew the outcome in favour of the more traditional property right, simply because the collective right to a 
clean environment finds less ready expression in private law terms.  
206 See Article 7 of EC Rome I Regulation: ‘The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of 
environmental damage or damage sustained by persons or property as a result of such damage shall be 
the law determined pursuant to Article 4(1), unless the person seeking compensation for damage chooses 
to base his or her claim on the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred.’ 
207 A Huet (ed), Trav Comité fr DIP 2006–2008 (Pédone, 2008) 201 (‘si on avait voulu favoriser l’intérêt 
général ce n’est pas à la victime qu’on aurait donné le choix, c’est au juge!’). 
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which was brought before the European Court of Justice in December 2007.208 When the 
ECJ was called upon to arbitrate between the economic freedom of the employer (to 
relocate, in Viking; or to call upon cheaper foreign labour, in Laval) and the social rights 
of the local workforce, the structure of the relevant choice of law principles was such 
that in both cases the employer was able to benefit from the less socially protective of 
the two laws in conflict—in one case, the law of the new place of incorporation (Viking), 
in the other, the law of the initial place of employment (Laval).209Articles 43 (now 49 
TFEU; freedom of establishment) and 49 (now 56 TFEU; free provision of services) of 
the EC Treaty prohibited industrial action designed to induce a collective agreement and 
resist social dumping, subject to the usual general interest proviso and proportionality 
test. The outcome has been duly critiqued by labour lawyers, who usually point to the 
biases inherent in the proportionality test. Conversely, the extent to which the terms of 
the dispute were actually framed by conflict of laws provisions on the law applicable to 
the employment contract has rarely been acknowledged—including provisions on the 
posting of workers in the context of cross-border provision of services under Directive 
96/71/EC. Indeed the law applicable to the employment contract was clearly designed 
not as a protective measure for foreign employees, but as an economic stimulus for 
cross-border services within the internal market.210 
An analogous instance of how private international law has become disconnected from a 
macro-perspective can be seen in respect of the international protection of cultural 
property. The private international law rules concerning the law governing the transfer 
                                                 
208 Aff’d Case C-341/05 Viking, Case C-438/05 Laval, Case C-346/06 Ruffert.  
209 Under Article 6 of the Rome Convention (now Article 8 EC Regulation no 593/2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations, ‘Rome I’), the law governing the individual employment contract is 
the law initially chosen, or initially applicable, by reason of the place of performance. When the worker is 
posted to a country with greater social protection, the 1996 Posting of Workers Directive extends the 
higher local level of protection to the worker for the duration of the posting whenever there is local 
legislation on various points listed in its Article 3, including minimum wage. However, this list was not 
designed to cater for the ‘Swedish social model’, under which there is no legislation or extended collective 
agreement instituting a minimum wage. Ruffert reaches a similar outcome, insofar as Germany was 
precluded from requiring that a Polish undertaking, submitting a tender for public works in Germany, 
accept in writing that it would respect the minimum wage laid down by a collective agreement at the place 
of performance. In these cases, therefore, workers from Latvia or Poland could not benefit from the extra 
protection at the (Swedish or German) place of posting (and continued thereby to represent a competitive 
threat to the local workforce). In Viking, where no issue of posting arose, the owner of a ferry, flying first a 
Finnish, and then an Estonian flag, was able to benefit from the legal consequences of a change of flag 
(considered as the ‘place of performance’ under Article 6 of the Rome Convention, and thereby governing 
the terms of employment). In both instances of social dumping, the workers’ action came up against the 
economic freedoms of the employer.  
210 For an analysis in these terms of the Posted Workers Directive, see Moreau (n 96). 
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of property constitute an effective means of laundering imported stolen cultural goods, 
thereby neutralising historical collective ownership.211 It is enough to introduce the 
stolen object into a jurisdiction—the lex situs—which allows the rights of the buyer or 
current possessor of stolen goods to prevail over those of the initial (rightful) owner. 
Supranational legislation—Unidroit rules and EU directives—has proved necessary, 
once a stolen cultural object has been exported and sold under the aegis of foreign 
property law, to allow repossession by a given community of its cultural heritage.212 
A further example can be found in the legal means by which the contemporary 
phenomenon of ‘land-grabbing’ takes place—understood as the acquisition of vast areas 
of arable land in developing countries (notably in Sub-Saharan Africa) by foreign 
corporate interests, for the purposes of producing either food or biofuels for export and 
consumption in developed countries. While these massive investment projects may be 
generative of revenues for the host states (although the levels of income are themselves 
restricted through the effects of regulatory competition for investment), the benefit of 
such windfalls rarely falls to the population as a whole. The projects themselves lead to 
massive expropriation, displacement and migration of the rural poor; they harness local 
production to the needs of foreign consumers and they increase the dependence of the 
growing local urban poor on foreign aid and the importing of cheap food. As illustrated 
by an increasing number of ‘villegisation’ enterprises mandated by investment projects 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, the law plays an essential role here in promoting such disasters, 
while attention is diverted from the economic and social reality of the land-rush.213 
Sovereignty is bartered with the help of private (international) law of contract and 
property, and little attention is given to the needs of local communities, particulary in 
terms of sustainable development.214 
                                                 
211 Since property rights may be transferred under the law of the place where the goods are situated, it is 
enough to have them transit through a place where the law recognises the rights of the possessor to 
launder any defect affecting the property rights. See, for example, in a case of stolen aboriginal artefacts, 
Winkworth v Christie Manson and Woods Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 1121. 
212 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (Rome, 1995); Directive 
93/7/EEC on the Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a Member State. 
Both texts derogate from the usual private international law of sale and property. 
213 de Schutter (n 202); T Ferrando, ‘Large-Scale Agricultural Investments and Forced Migration in Sub-
Saharan Africa: What Role for the Law?’ (publication forthcoming). 
214 See, for example, the case studies in S Leader and D Ong, ‘The Implications of the Chad-Cameroon and 
Sakhalin Transnational Investment Agreements for the Application of International Environmental 
Principles’ in S Leader and D Ong, Global Project Finance, Human Rights and Sustainable Development 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) 319. Compare, too, the analysis by Ferrando (n 213) of the various 
legal steps involved in the financial operation. The first step consists in framing the economic conflict 
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d. Insufficient Attention to ‘Private’ Rule-Making 
 
Has private governance become the centre of modern law with state authority at its 
periphery?215 Gunther Teubner suggests such a reading of the current direction of legal 
pluralism in a post-national setting, in which others point to the fragmentation of 
sovereignty216 and the structural disempowerment of states.217 More generally, the rise 
of new, post-national legalities is drawing considerable attention, including from non-
legal disciplines, to the need to redefine the features of law and authority once 
disengaged from state. In particular, regime theory has been imported from 
international relations into social theory and international law in order to theorise ‘post-
national rule-making’, ‘colliding social spheres’ and ‘private authority in global 
governance’. Its focus is on the multifarious transnational normativities—codes of 
conduct, standards, usages, benchmarking—and hybrid authorships218—international 
court-like dispute deciders,219 certifiers, rating agencies, NGOs, TNCs—which all 
contradict the liberal assumption of state monopoly on law-making and its orderly 
doctrine of hierarchised legal sources, according to which there is no ‘real’ law which is 
not produced directly or by delegation by the state. Beyond the descriptive question 
                                                                                                                                                        
between foreign investment (international markets) and local community as a domestic legal issue 
relating to individual property rights. This comes about when the host sovereign uses its legislative 
powers to establish a modern, centralised land-title regime, often posited by international financial 
institutions as a condition of access of local enterprise to foreign loans. Under the same (colonial) model, 
‘vacant’ land will fall to the state; the definition of vacancy will of course be exclusive of collective or 
nomadic forms of appropriation. The host country may then sell such land to foreign interests for ready 
income, through an investment contract coupled with, and governed by, a bilateral investment treaty with 
the corporate investor’s home state. The contract may again define vacancy, so as to delimit the land or 
natural resources to be put to the use of the investor, and the state is held to that definition under the 
principles of contract (or treaty) law geared to upholding the sanctity of the terms of the agreement. Any 
conflict between the foreign investor and the local community will be framed then as a foreign investment 
dispute, typically subjected to arbitration. Ultimately, the content of bilateral investment agreements 
between states, or indeed private investment contracts, purportedly effective only as between the parties, 
will determine the status of public land in the host country. 
215 G Teubner, ‘The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ (1992) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1443.  
216 Kalmo and Skinner (n 3).  
217 On the notion of remedial capacity of states, and its current decline, see Y Dahan, H Lerner, and F 
Milman-Sivan, ‘Global Justice, Labor Standards and Responsibility’ (2011) 12(2)(3) Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law, www.bepress.com/til/default/vol12/iss2/art3 (accessed 2 May 2012).  
218 Social theory also uses the term ‘authorship’ to describe the normative action of non-state actors 
(NGOs or MNEs), covering agenda-setting, amici interventions, codes of conduct, and various other kinds 
of influence or leverage affecting third parties. In this context, norm making may be separated from 
monitoring. 
219 See Alvarez, International Organisations as Lawmakers (n 1). 
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(what counts as law?), there is of course a fundamental legitimacy issue, linked to the 
private origin of such sources.220 Here, depending upon the disciplinary and ideological 
yardstick chosen, non-state transnational regimes are either commended as more 
efficient than burdensome public regulation and more in tune with the claims of global 
civil society, or, conversely, condemned as the result of expert-knowledge-driven 
fragmentation and as an undemocratic—unaccountable and untransparent—exercise of 
private power.221 For example, it is clear that private regimes may be put to excellent 
use in the protection of the planetary commons (for instance, global water and forestry 
stewardship programs222 do seem to contribute to the general interest despite their 
private origin). Nevertheless, there also remains a largely unmonitored risk that at least 
some affected interests are not addressed by non-state standards.223  
In private international law, the paradigmatic lex mercatoria debate224 well illustrates 
the challenge posed by these various private or non-state legalities and hybrid 
public/private law-makers which develop beyond (or irrespective of) the state, and 
cannot entirely be explained away through traditional public or private categories of 
delegation and custom, or contract and trade usage. Thus, the combined result of the 
selective focus of public international law on state sovereignty, and the tight harnessing 
                                                 
220 From a Foucauldian perspective, see M Herberg, ‘Global Governance and Conflict of Laws from a 
Foucauldian Perspective: The Power/Knowledge Nexus Revisited’ (2011) 2(2) Transnational Legal Theory 
243–69.  
221 Regime theory appears basically to have been an attempt to inject empirical questions into public 
international law. As defined by Stephen Krasner, a regime is a set of explicit or implicit ‘principles, norms, 
rules, and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area’. It 
may be an informal group, and is not necessarily composed of states (see S Krasner (ed), International 
Regimes (Cornell University Press, 1983)). For a sample of the most recent literature on non-state 
regimes, which now gives greater room to the lawyers, see Hall and Biersteker (n 10); Mattli and Woods 
(eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (n 42); Calliess and Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code 
(n 10); T Büthe and W Mattli, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy 
(Princeton University Press, 2011).  
222 On such examples, see R Lipschutz and C Fogel, ‘Regulation for the Rest of Us? Global Civil Society and 
the Privatization of Transnational Regulation’ in Hall and Biersteker (n 10) 115. For an overview of the 
various forms of international law-making by non-state entities, see B Woodward, Global Civil Society in 
International Lawmaking and Global Governance: Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010).  
223 A good example is privately promoted food safety and quality standards, which are diffused along the 
chain of production to small producers in poor and developing countries, which may well ignore their 
needs (see M Schmidt, ‘The Transformation of Food Retail and Marginalisation of Smallhold Farmers’ in 
De Schutter and Cordes (n 103) 65). Another example can be found in the use and misuse of 
standardisation in the field of labour law: see I Daugareilh, ‘L’ISO à l’assaut du social: Risques et limites 
d’un exercise de normalisation sociale’ in Daugureilh, Responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise transnationale 
et globalisation de l’économie (n 84).  
224 This debate, launched by Berthold Goldman and Clive Schmittoff in the 1960s, opposed those who see 
it as an autonomous legal order composed of transnational principles administered by private (arbitral) 
courts, and those who see it as an instance of state delegation and control through enforcement. An 
excellent summary of the legal arguments can be found in Lagarde (n 4) 125.  
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of private international law to legal positivism, has been to turn the blind eye of the law 
on the multifarious non-state actors and norms which continued to support the 
expansion of informal empire. Outside the realm of the public and its institutionalised 
processes, but equally beyond the tunnel vision of private law still focused on 
individuals and their domestic relationships, the expressions of private authority in the 
global arena225 continued to develop outside formal legal discourse. Thus, rather than 
contributing to improving transparency and accountability of the various practices of 
post-national benchmarking and rule-making, the law shelters and nurtures private 
authority by persistently denying its existence. 
This debate also reveals the profound ambivalence in respect of the meaning of ‘private’ 
in private international law.226 In the positivist model, the ‘private’ initially expressed 
the confluence between a field of law (private law) and a category of interests (issues 
not involving the public order), and was to be taken as a clear indicator of the absence of 
any power issue. But ‘private’ has now come to signify a non-state source. Its continued 
use occults the fact that the field may well implicate private power—a form of non-state 
law-making—and impinge upon the public good. Of course the point here is not that all 
non-state norms should be seen as ‘law’, at least if such a category implies a recognition 
of legitimacy, as many may be coopted, captured, or the fruit of unholy alliances.227 But it 
does mean that since these sources are self-styled, and perceived, as authoritative, they 
should receive attention as such and their place in the global system questioned and 
articulated. The rise of international commercial and investment arbitration provides an 
excellent illustration of a system of economic power asserted under the cover of the 
‘private’: left unarticulated as such, it will inevitably expand unchecked. 
 
e. No Sense of Systemic Linkages 
 
The risks linked to fragmentation are well identified in public international law: 
specialised regimes are seen to compete for authority (the prince’s ear), to the 
                                                 
225 On which, see Cutler (n 10). 
226See Jansen and Michaels (n 3). 
227 On the workings of legal entrepreneurship and the alliances that lead to legal change, see W Mattli and 
N Woods, ‘In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global Politics’ in Mattli and Woods, The 
Politics of Global Regulation (n 42).  
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detriment of more general principles.228 Disconnectedness might be seen as the 
expression of the same syndrome in the private international sphere, where diverse 
specialised spheres—governed by a variety of transnational private regimes—garden 
varieties of state law; human rights; regional law; transnational customary sources—
tend either to overlap or cancel each other out, with no regard for the consistency or the 
acceptability of the end result. Thus, an identical issue—such as whether pharmaceutical 
products may be tested by foreign manufacturers on children in developing countries,229 
or whether patent rights belonging to multinational corporations may block the sale of 
generic medication in countries whose populations suffer from catastrophic levels of 
HIV230—might simultaneously and alternatively be approached, in the transnational 
context, in terms of intellectual property, product liability, human rights, pharmaceutical 
standard-making, WTO requirements … Beyond the public/private divide, the 
disaggregation of the law may well be the hallmark of globalisation, which interconnects 
markets as much as it dissolves other linkages—particularly those that might make 
sense of multiple legalities. Private international law, while purporting to exercise a 
coordinating function, nevertheless lacks an integrated vision of its own systemic 
governance implications and the distributional consequences of its rules. Whereas it is 
quick to respond to ‘logical’ or aesthetic inconsistency (void, overlap, and misfit) 
between interlocking pieces of national law,231 fragmented regimes lead to a nonsensical 
                                                 
228 See the fragmentation/specialisation/competition critique by Koskenniemi (n 1) 319. It may be seen as 
a more general issue of legal epistemology: see G Samuel, Epistemology and Method in Law (Ashgate, 
2003) 248. But can the Centre reassert itself? M Andenas addresses this question (see ‘Is the Center 
Reasserting Itself?’ (January 2012) Conference Sciences-po, PILAGG (forthcoming)), asking to what extent 
the contemporary loss of faith in the International Court of Justice is due to the Court’s own positivistic 
approach to ius cogens, erga omnes extraterritoriality, which makes it a bilateral dispute resolution 
mechanism, rather than the maker of a credible body of public international law with a centrifugal pull.  
229 See the dispute in Abdullahi v Pfizer, Inc, United States Court of Appeals, 2d Cir, 30 Jan 2009, n° 05-
4863-cv (L), finding that the prohibition of non-consensual medical experimentation on humans is 
binding under customary international law. In July 2009, Pfizer petitioned the US Supreme Court. In May 
2010, the Solicitor General submitted a brief to the court urging the court to deny Pfizer’s petition. On 23 
February 2011, the parties announced that they had reached a settlement in this lawsuit.  
230 The South African government has been in conflict with American pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
which claim patents on all HIV medications and attempt to block generics from being offered, claiming 
patent rights. Foreign companies such as Cipla, an Indian maker of generic drugs, are ready to provide far 
cheaper generic copies.  
231There is a considerable body of conflict of laws literature on the systematicity of private law, which 
mandates respect in the design of the conflict of laws for the internal balances within institutions (eg 
between conditions and effects), for the systemic integrity of the legal system (within succession law, for 
instance), or for the avoidance of legal irritation (unfamiliar legal institutions). Thus, categories should be 
designed so as not to cut across issues that should be dealt with together, or avoid institutional misfits. An 
often cited example concerns the rights of a widow on the death of her spouse, when matrimonial 
property is allocated to a different law to that governing succession, whereas each body of rules within a 
 
 52 
governance puzzle on a wider plane, when their interactions and economic 
consequences are ignored. How can South African Black Empowerment legislation be 
considered a violation of South Africa’s obligations towards European investors in the 
course of international investment arbitration, yet at the same time be hailed as 
progress by the investors’ home states?232 How can international investment arbitration 
be allowed to soar beyond the reach of national law, while fundamental human rights or 
peremptory regulatory policies are asserted with increasing conviction on the other? 
How plausible is the assertion of worker protection at home when home-based 
employers use child labour elsewhere? How can norms of corporate social reponsibility 
(such as ISO 26000) plausibly be decoupled from the WTO trade regime?233 How can a 
jurisdictional regime designed to protect weaker parties credibly not extend to 
arbitration?234 How can free choice of forum be justified by consent and then extend to 
unsuspecting third parties?235 How can collective action by workers be both a 
fundamental right and a restriction to free movement of the employer?236 In each of 
these instances, one regime undermines the other.237 The policy signals put out by 
private international law are characteristically ambivalent, because they are not 
assumed as such. More generally, the ostensible neutrality of private international law 
                                                                                                                                                        
given legal system is dependent upon the other. This may lead to giving the widow a double set of rights 
(under both matrimonial property and succession, or none at all, according to where each of the 
governing laws put the emphasis on protection of the surviving spouse). 
232 Example given by E Fura, ‘Droits humains et monde économique—liaisons dangereuses’ in La 
Consciences des Droits. Mélanges en l’honneur de Jean-Paul Costa (Dalloz, 2011) 265. 
233 ISO 26000 is not an ‘international standard’ for the purposes of the WTO, and does not provide a ‘basis 
for legal actions’. But is it in itself a non-tariff barrier to trade? See Daugareilh (n 223) 563; see more 
generally, on the abdication of law’s role in structuring private governmentalism, H Shepel, ‘The Empire’s 
Drains: Sources of Legal Recognition of Private Standardisation Under the TBT Agreement’ in Joerges and 
Petersmann (n 8) 397.  
234 In the EU, choice of forum agreements involving consumers or employees are strictly regulated, but 
international arbitration is left to each Member State (except where an arbitration clause is considered 
abusive, within the meaning of EC consumer law). In the US, mandatory arbitration clauses are permitted 
in consumer contracts, but class arbitration may be specifically excluded.  
235 This problem, which inhibits the access to justice of parties who are hauled before a contractually 
‘chosen’ forum without their consent, is, to date, currently dealt with under a conflict of laws analysis 
within the EU (the law governing the contract must allow the transmission of the obligations to which the 
choice of forum applies): see, in the ECJ, Case C-387/98 Coreck; Case 71/83 Tilly Russ; Case C-159/97 
Castelletti.  
236 See the following ECJ case law: Case C-341/05 Viking, Case C-438/05 Laval, Case C-346/06 Ruffert (n 
177). 
237 It is worthy of note that the contradictions may even arise as a form of an institutional schizophrenia: 
how can the WTO encourage the expansion of agribusiness while showing equal concern for the 
protection of access to food by the world’s population (de Schutter (n 46))? 
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has led to a blacking-out of background rules and their distributional consequences.238 If 
therefore it is to address the issues raised by the transnational exercise of private 
power, it must evolve on these various points, in terms of both philosophy and 
technique, in order to overcome the legacy of the closet. To do so, it must articulate a 
project.  
 
III. PLANET: The Politics of International Law Beyond the Schism 
 
Beyond the closet, the planetary239 function of private international law requires it to 
rise to the challenge of private power beyond the state. The project involves reaching 
over the current schism within international law to reassert its political function in 
moderating conflicts of normative authority. To do so means to quarry the potential of 
human rights in cases of abuse by private actors (A), to explore the resources of legal 
pluralism to address transnational normative claims beyond the state (B), and finally to 
re-embed global governance in its social context (C). 
 
(A) The Fundamental Rights Quarry 
 
The closeting of private international law has meant that, by not responding to the need 
induced by the advent of globalisation for new forms of regulation of the cross-border 
conduct of private actors, it has been sidelined to a certain degree by the extraterritorial 
application of fundamental rights norms.240 These norms have been observed as 
                                                 
238 This point is made tellingly in the field of family law by J Halley and K Rittich, ‘Critical Directions in 
Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism’ (2010) 
58 American Journal of Comparative Law 753. Compare too, in the context of substantive private 
(European) law, M Lurger, ‘Old and New Insights for the Protection of Consumers in European Private 
Law in the Wake of the Global Economic Crisis’ in Brownsword et al (n 158) 89, especially 102. 
239 The significance of the planet is thus described by M Hardt and A Negri, Empire (Harvard University 
Press, 2000) 41: ‘the earth may be emerging as an imminent field upon which to relocate visceral 
experiences of identification traditionally reserved for the territorial nation. The earth becomes a rallying 
cry through which to fashion and tame capital.’ See also U Mattei, ‘2012 European Charter on the 
Protection of the Commons’, launched at International University College, Torino (Italy) on 2/3 
(December 2011) See www.ibs.it/.../mattei.../beni-comuni-manifesto.htm.  
240 The term ‘fundamental rights’ will be used here to designate rights of international, regional (European 
or Inter-American Conventions), or indeed national and constitutional origin. This does not mean that 
there may not be significant differences in their content, scope or conditions of application (for instance, 
in respect of comparative judicial use of the proportionality test, see D Kennedy, ‘A Transnational 
Genealogy of Proportionality in Private Law’ in Brownsword et al (n 158) 185). The point made here is 
that these rights may increasingly disrupt the more traditional rules of private international law.  
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‘migrating’ steadily towards sites of transnational governance.241 Such migration has 
generated a battle of disciplines, in which human rights norms are usually presented as 
a methodological irritant of a somewhat primitive sort.242 Clearly, however, the struggle 
is largely ideological, rights being perceived as the harbinger of disorder within an 
otherwise harmoniously governed arena.243 The clash is of course hardly surprising, 
given the highly political content of human rights, as opposed to the supposedly neutral 
and resolutely technical terrain of private international law. Methodologically, they 
bring proportionality where the conflict of laws uses deductivism; and as a matter of 
epistemology, they are no respecters of the public/private divide which remains so 
engrained in dominant private international law doctrine. The resulting disciplinary 
confrontation means that human rights and the tools of private international law are in a 
state of competition which looks at present to be likely to end in the demise of the latter, 
rather than in a quest for confluence or mutual benefit. 
 
(a) Competition 
 
Fundamental rights are not equipped with any specific technology for dealing with the 
transnational sphere; indeed, their very fundamentality means that they are, if not 
universal,244 at least non-discriminatory and thus border-blind. Frequently, therefore, 
private international law is perceived to have been brushed aside by the imperious 
demands of fundamental rights, with little regard for its foundational distinction 
between the international and the domestic. In the European context, for example, non-
discrimination (Article 14 ECHR) will frequently impose the protection of a Convention 
                                                 
241 Scott and Wai (n 8).  
242 These critiques are widespread in Europe (see eg L d’Avout, (2011) Revue critique droit international 
privé 673, denouncing the ‘inappropriate politisation’ of legal debate induced by human rights).  
243 See ibid, 675 on the disorder created by the introduction of human rights into the conflict generated by 
the two successive marriages (20 years apart) of a Maltese woman, who had believed, no doubt in good 
faith (or with insufficient knowledge of conflict of law rules), that her first marriage had been legally 
dissolved. The case discussed was handed down by the ECtHR, 4th Section, on 6th July 2010 (req 
38797/07). The decision is one of inadmissibility however, so that its real thrust on the merits is doubtful.  
244 Regional human rights instruments accept their own cultural components and limited scope (eg Article 
1, European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees these rights “within the jurisdiction” of the 
Contracting States ). The fundamental rights protected by international law comprise a claim to 
universality, but their very content is contested. Paradoxically, the relativist doctrine, respectful of 
alterity, which was first canvassed by Western comparatists and anthropologists in order to curb 
imperialist legal attitudes towards third world legal cultures, is now in tension with the universalist claim 
by the latter, who (rightly) see an emancipatory potential in international human rights law.  
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right (often the right to privacy under Article 8), irrespective of the national legal regime 
applicable under the forum state’s conflict of laws rules. This means that, in many cases, 
the tools that private international law has developed to determine both the 
geographical and personal reach of rules (jurisdiction and choice of law), and the 
acceptability of foreign solutions (ordre public), will be paralysed.245 More technically, 
the sidelining of private international law takes place through the three different 
channels by which human rights claim to regulate the conduct of private actors: 
verticality, diagonality and horizontality.  
 
1. Verticality 
 
The first set of instances in which fundamental rights appear to be in competition with 
private international law mechanisms are cases of ‘vertical’ application, in which states 
or their agents are held to the protection of such rights by a supranational court. Cases 
of violation may give rise to any of the various mechanisms of state responsibility in 
international, regional or specialised regime settings (through diplomatic protection 
before the CIJ; interstate actions before the dispute resolution body of the WTO or the 
ECJ; or specific private actions in the context of the ECHR, etc). The confrontation may 
take any of several different forms: 
 
- The first set of instances reveals nothing specific about the conflict of laws. 
Fundamental rights may be invoked in any of these fora in order to challenge the 
                                                 
245 For instance, illustrating the requirement of non-discrimination, the European Court of Human Rights 
ruled on 2 March 2010, in the case of Kozak v Poland, that a same-sex partner should be able to succeed to 
a tenancy held by their deceased partner. The Court held that the Polish authorities’ exclusion of same-sex 
couples from succession could not be justified as necessary for the legitimate purpose of protection of the 
family and was a violation of the right to non-discrimination under Article 14 ECHR. Although this 
particular case was domestic, the same regime will apply whatever law governs the succession, and 
whatever the answer the conflict of laws brings to the ‘incidental question’ of status raised in connection 
with the assertion of rights to heritable property or succession. Although much criticised for its intrusions 
on national sovereignty, the Court shows considerable prudence in using the principle of non-
discrimination (Article 14) when the right is not itself protected by the Convention. Thus, in Gas et Dubois 
v France, 15 March 2012, the Court ruled that the right of a person in a same-sex partnership to adopt his 
or her partner’s child is not protected by the ECHR. The case involved a French woman who was denied 
her request to adopt her civil partner’s child, who was conceived through in vitro fertilisation (IVF). She 
argued that the adoption denial violated Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, which protect against invasion of family 
privacy and discrimination, respectively. In its decision, the Court found that the denial did not 
discriminate against same-sex couples, because opposite sex couples in civil partnerships are equally 
denied a right to adoption. The court reiterated that the ECHR does not require its members to legalise 
same-sex marriage. 
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international legality/conventionality/constitutionality of a choice of law rule, in the 
same way as they might invalidate domestic substantive law. The combined effect of 
privacy and discrimination (Articles 8 and 14 ECHR) provides a good example. Thus, in 
Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom, the ECHR imposed legal recognition of 
transsexualism in a domestic context, on the basis of Article 8.246 It follows from there 
that in a case in which a foreign individual claims official recognition of a change of sex, a 
national conflict of laws rule which retains the nationality of the individual as a 
connecting factor for questions of personal status and thereby prevents such recognition 
is discriminatory (under Article 14 ECHR, or under national constitutional rules).247  
- In a second set of cases, the clash between conflict of laws and human rights is specific 
to the former, since these instances involve situations that are inherently transnational. 
More remarkably, violations are independent of the substantive content of the domestic 
laws involved. For example, in its decision in Wagner, the ECtHR held that Luxembourg 
was in contravention of Article 8 ECHR in refusing recognition to an adoption granted in 
Peru, under its choice of law rule on the validity of inter-country adoption. The source of 
the illegality was thus the working, in this particular context, of Luxembourg’s choice of 
law principles which prevented the foreign adoption from producing its effects in the 
forum.248 The illegality, therefore, is not linked to Luxembourg’s own regulation of the 
substantive institution of adoption, and certainly does not impose any particular 
legislative enactment of adoption within a Contracting State. The violation concerns the 
protection of the claimants’ right to family life in a cross-border context: once an 
effective family relationship had been constituted in Peru, Luxembourg, from whom 
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment was sought, was bound to protect it. Human 
                                                 
246 In Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom, on 11 July 2002, the ECHR ruled that Contracting States must 
legally recognise sex changes under Article 8, given the serious interference with private life arising from 
the conflict between social reality and law (in circumstances where sex was of legal relevance, such as in 
the area of pensions, retirement age etc) which placed transsexuals in an anomalous position, where they 
could experience feelings of vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety.  
247Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG Federal Constitutional Court) 18 August 2006, cases 1 BvL 1/04 and 
1 BvL 12/04 (NJW 2007, 900; IPRax 2007, 217) declaring the Transsexuals Act as unconstitutional 
(Transsexuellengesetz, TSG) as it benefited only German nationals. As a result of the use of nationality as 
a connecting factor, most foreign transsexuals had no means to apply to German authorities with regard 
to an adjustment of their official documents. Under this judgment, German law has to offer to each 
transsexual living in Germany an equal means for the official recognition of gender affiliation. This raises 
the burning question of whether all differentiation on the basis of citizenship is discriminatory (see in the 
context of US conflicts debate, as a critique of Currie’s governmental interest analysis: D Laycock, ‘Equal 
Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law’ (1992) 92 
Columbia Law Review 249).  
248Wagner et JMWL v Luxembourg, req no 76240/01), 28 June 2007.  
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rights protection takes the form of a specific methodology, imposing recognition of the 
foreign relationship, whatever outcome was mandated by the conflict of laws rules.249 
What counts here is that the situation originally constituted (or the expectations initially 
generated) should benefit from continuity when it crosses the frontier, irrespective of 
the forum’s private international law.  
- The third set of cases illustrates indirect or ‘mirror’ violation of a fundamental right, in 
cases where the initial offender is a foreign (and in the case of the ECHR, not necessarily 
Contracting) State. This situation arises in cases of recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments, or other circumstances in which a state is called upon to give effect to 
the laws of another state. If those foreign laws or judgments offend a right that the 
recognising state is bound to protect, then recognition of the law or judgment will 
constitute a violation by the receiving state. Thus, in the Pelligrini case, Italy was held to 
account by the Strasbourg Court for the violation of Article 6 of the ECHR, for omitting to 
verify whether a judgment handed down by the courts of the Vatican, which was 
operative in Italy by reason of the Concordat, had respected the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial.250  
- A fourth category is composed of instances in which a state is responsible for the 
violation of human rights by its own agents, whether within its own territory or abroad. 
This responsibility based on agency frequently involves positive obligations, whereby 
states must actively ensure that the rights are protected. For instance, not only must a 
state refrain from torturing prisoners, it must ensure that prisoners do not torture each 
other in their cells. It may therefore be responsible for inadequate supervision by state 
agents (police, officers, functionaries). Such responsibility for agents may also apply 
extraterritorially, in cases where the state exercises effective control over a foreign 
territory.251  
                                                 
249 On the rise of this methodology (painted in broad brush strokes) see H Muir Watt, ‘The New 
Unilateralism: European Federalism and the New Unilateralism’ (2008) 82 Tulane Law Review 1983. It is 
often likened to that of the vested rights doctrine, which required recognition of rights vested under a 
foreign law (although the unconditionality of such recognition was only apparent, since it referred 
implicitly to the principle of territoriality). Similar reasoning can be found in the ECJ’s case law, where it 
shares common ground with the ‘country of origin’ principle dictated by the economic freedoms. See ECJ, 
Case C-148/02, Carlos Garcia Avello v Etat Belge, 2 October 2003, mandating recognition by Belgium of the 
structure of a child’s family name under Spanish law. 
250 See ECtHR, 20 July 2001, Pelligrini v Italy, req n° 30882/96. The violation is imputable to Italy for 
Italy’s own action in giving effect to the Vatican’s judgment (which is not examined by the Court; the 
Vatican is not a party to the ECHR). 
251 For constitutional rights, see US Supreme Court Boumédienne v Bush, 553 US 723 (2008); for European 
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- The fifth set of cases of vertical effects of fundamental rights overlaps significantly with 
choice of law principles governing transnational private law relationships, although the 
issues raised here have not yet been addressed in the courts. They correspond to an idea 
canvassed contemporaneously by John Ruggie and Olivier de Schutter, according to 
which states could (and should) be held accountable for violations of international law 
by the corporations that—without being state agents as in the previous hypothesis—are 
nevertheless within their sphere of influence or impact.252 In support of this idea, the 
economic tie between the corporation and the state of its seat or incorporation would 
seem to imply that the latter benefits from fiscal returns on corporate activity in trade 
and investment abroad. As a corollary, therefore, the home state can be seen to owe a 
duty of care to the local community of the host state and its environment, under which it 
is responsible for the harmful effects of the foreign conduct of the revenue-generating 
corporation. One might indeed go further and suggest that bilateral investment treaties, 
under which corporate investors receive state protection and encouragement when 
investing in a foreign country, might equally constitute the legal foundation for a 
corresponding duty of care on the part of the investor’s home state. In a similar 
perspective, in an attempt to make effective the right of the world’s population to 
adequate food, Olivier de Schutter has explored the legal foundations of a duty for states 
to ensure that their own corporations in the multinational food supply chain do not 
interfere with access to food (via access to land and agriculture) of foreign 
communities.253 
 
2. Diagonality  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
human rights, see ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Al Skeini and Others v United Kingdom, joined Al-Jedda v The 
United Kingdom (Application No 27021/08), 7 July 2011. However, the overlap with private international 
law remains relatively limited here; while foreign citizens may benefit from state liability before the 
courts of the home country as seen in these instances, an official agent acting under orders will generally 
benefit from foreign sovereign immunity before the courts of another state. 
252The (controversial) concept of ‘sphere of influence’ was introduced at the instigation of John Ruggie 
into the preamble to the UN Global Compact, which asks companies to ‘embrace, support and enact, within 
their sphere of influence, a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour standards, the 
environment, and anti-corruption’. For Olivier de Schutter’s ideas on the world population’s right to food, 
see de Schutter and Cordes, Accounting for Hunger (n 103).  
253 He emphasises however, in this respect, the dangers of fragmentation of international law, and the 
correlative tendency of states to opt for compliance with trade agreements backed by immediate 
economic sanctions, rather than human rights—despite their ius cogens status. 
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‘Diagonal conflicts’ evoke the confrontation and articulation of rules or norms 
originating in formally distinct legal orders which are themselves in some form of 
relationship other than one of primacy or verticality.254 It can be used to describe the 
reference by a national statute such as the Alien Tort Statute to international law (the 
law of nations), whereby domestic law provides a remedy in cases of violation of the 
latter. The way in which the national remedial rule ‘fits’ with the substantive norm 
borrowed from international law is now at the core of a methodological debate, which 
has led to the US Supreme Court’s granting of certiorari in the Kiobel case, as seen 
above.255 Under the Alien Tort Statute, does international law govern the entire question 
as to whether a given defendant is civilly liable, as the Second Circuit thought, leading it 
to look for international precedent for the civil liability of corporations? Is the addressee 
of the norm of conduct (or the authorship of the violation) an inherent part of its 
definition? Or does international law provide only the content of the norm of conduct of 
which the violation is in issue, leaving it up to domestic law to determine who can be 
made liable (and for what kinds of liability)?256 The latter approach can be convincingly 
explained in terms of ‘incidental application’ or ‘prise en consideration’ of norms from 
other legal systems, a technique well known in conflict of laws methodology, when one 
domestic legal system ‘borrows’ from another for specific purposes.257  
 
3. Horizontality  
 
There is a real need for effective sources of discipline of private actors in the 
transnational sphere, where local conceptions of the public interest do not reach. The 
response of human rights, at least in their regional form (ECHR or IACHR), is to subject 
                                                 
254The term was used by Joerges (n 79) 149 to denote the specific relationship of European Union law to 
the national laws of Member States, in cases where the latter govern (subject to the availability of 
procedural remedies) but may not frustrate the ends of the former (as illustrated in Case C-453/99, 
Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan, 20 September 2001); compare, generalising the concept as a federalist tool, 
Heymann (n 30).  
255 See above n87 and section I-B-a.  
256 The second of these two alternative interpretations has prevailed in three other Circuits: see US Court 
of Appeals for the DC Circuit (John Doe v Exxon Mobil 09-7125), 9th Cir (Sarei v Rio Tinto 02-56256), 7th 
Cir (Flomo v Firestone 10-3675).  
257 Borrowing takes place when choice of law rules cannot do the job, usually because the borrowed norm 
is part of a heterogeneous normative order. In the context of theories of legal pluralism, it might be said 
that one system has ‘relevance’ for another (see S Romano, L’Ordinamento Giuridico (1918)). It also 
appears in conflict of laws doctrine in the US, where it accounts for the relevance of ‘local data’ (see B 
Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Duke University Press, 1963) 82). 
 60 
such actors to identical obligations as are applicable to states, through the mechanism 
known as ‘horizontal effect’. Private persons may thus be held responsible for human 
rights violations ‘by catalysis’, that is, through the intermediary of the responsibility of 
the state which had a duty to prevent their action.258 The catalysis is achieved first by 
interpreting human rights to include ‘positive obligations’ whereby states are 
accountable for violations by third parties (as seen above), then by considering that 
these obligations may be invoked by all persons ‘subject to their jurisdiction’ (as in 
Article 1 ECHR). For instance, as seen above, a state must not only refrain from torturing 
prisoners, but must ensure that prisoners within its territory do not torture each other 
in their cells. Supposing that domestic criminal law does not provide adequate sanction 
and reparation in such a case, the family of a tortured prisoner may nevertheless bring 
an action before the courts of a Contracting State against the fellow detainee-torturer on 
the basis of Article 2 ECHR (right to life). The responsibility of the defendant co-detainee 
is derived by catalysis from that of the state which by virtue of its positive obligations 
under Article 2 should have prevented the harmful conduct.  
However, it appears that under human rights law, the positive obligations that private 
individuals may invoke horizontally, in interactions with other individuals, do not 
extend beyond the limits of the territory of the (accountable Contracting) State.259 For 
instance, the victim of corporate misconduct outside the corporation’s home state 
cannot—in the present state of judicial doctrine in international law and according to 
dominant academic opinion—use horizontal effect to hold that corporation to account 
before the courts of the home state for violation of fundamental rights. Such instances 
are said to lack a sufficient public nexus (state action requirement) with the home state 
to justify the direct liability of the latter, thereby excluding any horizontal effect. In many 
cases, domestic law will be insufficient either because the right in question is 
unarticulated as such (for instance, the right to food) or because the conflict of laws 
rules of the forum will lead to the application of local law, whose standards of care/level 
of protection are too low to provide any effective redress. If framed in terms of vertical 
effect, this hypothesis would correspond to the fifth set of cases envisaged above: ones 
                                                 
258The concept of responsibility by catalysis was invented in this context by Robert Ago, special 
rapporteur for the International Law Commission; see (1972) Fourth Report, 105, para 65, note 120.  
259 As opposed to the agency hypothesis, in which the State is accountable for the acts of its public officers 
abroad (such as acts of its military in occupied territory).  
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where current doctrine draws the line and does not allow the responsibility of states for 
private extraterritorial conduct, for want of a public nexus (the state action 
requirement). Under current judicial doctrine, horizontal or vertical effects of human 
rights are therefore largely powerless to ensure that corporations conducting their 
activities in third states respect therein the rights that are guaranteed at home.  
This is where private international law comes into the picture and where its specific 
tools could make a significant contribution to the use of such rights in respect of private 
actors acting outside the territory of the defendant state. In the specific case of 
multinational firms whose conduct in third countries violates standards applicable in 
the home (Contracting) State, the choice of law rule in Rome II leads to the application of 
the lex loci delicti, thereby consolidating the vocation of the less protective standards of 
the host country. Of course, if the ordinarily applicable law does not provide the 
protection due to fundamental rights, these will interfere in the derogatory form of the 
exception of ordre public, which will then require a fine-tuning of their scope. It will be 
asked, in particular, if the nexus with the forum state is sufficient to allow (oblige) the 
court to set aside the content of the foreign law and make the right prevail.260 A 
preferable version of this reasoning suggests a teleological approach designed to ensure 
that right is given a scope that makes sense in terms of the objectives that are sought to 
be accomplished. Here, it would be inconceivable that an employer would not be subject 
to home standards in respect of the rights of employees, or that a polluter would escape 
liability simply because the affected environment is that of another country.  
This, therefore, can be seen as a case of confluence, which calls for further 
enquiry.  
 
(b) Confluence 
 
The political dimension of fundamental rights explains why they have been perceived as 
an unwelcome onslaught in a ‘smooth’ or uncontested system of private international 
legal ordering.261 Clearly, however, such resistance by the discipline of conflict of laws to 
the surfacing of political choice in transnational contexts will lead to its being sidelined 
                                                 
260 Such fine-tuning owes much to German constitutional doctrine: see P Hammje, ‘Droits fondamentaux et 
ordre public’ (1997) Revue critique droit international privé 1. 
261 Ibid. 
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by other forms of governance—except perhaps in contexts where there exists sufficient 
underlying consensus on the content of legal institutions to justify the primacy of 
technical rules. The European Union aspires to such a ‘community of laws’, and may 
conceivably be able to maintain traditional methods of determination of the applicable 
law on the basis of shared core values.262 However, even here, practice tends to show 
that radical conflicts still surface, not the least of which oppose the two regional Courts 
on issues of allocation of jurisdiction among national courts.263 It is useful, and perhaps 
pressing, therefore, to rethink some of the core positions of private international law, to 
see how they could be changed to ensure confluence and mutual enrichment, rather 
than conflict and absorption. For a start, this could involve revisiting the dividing line 
between the private and the public, and re-mapping the purview of (state and non-state) 
responsibility for human rights violations.  
 
1. Redefining the Private  
 
One of the most radical disturbances induced by human rights on traditional private 
international law thinking is the disappearance of the foundational distinction between 
public and private law. The main difficulty raised by the subjection of private actors to 
human rights norms for private international law is that public and private law are 
supposed to obey different precepts in respect of their application in the international 
sphere. As seen above, while private law was seen to possess an abstract vocation to 
apply to any given legal issue, wherever the geographical location of the underlying 
facts, the sway of public law was perceived to be limited to local territory. Hence the 
difficult issue of extraterritoriality in the horizontal application of state responsibility, 
which reflects the paralysis of public law in the transnational sphere. On the other hand, 
through the combined workings of positive obligations and horizontal effect, private 
actors are no longer immune to human rights norms which were once thought to 
address only the public exercise of power. Human rights therefore encroach on the 
                                                 
262At least if all EU Member States subscribe, or continue to subscribe, to the same liberal market project. 
The limits of this condition are evident in the European markets for corporate charters, or the labour 
market, where it is difficult to conciliate the different existing economic and social models (see Muir Watt 
(n 57) 60 ff).  
263 Compare (in the field of child abduction) ECJ-C-491/10 PPU, 22 December 2010; ECtHR n° 14737/09, 
12 July 2011, Sneersone.  
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realm of the private, and are equally indifferent to the traditional modes of operation of 
public and private law in respect of territory.  
This does not mean, however, that the usefulness of distinguishing the public and 
private spheres has disappeared; simply, the foundations of the distinction need to be 
revisited. Working on the horizontal effect of human rights law on private actors, 
Andrew Clapham has suggested an analytical framework264 that structures the 
justification for human rights around the dual goals of dignity and democracy.265 
Clapham’s thesis is that by identifying the foremost aim of the right invoked in any one 
situation, the scope of rights can be determined without having to deal with ‘the 
intractable riddle of conflicting human rights, or endless balancing and weighing 
exercises’. Thus, if the situation calls for the right to be justified by the goal of 
democracy, then there has to be a public element in the private actor’s activities, that is, 
the private actor is operating in the sphere of the public domain. But in a situation 
where the justification for the right in question concerns dignity, then rights must be 
protected even in the absence of a public element. Thus, inhuman treatment threatens 
dignity wherever it may take place, whereas freedom of speech needs to find expression 
in public fora.266  
It is doubtful that conflicting rights claims can really be so readily resolved, or that the 
division of rights as between dignity and democracy is any easy matter.267 Indeed, such 
classificatory endeavours as a method of conciliating conflicting norms are familiar in 
private international law: they are evocative of the medieval glossators’ (and then post-
                                                 
264 J Fedtke and D Oliver, Human Rights and the Private Sphere (Clarendon Press, 1996).  
265The author proposes to translate these concepts into Raz’s terminology: for ‘collective goods’ read 
‘democracy’, and for ‘autonomy’ read ‘dignity’.  
266 Andrew Clapham illustrates the distinction by comparing two examples. The first case concerns 
measures taken by local authorities restricting the freedom of expression of protesters in a (private) 
shopping precinct. If this precinct is the only forum in the town, democracy demands that there is full 
participation and representation of different ideas in the community. The second case concerns a coven of 
witches demanding to speak at a Christian prayer meeting. Here, there is no question of democracy being 
threatened where the witches are free to disseminate their views via alternative means. ‘Both these 
situations relate to freedom of speech and democratic participation, yet in one situation banning the 
speakers results in a breach of human rights and in the other it does not. This holds true for the shopping 
precinct example, because it is suggested that there is a public element here, yet in the witches example, 
there is not one. (Of course “public” in this context does not require a nexus with the State, but simply 
means relevant to the interests of the community or collective goods.) But if the witches were denied the 
right to meet at all, this would threaten their dignity, as their freedom of conscience, expression, or 
autonomy would be restricted’ (145). 
267 Referring back to the example cited in the previous footnote, is it entirely clear that a blanket ban on 
witches’ covens would not also contravene the requirements of democracy, or that the reduction of a 
group of protestors to silence would not also offend the dignity of that group, insofar as it carries a 
particular belief? 
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glossators’) determination of the personal or territorial reach of statutes, and the 
accompanying characterisation exercise, which required determining whether the 
statute was mainly personal or mainly real.268 However, despite these inevitable frontier 
disputes, the suggested framework seems extremely useful as a broad tool for 
understanding the ‘public’ element that conditions the violation of certain rights. In turn, 
it sheds light on the public nexus or ‘state action’ requirement which triggers the 
horizontal effect of human rights, and may in turn help in the latter context with the 
complex issue of extraterritoriality. As seen above, such an issue arises when private 
actors are held responsible through the catalysis of state responsibility. But once it has 
integrated the fact that the private exercise of public power calls for the same 
constraints as those applicable to public actors, private international law needs to 
concede an effort of remapping, before this line of exploration can go any further.  
 
2. Remapping (State and Non-State) Responsibility 
 
Jacco Bomhoff has pointed out the analogy between the vocabulary used to describe the 
impact of fundamental rights within the private sphere and their ambit outside the 
home (forum) territory.269 The methods for determining the reach of rights in either 
case differ, however. In the first case, considerations relating to the (public) nexus are 
integrated into the balancing or proportionality test,270 under which the violation of a 
right is assessed. Simply put, violation may be less likely if the claim relates to a factual 
situation which has a weak nexus with the defendant state, while responsibility is more 
justified when such a nexus exists. In the second case, there is a non-integrated, two-step 
analysis, which starts by asking if a given right is applicable given its (territorial or 
personal) nexus with the facts, before determining whether, as a distinct matter of 
substance, it has been violated. Bomhoff asks whether these two methods for 
determining the reach of rights (respectively in private sphere cases or in foreign cases) 
should not be merged, and whether, in transnational cases, the responsibility of the 
                                                 
268 See Bureau and Muir Watt (n 65) 357.  
269 See Bomhoff, ‘The Reach of Rights’ (n 12).  
270 On the relationship between balancing of interests and the proportionality test, see D Kennedy, ‘A 
Transnational Genealogy of Proportionality in European Private Law’ in Brownsword, Micklitz et al (n 
158).  
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defendant state for a violation of fundamental rights—and, by catalysis, that of private 
actors—could be framed as a single issue, aligned on nexus.  
Obviously, collapsing the traditional rule-based approach into a single proportionality 
test would represent a radical change of perspective for traditional forms of private 
international legal reasoning. Indeed the conflict of laws has always singled out 
applicability or jurisdiction as a preliminary matter, to be determined before issues of 
substance may be addressed. However, the idea that responsibility—whether of public 
or private entities—should be directly correlated to nexus, and that each entity 
exercising political or economic power should be held to account for violations of human 
rights within the sway of such power, both towards and on the part of third parties 
(subjects, contractors, communities, etc), has been gaining considerable ground in the 
past decade. As discussed above, this idea finds expression in various contexts: state 
responsibility, jurisdiction, and private corporate liability. Indeed, as we shall see below, 
extending the responsibility of private actors according to influence and affectedness 
could be one of the new axiological foundations of private international law. This is what 
we shall now attempt to verify, in addressing the legitimacy issues that come with 
transnational legal pluralism. 
 
(B) The Resources of Legal Pluralism  
 
As seen above, the recent focus of the global governance debate, in various non-legal 
vocabularies—political science, social theory, economics—has been the emergence of 
authority beyond the state.271 Subsequent legitimacy issues have been arising when 
traditional democratic structures and processes are no longer there to ensure—or can 
no longer plausibly be presumed to ensure—that the resulting legalities are not merely 
the one-sided expression of economic power.272 Severe hardship, injustice, imbalance 
and crisis linked to the rise of private global rulers have largely dampened the initial 
excitement over the brave new world freed from the constraints of parochial (when not 
totalitarian or corrupt) state regulation. The backlash may often come in the form of a 
                                                 
271 See the discussion in-text, at page 30, and see also the references cited supra note 175. 
272 At the same time, while considerable harm can be wrought by governmental practices sheltered by 
sovereignty (or indeed the reverse, if the state is perceived to be a mere receptacle for cultural practice), 
see Mutua (n 55). That ‘private’ is synonymous with ‘virtuous’ is certainly not the claim here.  
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return to the national, whereas the real need now is not for protectionism or integrism, 
but for forms of governance that adequately address the issue of private power in the 
global economy. In this respect, private international law’s own ‘private history’273 
reveals that it has the potential to make an essential contribution to the enabling and 
tethering of private authority. Indeed, it is contended here that there has always been, in 
varying guises, a pluralist counter-narrative, left over from the era, before the nation-
state, when it was in effect the only governance instrument available to mediate the 
conflicting regulatory claims of the medieval cities and ensure the fair resolution of 
disputes between merchants hailing from diverse origins.274 As Robert Wai has 
suggested, private international law has always served as an interface between the local 
and the global,275 allowing national cultures their place in the governance of situations 
beyond their own territorial boundaries. This mediating function of private 
international law needs to be remembered and reinvented in a world where the 
‘disembedding’ of regulation is seen to be one of the prime causes of global mal-être.276  
The abundance of diverse public and private regulation now to be found in the global 
arena, where diverse actors and legal entrepreneurs compete or cooperate extensively 
to acquire legal influence,277 has sometimes led to the very concept of a governance gap 
being challenged.278 However, pointing to such a gap does not signify that there is a 
dearth of (state and non-state) normativities, but rather that despite and sometimes 
because of their multiplicity, they do not achieve—and indeed may conspire to 
impede—the tethering of private interests in the name of the global good.279 Indeed, in 
                                                 
273 Mills (n 26) ch 2, 26 ff. 
274 And all the while laying the foundations of informal economic empire: see above, section I-A. 
275 See Wai, ‘Conflicts and Comity in Transnational Governance: Private International Law as Mechanism 
and Metaphor for Transnational Social Regulation through Plural Legal Regimes’ (n 8) 240. 
276 On disembeddedness as a loss of connection between markets and society, see Joerges and Falke, 
‘Introduction’ in Karl Polanyi (n 42). Cf M Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure, The 
Problem of Embeddedness’ (1985) 91 American Journal of Sociology 481, J Caporaso and S Tarrow, 
‘Polanyi in Brussels: Supranational Institutions and the Transnational Embedding of Markets’ (2009) 63 
International Organization 593–620. One of the virtues of private international law as a global governance 
project is that it does not ‘disembed’, but mediates between the global and the local by ensuring that 
societal forces have their say. 
277 Such entrepreneurs may be public and private standard-setters, certifiers, lobbies, monitoring 
agencies, corporations and corporate alliances, in addition of course to sovereign states and international 
organisations.  
278 See Bartley (n 44) 25 ff. 
279 See S Picciotto, ‘Disembedding and Regulation: The Paradox of International Finance’ in Karl Polanyi. 
Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets (n 42) 157 ff; Falke (n 41), especially 160 
ff; cf D Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ in Ruling the World (n 2) 56, noting that rather than 
the lack of regulation, the governance black hole is where somes rules apply and others don’t (in relation 
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some cases, private regulation may actually constitute the governance gap that it 
purports to fill.280 That rating agencies are governed by corporate codes of conduct,281 
or financial markets by purportedly autonomous regimes designed and monitored by 
market actors,282 illustrates the ambivalence of such private legislation. However, who 
could object on moral grounds to environmental (water or forestry) stewardship,283 
equally private? Similarly, the effect of corporate compliance mechanisms, 
superimposed upon human rights standards, may be to coopt, disactivate, or otherwise 
keep at bay apparently mandatory international regimes.284  
At the same time, these new legalities collapse some of the most established organising 
principles of the liberal legal system. Thus, describing standardisation, Harm Shepel 
observes285 that ‘standards hover between the state and the market; standards largely 
collapse the distinction between legal and social norms; standards are very rarely either 
wholly public or wholly private, and can be both intensively local and irreducibly global’. 
                                                                                                                                                        
to Guantánamo). The gap refers not to the quantity of available norms, nor indeed to their content, but to 
the processes through which they are articulated. This is precisely the focus of ‘Global administrative law’, 
which aims to apply standards of good governance to rule-making in contexts such as comitology where 
state-centred democratic values are inapplicable. However, Nils Jansen and Ralf Michaels make the 
important point that lack of regulation can only be considered a form of regulation if it corresponds to a 
deliberate abstention and not a failure of states having lost control (see Jansen and Michaels (n 3) 872). 
280 Making this point in the context of global project finance, in respect of the web of private contracts 
framing investment which tend to reduce the protective potential of the host-state’s human rights 
responsibilities, see Leader and Ong (n 214) especially 9. 
281 On such codes, see Audit, ‘Aspects internationaux de la responsabilité des agences de notation’ (n 30) 
581–602, especially 584.  
282 Such as the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). On the clash between conflicting 
claims of autonomous private regime and ultra-mandatory international public law principles, see H 
Collins, ‘Flipping Wreck: Lex Mercatoria on the Shoals of Ius Cogens’ (LSE conference paper, forthcoming).  
283 On the functioning of certification by the forest stewardship council, see S Guéneau, ‘Certification as a 
New Private Global Forest Governance System: The Regulatory Potential of the Forest Stewardship 
Council’ in Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 379. The Alliance for 
Water Stewardship defines its own mission as promoting responsible use of freshwater that is socially 
and economically beneficial as well as environmentally sustainable, in order to maintain or improve 
biodiversity and ecological processes at the watershed level. It ‘recognizes basic human needs and 
ensures long-term benefits (including economic benefits) for local people and society at large’. Among the 
subscribers to the Alliance is the Coca Cola Company, with the goal ‘to ensure the water we use in our 
manufacturing processes, everywhere in the world, will be returned to the environment at a level that 
supports aquatic life by 2010 through comprehensive wastewater treatment’. How credible is this 
commitment? How legitimate is the standards setting process? How effectively are such standards 
monitored? 
284 On the illusions and delusions of social corporate responsibility, which makes worker protection in the 
third world dependent upon the vagaries of the Western consumer market, and its cooptation of human 
rights norms, see F Cochoy and A Lachèze, ‘Capture et Contre-Capture dans les Politiques de 
Responsabilité Sociale de l’Entreprise’ in Daugareilh, Responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise transnationale et 
globalisation de l’économie (n 84) 31; D Vogel, The Market For Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (Brookings Institution Press, 2005).  
285 See Shepel (n 8) 3. 
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They constitute ‘a normative fabric far beyond the capacity of any state. Markets 
wouldn’t exist without them … ’. Significantly, while a public law approach assumes that 
standards are essentially political, private law considers them to be essentially 
economic.286 By the same token, it is also quite clear that the avenue of legal pluralism, 
which implies accepting the claim of effective normative authority beyond the state, is 
the only one that adequately addresses the issue of private power in the global arena. 
However, in order to solve the legitimacy problem raised by transnational expressions 
of non-state authority, the purely process-based methodology often associated with 
legal pluralism is clearly inadequate (a). Here the search for a methodology better fitted 
to the governance function of private international law requires excavating neglected 
episodes of its own history (b). 
 
(a) The Legitimacy Issue 
 
Private international law has traditionally remained aloof from debates on the 
democratic legitimacy of the rules with which it deals.287 This is no doubt because such 
an issue is solved implicitly in state-centred methodologies as a threshold matter, by 
excluding any law elaborated by entities which do not conform to the definition of State 
as accepted in public international law. In Savigny’s initial formulation of ‘multilateralist’ 
methodology, only the communities (at the time, German princedoms) belonging to a 
closed ‘community of laws’ cemented by shared cultural (religious, linguistic and legal) 
tradition,288 were considered as participants in the common allocation of prescriptive 
authority.289 At the end of the nineteenth century, the ambit of Savignian methodology 
was extended, along with its academic success throughout continental Europe, to the 
                                                 
286 Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli suggest that standardisation actually covers an array of market-driven, 
industry-driven and public norms (see Büthe and Mattli (n 10) 18 ff for a typology). Social theory sees 
them as stabilising and generalising normative expectations, and constituting at least partially 
autonomous systems (see above n289). 
287 Even the controversial issue of lex mercatoria is more about the frontiers of law than the requirements 
of democracy.  
288 No ‘true conflicts’ were conceivable here. With the exception of ‘odious statutes’, which did not belong 
to the community (the concept, ancestor of the exception of public policy or ordre public, appears to have 
originated with the post-glossators: Bartole, 1314–57; Balde, 1327–1400). See B Ancel and H Muir Watt, 
‘Du statut prohibitif (droit savant et tendances régressives)’ in Etudes à la mémoire du professeur Bruno 
Oppetit (Litec, 2010) 7. 
289 Since such allocation was designed on the basis of a shared model, shaped by a common understanding 
of the ‘nature’ of legal institutions. For the analogous assumption of a like-minded community of European 
sovereign States in public international law, see above, section I-A. 
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world of sovereign states.290 At that point, the lines of political communities were 
redrawn so as to exclude infra-state and trans-state normative authority from the scope 
of the conflict of laws. This exclusion created undeniable tension in cases involving 
multiple religious communities, or non-recognised states, or claims by indigeneous 
people. This was particularly so since the methodology was made to apply ‘universally’ 
to cases involving laws beyond the cultural pale, notably in colonial and post-colonial 
encounters with the exotic.291 By and large, however, while carving out exceptions, this 
state-based model remained intact until today.292 
However, the challenge arising from the contemporary multiplication of normative 
claims from diverse sources beyond the state293 is more unsettling, since such claims 
may no longer be disqualified as exceptional. Today, ‘private governance regimes 
produce law exerting validity far beyond the borders of single nation-states, controlling 
and sanctioning behaviour in trans-national markets’.294 They constitute ‘an entire set of 
governance mechanisms within and without the state, generating new legalities and 
legitimacies’.295 At the same time, their very number implies that the acceptability296 of 
the norms involved in the governance of transnational private power can no longer be 
presumed without further scrutiny of their democratic pedigree.297 If, for instance, an 
issue of corporate environmental responsibility arises and it is claimed that a private 
code of conduct, or soft-norms created by international institutions, or standards set by 
an international private agency (such as the forest stewardship council298), are 
applicable in addition to, or instead of, the national rules of the place where the 
                                                 
290 Savigny’s prime intellectual rival was the Italian Mancini, whose influential state-centred doctrine was 
based on the public international principle of nationality.  
291On colonial public policy see above, n166 and 168 and accompanying text. 
292 On the tensions within multilateralist methodology on this point, see V Parisot, ‘Les conflits internes de 
lois’, doctoral thesis, Paris I, 2010. 
293 Identified by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ‘State, Law and Community in the World System: An 
Introduction’ (1992) 1 Social and Legal Studies 131. The term ‘beyond the state’ will often be used as a 
synonym for ‘private’ norms, meaning ‘privately-made’ norms (on the multiple meanings of the ‘private,’ 
see Jansen and Michaels (n 4)).  
294 Shepel (n 8) 21.  
295 S Sassen, ‘The State and Globalisation’ in Hall and Biersteker, The Emergence of Private Authority in 
Global Governance (n 10) 91, 94.  
296 Joerges (n 12) addresses the ‘acceptability’ question as one of the legitimacy of norms in private 
international law.  
297 See Black (n 8). 
298 On the functioning of certification by this council, see S Guéneau, ‘Certification as a New Private Global 
Forest Governance System: The Regulatory Potential of the Forest Stewardship Council’ in A Peters, L 
Koechlin, T Förster and G Fenner (eds), Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (Cambridge University Press, 
2009) 379. 
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pollution was felt, then it must surely be asked whether the norms thus invoked, while 
lacking the standard criterion of democratic legitimacy, are nevertheless the result of a 
sufficiently transparent process, and benefit from adequate compliance pull, to be 
considered by a (planetary-minded, pluralist) court.299 When should a claim to 
normative authority by a non-state regime be considered legitimate, and indeed 
relevant, in the case of competing claims, to the particular case?300 What if in the above 
example of an issue of liability for environmental harm on which various state laws are 
also in conflict, a programmatic agenda set by a prominent NGO, public opinion in a 
particular sector or locality, indigeneous custom, private codes of conduct drafted in the 
context of an alliance of corporate groups, and the UN global compact all have something 
(different) to say? Which are to be considered potential sources of the applicable law on 
which a given court (investment arbitrator? domestic court?) must ground its decision? 
Another telling illustration can be found in the context of the legal aftermath of the 
financial collapse of Lehmann Brothers,301 a situation characterised by Hugh Collins as a 
‘flipping wreck’.302 Here, British and American courts, reaching utterly contradictory 
decisions, approached the legal issues in terms of their own national (and conflicting) 
insolvency laws, all the while ignoring the comprehensive system—as powerful as it is 
problematic—of self-regulation devised by the various financial players in the OTC 
(‘over the counter’) market in which the disastrous credit swap agreements took 
place.303 At this point, therefore, one may ask whether claiming room for legal pluralism 
                                                 
299Compare the problematic example of the self-regulating financial ‘OTC’ market (discussed above at n 
262). Or indeed, the self-regulating Lloyd’s insurance market (discussed above at n 163). 
300 See again, on the issue of legitimacy and accountability of polycentric regimes, Black (n 8), for 
whom ‘legitimacy lies as much in the values, interests, expectations and cognitive frames of those who are 
perceiving and accepting the regime as they do in the regime itself’ (145). In cases of multiple legitimacy 
claims, this explains why a given organisation or regime may suffer ‘multiple accountability disorder’ with 
deleterious effects. Hence, for example, increasing bureaucratisation of NGOs to take account of 
accountability requirements formulated by state or international public actors may lead to a decrease in 
acceptance by the communities they seek to represent (154).  
301 See the conflicting decisions handed down respectively by US and UK courts, both framing the issues as 
a matter of insolvency law: Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd, 
Case no 09–01242 (Bankr SDNY) 25 January 2010; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd, Belmont Park Investments 
PTY Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd, Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc [2009] EWCA Civ 
1160. See Muir Watt (2011) Rev crit DIP 662. 
302 See Collins (n 285). 
303The ‘OTC’ (over the counter) market, whose functioning was at the heart of the Lehman saga, is 
described by Hugh Collins (n 285) as having ‘flourished internationally on the basis of a belief that its 
standardised transaction constituted a form of lex mercatoria. In the international financial markets, the 
ISDA Master Agreement, together with its supplementary documentation, was believed to provide a 
comprehensive system of self-regulation. The Master Agreement was devised by all the major players—
that is, the banks and their lawyers—with a view to providing an appropriate system of checks and 
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in such a context is really a means of furthering the privatisation of regulation in the 
world economy, avoiding the constraints of democracy in their elaboration and 
implementation. And if the relevant legalities are contradictory, which trump which?304 
Are not pluralism and deference, on the one hand, and conflict settlement, on the other, 
an ontological contradiction (or a utopian ideal?)305 
A seemingly obvious path here, in order to assess the legitimacy of private law-making, 
would be to turn to the resources developed elsewhere—within global administrative 
law, or political and social theory—to formulate requirements of effectiveness, 
transparency and accountability that contribute to ‘good governance’. As a meta-
regulatory system, a procedural law ‘law of law production’ would appear to hold the 
most promise.306 The implication is that private international law, eclipsed or 
superseded by a constitutional approach to transnational regimes, would have little to 
offer at this stage. However, it has also been suggested that its eclipse could be reversed. 
Christian Joerges proposes a ‘three-dimensional’ system of conflict of laws as 
‘constitutional form’.307 The idea, which posits the governance implications of private 
international law, is that conflict of laws could deal with collisions between public and 
private norms on several levels of governance.308 Thus, for instance, beyond horizontal 
                                                                                                                                                        
balances between the parties to the transactions. The Master Agreement rose above national legal systems 
because it provided a comprehensive code of self-regulation for the international financial market, which 
might be, and in practice invariably was, used as the documentation for these transactions.’ Nevertheless, 
no mention (for better or worse) of an alternative normative system was made in the two sets of decisions 
cited above. 
304 At least part of this dilemma was identified long ago by the early critics of Italian unilateralism, more 
recently by the opponents of Currie’s governmental interest analysis, and currently by the detractors of 
balancing approaches to conflicting human rights: what good is a methodology if it cannot provide a 
criterion (other than the equity or the subjectivity of the court) for selecting the conflicting claims and 
then settling ‘true conflicts’? 
305 Koskenniemi (n 1) 53 formulates a scathing criticism: ‘The problem of legal pluralism is the way it 
ceases to pose demands on the world. Its theorists are so enchanted by the complex interplay of regimes 
and a positivist search for an all-inclusive vocabulary that they lose the critical point of their exercise …’ 
And again, on social systems theory, ‘A part of the problem, and not of its solution, law has no argument to 
defend its ambition to be anything but “a gentle civiliser of nations”’. And again, ‘the substance of the law 
has dispersed into …  a generalised call for equitable solutions or “balancing whenever conflicts arise”’ 
(51).  
306 See Bomhoff and Meuwese (n 16). The authors turn to good governance principles after dismissing the 
governance potential of private international law as excessively state-centred.  
307 C Joerges, ‘The Idea of a Three-Dimensional Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form’ in Joerges and 
Petersmann (n 8); for an earlier model see P Hay, O Lando and R Rotunda, ‘Conflict of Law as a Technique 
for Legal Integration’ in M Cappelletti, M Seccombe and J Weiler (eds), Integration through Law: Europe 
and the American Federal Experience, vol 1 (Walter de Gruyter, 1987) 161. 
308 The thesis is that ‘the “geolocal” transformations that have been reconstructed within legal systems of 
constitutional democracies necessitate the development of a differentiated, three-dimensional conflict-of-
laws approach with the first reflecting the interdependence of the formerly more autonomous 
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conflicts of private or regulatory law, a conflict of laws approach could govern clashes 
between general international law and WTO norms, or ‘diagonal’ collisions between EU 
law and that of Member States.309 A similar allocatory mechanism could extend to the 
relationship, for instance, between WTO and private regulation.310 Such a proposal aptly 
reflects the complexity of the normative environment beyond, above and across state 
jurisdictions. Within this plural context, it rightly emphasises the central problem of 
recognition arising in connection with polycentric norms and sources of authority. 
Moreover, it legitimately refuses both to stop at the public/private divide and to derive 
any comfort from any hierarchical doctrine of ‘sources’. And indeed, it may be that a 
body of multi-dimensional collision rules is, at least at present, the only ‘constitutional 
form’ that is realistically available in a global (non-constitutional) context. As such, it is 
in line with the perceived quasi-constitutional function assumed by the conflict of laws 
in an environment which does not provide constitutional checks on local over-reach.311 
Nevertheless, the process-based form of this approach, presented as the ‘proper 
constitutional form of law-mediated transnational governance; as a democratic 
perspective which is not dependent on the establishment of a European state or a world 
republic’312 means that it appears more as an apology for the chaos of competing 
normative claims (or an ‘enchantment with the complex interplay of regimes’313) than as 
creating an opening for axiological choice. Because it asserts political neutrality, it 
cannot explain how to sift between the acceptable and unacceptable among the 
expressions of private authority.314 It may be, therefore, that a more promising road 
                                                                                                                                                        
jurisidctions, the second dimension responding to the rise of the regulatory state, and the third dimension 
considering the turn to governance—in particular, of the inclusion of non-governmental actors in 
regulatory activities and the emergence of para-legal regimes’ (Joerges (n 310) 414). See too, on the 
conflict of norms in public international law, C Lim and H Gao, ‘The Politics of Competing Jurisdictional 
Claims in WTO and RTA Disputes: The Role of Private International Law Analogies’, and J Pauwelyn, 
‘Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law’ 
in The Politics of International Economic Law, T Broude, M Busch and A Porges (eds) (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003).  
309 On diagonal conflicts see Joerges (n 79); Schmid (n 79) 155; Heymann (n 30).  
310 On the interlegality of WTO and soft norms, see also Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Non-Traditional Patterns of 
Global Regulation: Is the WTO “Missing the Boat”?’ in Joerges and Petersmann (n 8) 199.  
311 Muir Watt (n 57) § 206 ff; Mills (n 26) especially 295. 
312Mills (n 26) 415. 
313 cf the criticism addressed by Koskenniemi (n 1) 353 to process-based approaches to pluralism as a 
stereotyped reaction to modernity: ‘Its theorists are so enchanted by the complex interplay of regimes and 
a positivist search for an all-inclusive vocabulary, that they lose the political point of their exercise.’  
314 For a severe judgment on the claims of pluralism as a ‘stereotypical reaction to modernity’ see 
Koskenniemi (n 1) 355.  
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might lie in excavating the potential of historically marginal doctrines of private 
international law, in order to integrate and reconnect plural norms. 
 
(b) Methodological Approaches: An Historical Reminder 
 
 
In the heyday of positivism—during the long era of the closet—there was always a 
dissident, pluralist-compatible methodology present in the ‘unofficial portrait’ of private 
international law.315 It looked to foreign sources and institutions on which societal 
expectations had been formed, accepting them on their own terms in an ethos of 
tolerance. At the time, it was described as ‘suffering from the worst defect that ever 
affected a methodology, its lack of positivity’.316 The unsung song of private 
international law—counter-intuitively named ‘unilateralism’317—was a project for the 
open-ended articulation of diverse claims to govern, based on mutual deference and 
balancing, rather than exclusiveness and hierarchy. While the dominant methodology—
here, as in comparative law—carried a project of assimilation, unilateralism worried 
about the violence implicit in the transposition of idiom and strove for the recognition 
and tolerance of otherness.318 The first step towards reinventing a pluralistic version of 
private international law might therefore be to garner the insights of this alternative 
methodology, and ensure that the starting point of any new governance approach is 
openness to competing legalities of various origins and horizons. Once it is recalled that 
the conflict of laws has always carried the hidden imprint of pluralism (i), the lesson to 
                                                 
315 On the delicate balance and interplay between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ self-portraits, each feeding into 
the other, see M de l’O Lasser, ‘Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System’ 
(1995) 104 Yale Law Journal 1325. On the repressed ethics, methodology and epistemology of private 
international law, see H Muir Watt, ‘New Challenges in Public and Private International Legal Theory: Can 
Comparative Scholarship Help?’ in Mark van Hoeke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2004) 271. 
316 Gothot, ‘Le renouveau de la tendance unilatéraliste’ (n 167). 
317 Despite disparagement from the ‘multilateralist’ camp (equally a misnomer: see above, n144), the 
concept of ‘unilateralism’ (which is self-defined in opposition to ‘multilateralism’) is not to be conflated 
with ‘judicial unilateralism’ (within the meaning used by William Dodge (n 74)), which denotes an inward 
turn, or a turn to the protection of national interests and a correlative disregard for the foreign or the 
Other. It would be erroneous to mistake deference for self-interest (although the mistake is current in 
private international law: see, for example, the debate over the real meaning of Currie’s governmental 
interest analysis in Kaye (n 196)). 
318 In his work on subjectivity and language, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925–95) was 
concerned with the violence of the transposition of idiom to the Other. For an excellent account of 
Deleuzian philosophy see D Huisman (ed), Dictionnaire des philosophes (Presses Universitaires de France, 
2nd edn 1993). 
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be drawn from its own tools for assessing the relevance of conflicting norms (ii), is that 
the ‘private’ should be taken seriously (iii). 
 
(i) The Imprint of Pluralism 
 
The minoritarian methodology known in European terminology as ‘unilateralism’319 was 
elaborated in its most sophisticated form in Italy by Quadri.320 It finds contemporary 
support in Europe in the work of Pierre Gothot321 and Didier Boden,322 while across the 
Atlantic, its Doppelgänger is easily identified in American functionalism.323 Unilateralism 
originated in the medieval doctrine of statutism, arbitrating the colliding claims made by 
the various laws of the European city-states. These conflicts were articulated in terms of 
clashes of power, and their settlement involved allocating to each claim the scope that 
made most sense in policy terms.324 This vision of conflict of laws is the one Savigny 
assumed still to be the working model when, in the middle of the nineteenth century, he 
suggested that the functional problematic could be rephrased in terms of multilateralist 
‘signpost’ rules whenever the conflicting laws belonged to a legal community composed 
of shared institutions and characterisations. In other words, rather than determining the 
(territorial or personal) scope of statutes according to their object (things or persons or 
contracts), it was equally possible to identify a category of ‘legal relationships’ (personal 
or property-based or contractual) and allocate each to its governing law through a 
                                                 
319 On the contemporary avatars of this doctrine, see Gothot (n 167). For an account of unilateralism 
versus multilateralism, see S Symeonides, ‘American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century’ 
(2001) 31 Willamette Law Review 1.  
320 R Quadri, Lezioni di diritto internazionale privato (Liguori, 5th edn 1969); for an instructive account of 
the Italian School of private international law in wider context, see E Cannizzaro, ‘La doctrine italienne et 
le développement du droit international dans l’après-guerre: entre continuité et discontinuité ’ (2004) 
Annuaire Français Droit International 1. 
321 See Gothot (n 167). 
322 Boden (n 152) 504–813. PLEASE CHECK THIS REFERENCE – THE PAGE SPAN SEEMS VERY LARGE 
REFERENCE CORRECT 
323 For a comparison, see Bureau and Muir Watt (n 65) 358. 
324 For instance, two different city-states may have claimed authority simultaneously over the estate of a 
deceased person domiciled within the remit of the one, leaving immovable property within the other. The 
question that fascinated and divided the statutists was whether succession was personal (in which case 
the domicile could legitimately assert its claim), or real (in the sense of in rem, in which case the territorial 
law of the situs would prevail). The conflict was discussed in terms of policy and consequences, before it 
gradually became reframed in terms of the ‘nature of things’. Contemporary US functionalism responds to 
an analogous policy-oriented definition, except insofar as the statutists ‘typified’ the various categories of 
policies, according to whether they required general implementation throughout the territory, or whether 
they were designed to shape personhood (and would therefore apply extraterritorially to all persons 
subject to the home jurisdiction based on domicile).  
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connecting factor representing its ‘natural seat’ (situs of the property; domicile; place of 
contracting, etc). It is only when, towards the end of the century, Savigny’s 
multilateralist approach was extended beyond the scope of the German princedoms that 
it became apparent that the two methodologies did not in fact yield identical results in a 
context of diverging legal cultures. A choice became necessary: unilateralism was about 
tolerance and opening the legal order to other normativities on their own terms;325 
multilateralism was about fitting the foreign into ‘monist categories’.326 The 
multilateralist version carried the day. 
Multilateralist conflict of law theory borrowed its categories, as Savigny had designed 
them, from Roman law (along with its public/private divide and its systematicity). But 
once extended beyond the Romanist legal community to a rapidly internationalising 
world at the turn of the nineteenth century, there was necessarily a risk of legal misfit—
lack of equivalence—between the conceptions that had inspired the categories of the 
forum’s conflicts rule and those of the applicable law.327 In the United States, evidence of 
‘true conflicts’ generated by such misfit led, in the end, to a rejection of traditional ‘sign-
post’ conflict of laws methodology altogether; the functionalist turn clearly espoused a 
neo-statutist, unilateralist approach.328 In Europe, the same difficulties were either 
denied, at the price of deforming the categories of foreign law,329 or dealt with at a later 
stage in the choice of law process with decidely unilateralist ‘escapes’. The latter option, 
preferred in the more cosmopolitan second half of the twentieth century, explains the 
emergence of conflicts of characterisation, renvoi, preliminary questions and all the 
other legal-theoretical niceties that American legal realism had come to abhor. 
An attentive analysis, therefore, shows that for all that it was rejected by dominant 
doctrine, unilateralism left a significant imprint on the methodology used by the courts. 
                                                 
325 Among pluralist proposals in political science for global institutional design, the most prominent is 
‘deliberative polyarchy’ (J Cohen and C Sabel, ‘Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy’ (1997) 3 European Law 
Journal 314). It can be analogised to the reflexiveness and the quest for mutual understanding that 
underlies unilateralism.  
326 On the analogies between unilateralism/pluralism, and multilateralism/monism, see Boden (n 152) 
524–43, especially 533.  
327 See above, n 129. 
328 And, to a certain extent, to throwing the baby out with the bathwater of the conflicts revolution. In the 
end, for the reasons given in the text above, the US conflicts revolution, with its turn to flexible, policy-
oriented methodologies, may to a certain extent have missed the mark in rejecting wholesale the 
European acquis. See Symeonides (n 144) 1741–99. 
329 Thus, in France, the nationalist pre-war conception of Bartin, for whom the international legal order 
was necessarily formed in the image of the domestic (French!) legal order. See Bureau and Muir Watt (n 
65) 357.  
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The more such multilateralism called for monism and dealt with difference by reducing 
the other to its own image, the more frequent were the instances in which it was clear 
that despite its official portrait, it provided space for alterity and reflexivity.330 Its 
contemporary uses are most visible in lois de police methodology, which uses policy 
analysis to determine the scope of derogatory, hyper-mandatory rules.331 But it also 
provides the most convincing methodological approach to horizontal effects of human 
rights, whose reach depends upon a ‘nexus’ with the Protecting state.332  
 
(ii) ‘Incidental Application’ 
 
The specific resource that private international law has to offer in instances of 
conflicting norms is a methodology of linkages.333 The entire discipline is traditionally 
about ‘linking up’ legal issues to the most adequate source of regulation. However, 
whereas multilateralism concentrates exclusively on linkages to state sources, the 
unilateralist stream has, at the margin of traditional theory, developed a tool for 
including those non-state sources of normativity that are officially excluded from the 
ambit of multilateralist conflict of law rules but which may nevertheless be of relevance 
in assessing liability or reliance.334 The significance of this approach comes into focus 
when it is remembered that an important cause of governance voids—no doubt the 
corollary of fragmentation—stems from disconnectedness, or the lack of articulation of 
different norms issuing from diverse sources. Indeed, on either side of the 
public/private divide, the race to redefinition and primacy by various specialised 
                                                 
330 See ibid, 379 ff; 474 ff; 491ff; 504 ff for the many cases of methodological misfit where unilateralism 
comes back through the window, having been chased out by the door (renvoi, characterization, incidental 
questions …).  
331 These derogatory rules circumvent the ‘normal’ choice of law rules (see Article 9 of the Rome I 
Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations). On the rise of this methodology see H Muir 
Watt, ‘Les limites du choix: dispositions impératives et internationalité du contrat’ in S Corneloup and N 
Joubert (eds), Le règlement communautaire ‘Rome 1’ et le choix de loi dans les contrats internationaux 
(LexisNexis, 2010) 341.  
332 See above, section III-A. 
333 European private international law literature often cites Santi Romano’s work in the field of social 
norms, without however making very much of the richness of the concept of ‘relevance’ of one legal order 
for another. It is this concept that is at work in a pluralistic account of private international law. See 
Romano, L’ordre juridique (n 48). Relevance entertains close links with the philosophical concept of 
recognition in a pluralistic society (within the meaning of P Ricoeur, Parcours de la reconnaissance. Trois 
études (Gallimard, 2005)). On Ricoeur’s concept of recognition, see the Special Instalment of the review 
Esprit, La pensée Ricoeur (March/April 2006).  
334 For Santi Romano, relevance is the key methodological tool for reconnecting diverse normative orders.  
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regimes may hide the wider picture—with the risk of leaving the governance holes 
untended.335 Framing a question as one of trade or investment or economic freedom 
may work to hide the claims of human rights, environment or indeed personal dignity.  
The resource that unilateralism has to offer here is known as ‘incidental application’ (or 
‘prise en considération’), which constitutes a formidable tool for reconnecting 
heterogenous norms. It is often the case that a non-state norm is undoubtedly relevant 
but formally inapplicable in the sense that it does not meet the ‘entry requirements’ set 
up by private international law—such as belonging to private law, being of state origin, 
being valid under public international recognition standards … Thus, incidental 
application developed as an alternative technique principally in order to get round the 
‘public law taboo’ (for instance, to allow foreign social security law to be taken into 
account despite its public law nature336), to give effect to commercial custom or usage 
(which may be incorporated into the applicable law337), or to allow foreign judicial dicta 
to carry weight even if the judgment is not deemed to be valid. Like the ‘window’ opened 
by the Alien Tort Statute in the jurisdictional law of the forum towards international 
law,338 the tool of ‘incidental application’ allows for the recognition of the relevance of 
norms originating in another legal order, and otherwise deprived of any official 
currency.339 
For instance, a corporate code of conduct does not qualify formally as law-making under 
a state-centred methodology.340 However assertive it is of the rights of sub-contractors 
and stakeholders in far away places, its ‘private’ origin has meant (at least until recently) 
                                                 
335 In the public international idiom, this is ‘fragmentation’ through the rise of functional regimes, with its 
resulting incoherence and power politics (Koskenniemi (n 1) 69). For an example that directly implicates 
private international law, see the potential overlap of competition law and free movement in the EU in 
respect of private conduct such as industrial action as illustrated in the Viking, Laval and Ruffert cases 
cited above (n 208) in J Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement: The Economic Constitutional Law of 
the European Community (Hart Publishing, 2002). 
336 See eg a French decision, Cass Soc, 24 February 2004, Revue critique Droit International Privé 2005.62, 
note Louis d’Avout, in which foreign social security law (including the duties it imposed on employers) 
was taken into account (or applied incidentally) in order to characterise a fault of the employer under the 
governing (French) tort law. 
337 As suggested by Recital 13 to the EC Rome I Regulation. 
338 It is clear once again that the same methodological device is at work here as in the context of the Alien 
Tort Statute: international law does not dictate the remedies attached to its own rules of conduct. See 
above, section I-B-a.  
339 This is why it is difficult to subscribe to the idea that incidental application serves to correct the choice 
of law rule in cases of homogenous conflicts (as suggested by E Fohrer-Dedeurwaerder in La prise en 
considération des normes étrangères (LGDJ, 2008) 501).  
340 Within the meaning given by Julia Black (n 7). Indeed it may not qualify as binding, for the lack of 
intention to make it so, or lack of consent or mutuality, under traditional contract law.  
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that such a code does not provide grounds for contractual liability before the courts, nor 
does it serve as a legal foundation for tort liability. The lack of legal bite of this code 
explains its very success among corporate manufacturers relocating industry to foreign 
environments. However, it is now becoming clear that reliance induced in its addressees 
may nevertheless give rise to a right of redress if the conditions for estoppel are fulfilled. 
This ex post approach, balancing the equities, bypasses the legitimacy issue and looks 
straight at the effective impact of the code on those who are affected by it. Ultimately, 
however, the legal effect of that code derives from the (state) law governing estoppel. 
The cases of Nike’s spontaneous code of conduct for its own (or its sub-contractors’) 
factories, or Total’s voluntary vetting process for its sea-bound oil-tankers, similarly 
show how self-regulation can be given teeth by harnessing it to formal sources of private 
law.341 In these cases, the advantage of this methodology is that the coordinating forum 
retains control over the applicability of the private norm, either giving it extra bite or 
moderating its claim. Thus, given again the appropriate conditions of reliance, the norm 
ISO 26000 could be used, despite its own self-denying claim not to provide the 
foundation of legal action.342 Properly used, the methodology consisting in giving teeth 
through private law to non-state sources may signal a move towards the 
constitutionalisation of private codes, as identified by systems theory.343  
 
(iii) Taking the ‘Private’ Seriously 
 
Be that as it may, the legitimacy issue remains. How can effect be given to a norm that 
has been adopted through an opaque or unaccountable process? The examples 
examined above lead one to suppose that the legitimacy issue could be reframed in the 
context of incidental application. Digging up the resources of unilateralism suggests a 
promising avenue towards resolving the legitimacy dilemma raised by non-state claims 
to normative authority. This would consist in taking seriously the ‘private’ dimension of 
both the governance gaps and the remedial tools available. To the extent that the 
                                                 
341 For the effect of Nike’s code of conduct under consumer law see Supreme Court of California, Mark 
Kasky v Nike, Inc, 27 Cal 4th 939, 45 P 3d 243, 119 Cal Rptr 2d 296 (2002); for the Erika pollution case 
involving the Total group and its self-regulating vetting procedure, see Court of Appeals of Paris, 30 March 
2010, D 2010, 967, obs S Lavric, and 2238 obs L Neyret.  
342 See above, n 195.  
343 See the works of Gunther Teubner, cited above n23,28,215 
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governance holes result from the undisciplined exercise of private power, this may 
appear to be no more than a truism. But the proposal here is rather to highlight the 
specific disciplinary potential of private law. The idea has already been convincingly 
canvassed by Harm Shepel in respect of standard-setting.344 Thus, for Shepel, the 
‘constitution of private governance’ may lie in tort or competition rules, which can be 
used to discipline private authority when it causes harm to third parties. 
Of course, the very concept of ‘private law’ needs to be elaborated further in this context. 
In the first place, the idea of compensation is not the monopoly of the (private) law of 
tort but exists in administrative law too.345 On the other hand, the privateness of 
competition law is doubtful; its only ‘private aspect’ is the nature of the actors to which 
it (as opposed to public procurement) applies. However, the cue can be taken from here: 
it may be that while a ‘public law’ approach to accountability tends to focus ex ante on 
transparency and deliberation in decision-making process, ’private law’ tends to repair 
harm ex post in individual cases. Taking ‘private law’ seriously in the global governance 
context means ensuring that—irrespective of whether this is ‘administrative’ or ‘civil’ 
action346—the exercise of sovereignty beyond the state, in the forms of standard-setting, 
or certifying, or code-drafting, gives rise to adequate reparation when it is harmful, and 
is conversely held to respect the reliance of third parties. While the determination of the 
means by which public law (in the form of ex ante legitimacy) tools can be implemented 
in a transnational context belongs to the realm of global administrative law (GAL), 
private international law reveals its own complementary governance potential through 
allocating a duty to compensate damage ex post.347 
How do non-state norms fit into this scheme? Claims based on functional regimes348 are 
usually framed as questions of applicable law.349 Here, private international law will 
                                                 
344 Harm Shepel uses this idea in the context of private standard setting in The Constitution of Private 
Governance (n 8). More generally, there is a clear a renewal of interest in the governance potential of 
private law, essentially sparked developments in the EU context: see F Cafaggi and H Muir Watt, The 
Making of European Private Law (Edward Elgar 2008); Brownsword, Micklitz et al (n 158).  
345 Administrative law in systems inspired from the French model has borrowed extensively from private 
law, since it is in large part in substance a specific regime for contracts and liability applicable to the state. 
346 In the French context, this issue may give rise to a problem of jurisdiction between administrative or 
civil courts. Administrative courts (applying French administrative law) are not competent to deal with 
disputes involving foreign states: see M Laazouzi, Les contrats administratifs à caractère international 
(Economica, 2008).  
347 See below, section III-C-a on the ways in which the allocation is to be done.  
348 In order to better understand how such a pluralist approach might be implemented in private 
international law, social theory provides a helpful taxonomy of non-state legalities. Thus, Talia Fisher 
distinguishes two different ontologies of non-state authority, according to whether it corresponds to the 
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naturally turn to its categories of private law, distinguishing according to whether the 
wielding of private power is invoked as a ground for liability, or as generating reliance 
on the part of third parties, or indeed as the source of anti-competitive effects. In all such 
cases, taking the ‘private’ seriously means mobilising ex post remedial tools in order to 
promote the public good.350 Thus, when a rating agency, a certifier, the author of a code 
of conduct or an industry-driven standard setter does its job negligently and causes 
damage, or betrays the reliance it has created, there is no reason why its exercise of 
private authority should not be subject to liability, promissory estoppel, securities law, 
or—in the case of corporate alliances resulting in various forms of private codes or 
standards—disciplined by competition law. In such instances, the rules of remedial law 
are used in the general interest, as a complement to ex ante public law ‘good governance’ 
principles. As seen above, the best example of reliance-type remedies that have 
effectively been administered by the courts are the legal effects that are sometimes, or 
                                                                                                                                                        
idea of community or market; see T Fisher, ‘A Nuanced Approach to the Privatization Debate’ (2011) 5 
Law and Ethics of Human Rights 71. The first category provides a complete and exclusive set of norms to 
govern the lives of its members, whereas the second comes in the guise of specialised expert functional 
regimes, which compete for primacy on specific issues but make no claim to exclusiveness. Each raises a 
different set of difficulties when it comes to assessing its acceptability. For instance, judging whether or 
not to give effect, on legitimacy grounds, to indigeneous law, or to the law of an unrecognised state, is a 
line of enquiry clearly distinct from that of whether a specialised expert regime which claims to 
benchmark or certify is impartial (or independent from the funding of its addresses) or not. On reflection, 
distinguishing these two different ontologies reflects the two different ways in which private international 
law can operate in respect of non-state authority, suggesting both a path to assessing legitimacy and 
solving the question of relevance. The regimes envisaged in the text above belong to the second category, 
of expert functional regimes. On the other hand, private international law also has the resources to take 
account of community, usually in connection with the question of jurisdictional authority. Although the 
latter has long been connected to state, there is currently a rich reflection on the ways in which 
jurisdiction can reflect the contours of community (Berman (n 15); in particular, for an account of 
symbolic assertions of jurisdiction by communities beyond the state, see pp 491 ff). For the links between 
jurisdiction, community and responsibility, see below, section III-C-a). As has been shown in connection to 
issues relating to the very ‘public’ question of citizenship (see Knop (n 81) 309), taking the ‘private’ 
seriously here can bring in a social perspective that is not necessarily aligned along the geo-political 
frontiers of state. Here, the private law perspective, which involves measuring the effectiveness of group 
identity and the degree of social reliance on the norms claiming authority, tends to absorb the public 
legitimacy question. An example familiar to students of the conflict of laws is the way in which courts have 
recognised the validity of religious marriages celebrated despite their lack of official or civil status within 
the host state, by assessing the reasonableness of the parties’ own expectations, given the changing social 
and political context (see, for instance, Schwebel v Ungar [1964] 48 DLR (2d) 644 (Supreme Court of 
Canada); Moatti, Cass civ 1re, 15 June 1982, Rev crit DIP 1982300, note JM Bischoff, JDI 1983.595, note R 
Lehmann (France, Cour de cassation)). This example shows that a little loosening up could go a long way 
to injecting greater responsiveness—along with an ethos of responsibility of those wielding state 
authority towards those who must navigate their way through an environment of conflicting norms—into 
existing methodology.  
349 Martti Koskenniemi disparagingly describes the current state of international law as induced by regime 
competition to provide the applicable law, a ‘politics of redefinition’ ((n 1) 67).  
350 Shepel (n 8) 384; G Spindler, ‘Market Processes, Standardisation and Tort Law’ (1998) 4 European Law 
Journal 316. 
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progressively, applied to voluntary codes of conduct drawn up by multinational 
corporations—usually with the opposite aim of warding off liability to show corporate 
good will. The Nike and Erika cases illustrate this trend.351 In such cases, private 
international law attempts to devise the most appropriate disciplinary tool. Its dominant 
trend in the field of tort and economic law is to give greatest weight to the law where the 
effects of harmful conduct are felt, giving voice to the affected community or market.352 
In all these cases, when the wielding of private economic power is held responsible for 
harm (or anti-competitive effects), the legitimacy issue is absorbed into a private law 
problematic of compensation. Importantly, there is no need here, as a preliminary 
matter, to ascertain ex ante whether the exercise of overweening market authority by a 
corporate actor is legitimate in the global arena, in the sense of whether it fulfils the 
requirements for democratic law-making under global administrative law. Indeed,a 
private law approach will look straight to the question of whether, under a balance of 
interests, an act alleged to be unfair has caused undue and reparable harm 
transnationally.353 In doing so, it goes a long way to resolving the legitimacy problem 
envisaged above, all the while preparing the ground for a re-reading of the political 
agenda of private international law in terms of ‘re-embedding’ the global. 
 
C. Re-Embedding the Global 
 
There was a time at the beginning of the liberal era, post Second World War, when 
‘international’ commerce bore a highly positive connotation: it was seen to signify a 
salutary shedding of retrograde, parochial concerns in favour of new open horizons of 
peace, communication, solidarity and prosperity.354 Liberalisation of exchange rates, 
trade and finance was flying  the same cosmopolitan banner as human rights. The 
private international law of commercial transactions received considerable impetus 
                                                 
351 See above, n 258. Counter-examples are unfortunately legion; thus the Lloyd’s affair shows how 
securities law or the law of misrepresentation could have been—but was not——mobilised as a 
disciplinary tool.  
352 On the ‘effects’ test in comparative perspective, see Muir Watt (n 57) § 251. 
353 At this point, the use of ex post methodology is bound to encounter the objection of legal certainty. Its 
political economy is hardly clear, however: see Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (n 8) 33. 
Positivism is full of implicit permissions; D Kennedy ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ 
(1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685.  
354 See J Ruggie, ‘ International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War 
Economic Order’ 36(2) International Organization 1. 
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from courts throughout the western world, which similarly subscribed to the 
Washington Consensus on a macro-legal level. However, the progressive slippage from 
liberalism to neo-liberalism brought disenchantment. The negative connotation now 
associated with the global is due to the financiarisation of the economy, and its 
indifference to concerns of humanity and planet, on which the voices of emerging 
countries the third world can now distinctly be heard. There is pressure to ‘re-
embed’.355 Indeed, private international law can now contribute to a re-embedding of 
the global, on condition that it is allowed to expand its mediating function between the 
claims of the global, on the one hand, and local circumstances, on the other (a). To do so, 
it must work to ensure the double correlation of affectedness and voice, on the one 
hand, and responsibility and sphere of influence, on the other. These are ideas that are 
emerging, as we have seen, in human rights methodology, but which would benefit 
considerably from the technology that private international law has to offer (b). 
 
(a) Mediating between the Global and the Local 
 
Social ‘disembeddedness’ of regulation, a concept borrowed from economic sociology 
and currently in the process of rediscovery in the context of the current financial crisis, 
has come to be seen as the ‘dark side’ of modernity, the consequence of global financial 
logic.356 As Karl Polyani famously observed, market rationality has effectuated the ‘Great 
Transformation’ of society into an ‘adjunct to the market … Instead of economy being 
embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system  … 
[Hence] society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function 
according to its own laws’.357 Similarly, Saskia Sassen observes ‘the incipient formation 
of a type of authority and state practice that entails a partial denationalizing of what had 
                                                 
355 K Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (Beacon, 1944) 57. 
356 Joerges and Falke (n 41). Cf Granovetter (n 279) 481. ‘Let them eat credit!’ See K-H Ladeur, 
‘Globalization and the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks: Can Democracy Survive the End 
of the Nation State?’ in K-H Ladeur (ed), Public Governance in the Age of Globalization (Ashgate, 2004) 89. 
See too, on the disembeddedness of the economic system from its societal pre-conditions, N Luhmann, Die 
Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft (Geburtstag, 1988), discussed in A Fischer-Lescano and G Teubner, ‘Regime-
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 999–1046. 
357 See Polanyi (n 358) 57. Joerges and Falke (n 41) rightly compare this observation to Foucault’s analysis 
of the rationality of market governance (Introduction, p 3). See too, on the hegemony of the economic 
system in a functionally differentiated society, Luhmann (n 359). 
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been constructed historically as national’.358 In a field of more particular relevance to 
private international law, Harm Shepel observes that the trend towards global 
standardisation ‘disconnects standards from cultural normative and cognitive 
frameworks and hence leads to a disconnection between socially accepted and legally 
required behaviour’, and, ultimately, to the degradation of the public good.359 This 
suggests, perhaps paradoxically, that by shattering local patterns—not only of culture 
and production but also of governance—globalisation is the principal threat to the 
global commons. Beyond the language of inevitability that tends to accompany 
globalisation, the autonomy of markets is shown up as a strategic discourse for both 
legislators and private actors intent on bypassing local policies or interests in the 
pursuit of profit through competition. Legislators may lay blame for the harm caused by 
domestic policy on the market,360 or argue that their hands are tied by an international 
treaty in which it has consciously lobbied in favour of a given category of actors, 
occulting its distributional effects.361 Private actors argue that they are merely surfing 
the inexorable tide of the world economy. 
However, growing awareness of the dangers of disembeddedness has induced a trend in 
the opposite direction, towards a re-embedding of the global. Of course, the reversal is 
not without its own risks; globalisation offers an escape from parochialism and the 
excesses of nationalisms, integrisms and feudalisms of all kinds. A backlash heralding 
the return of all these would be singularly regressive, so that the challenge today is to 
navigate between the false glitter of the global and the dark sides of localism. However 
utopian or desperate such a quest may seem, it appears in areas such as post-crisis 
proposals for the regulation of financial markets,362 or in policy changes in the area of 
economic development where a certain return of the local signals a reaction against the 
                                                 
358 See Sassen (n 298). Interestingly, this observation is made in connection with the ‘embeddedness’ of 
the global (Polanyi (n 358) 91), which signifies that the global has needed the participation of states in 
order to disembed. 
359 Shepel (n 8) 22. 
360 Markets have always obscured distributional issues and helped to diffuse blame for negative economic 
outcomes (see Polanyi (n 358)). It may of course be debated whether sovereign states ‘lost control’ as a 
result of the impotence in which the liberal paradigm had imprisoned them, or through the complicity of 
governing elites whose interest it was to make the progression of global capitalism appear both inevitable 
and self-regulating. The causal factors are no doubt complex, as is the resulting embeddedness of states 
and actors in the global framework they have contributed to create. See Sassen (n 17). 
361 On the example of private lobbying in international maritime treaties see above, n 36.  
362 An emblematic example is the book by Christian Joerges and Joseph Falke on the thinking of Karl 
Polanyi: see Joerges and Falke (n 41). 
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one-size-fits-all approach favoured by the Washington Consensus.363 Both cases seem to 
suggest a more holistic approach to global finance and development, reinstating local 
culture in the assessment of needs and the search for appropriate solutions.364 In a 
similar turn, social theory now works towards the constitutionalisation of reflexive 
social systems365 while the ‘footprint’ metaphor in the human rights movement denotes 
an ‘evolving, pluralistic, and relational view of rights’, attentive to the way in which they 
are constructed in collective memory.366 In cases of outsourced industry, labour lawyers 
plead for responsive regulation of the workplace.367 Similarly, the 2010 Ruggie Report to 
the Human Rights Council on corporate social responsibility for human rights violations 
emphasises that ‘companies need to consider how particular country and local contexts 
might shape the human rights impact of their activities and relationships’.368 
The question for contemporary private international law is therefore whether, in its 
mediating function between the local and the global, it can join forces with this 
movement and contribute in its own field to ‘re-embeddedness’. The contention here is 
that it can and—under an admittedly optimistic re-reading of existing solutions—
actually does. Indeed, the turn towards re-embeddedness is visible, here and there, in 
reaction to the excessive autonomy acquired by both public and private actors, whether 
in respect of fundamental norms or local constraints. Illustrations can be found in the 
European context, on the one hand, in the progressive integration of human rights into 
                                                 
363 D Kennedy, ‘Two Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–1968’ (2003) 36 Suffolk University 
Law Review 631. For an equally severe critique on development—as implemented by the World Bank—
and as driven by a private epistemology, see K Bayliss, ‘The World Bank and Privatization: A Flawed 
Development Tool (2001) 13 Global Focus 1.  
364 Contextualist comparative law is coming back into its own on issues of transition and development: see 
H Muir Watt, ‘Comparer l’efficience des droits?’ in P Legrand (ed), Comparer les droits, résolument, Les 
voies du droit (PUF, 2009) 433; see too, for a new approach in project finance, looking at the potential 
impact of risk allocation in the society in which the project is located, S Leader, ‘Risk Management, Project-
Finance Management, Project-Finance and Rights-Based Development’ in Leader and Ong, Global Project 
Finance (n 214) 107. 
365 See G Teubner on reflexive law as a response to disembeddedness: ‘Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs?   On 
the Linkage of “Private” and “Public” Corporate Codes of Conduct’ in G-P Calliess (ed), ‘Governing 
Transnational Corporations — Public and Private Perspectives’ (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 17. 
366 J Perelman and K Young, ‘Rights as Footprints: A New Metaphor for Contemporary Human Rights 
Practice’ (2010) 9 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 27. 
367I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford 
University Press, 1992), arguing for tripartism (the participation of local public interest groups) in 
workplace regulation.  
368 J Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, 2010, § 58.  
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private international law methodology369 and, on the other, in the primacy of functional, 
policy-driven analysis in areas where parties are endowed with freedom of choice.370 
Both of these approaches allow a sifting process in which the claims of peremptory 
norms can be weighed in context, and priorities clearly set out. An observation made by 
Harm Shepel regarding the role of private law in general in respect of global standard-
making can be extended here as an apt description of the mediating function of private 
international law, which ‘forces standards bodies worldwide to connect “universal” 
standards to local circumstances’.371 
 
(b) The Two Poles of Embeddedness: Affectedness and Responsibility 
 
It may be that the time has come for embeddedness to replace proximity, which 
famously captured the twentieth century paradigm of private international law.372 
Proximity was a response to changing social and political conditions, a move away from 
territoriality towards a more flexible, functional allocation of spheres of state authority 
in a world where geography began to count less. However, proximity remained 
inexorably horizontal, and state-centred; it continued to claim axiological neutrality, and 
pursued the liberal ideal of individual choice. Embeddedness is, on the other hand, a 
political project. It is geared not to ensuring the content-neutral ‘best fit’, but to 
protecting the global or planetary commons by tackling head-on the exercise and abuse 
of private economic power. To do so, embeddedness integrates what might be described 
as a disciplinary dimension in respect of state and private action. It uses jurisdictional 
and conflict of laws rules to give voice to affected communities, and simultaneously 
forces non-state actors to ‘jurisdictional touchdown’373 by extending their social and 
environmental responsibility to match their sphere of influence. To this extent, the 
double correlation of affectedness and voice, and responsibility and sphere of influence, 
are the two complementary poles that best implement the idea of embeddedness, and 
                                                 
369 See above, section III-A. 
370 See above, n181. Although ‘governmental interest analysis’ in the United States is now to a certain 
extent disqualified as being associated with parochialism (or lex forism), its potential in the global arena is 
to allow deference to local policies when appropriately weighed both against each other and in respect of 
other wider, public and private, interests. 
371 Shepel (n 8) 401. 
372 On proximity as a paradigm, see P Lagarde, ‘Le principe de proximité’ (1986) 196 RCADI 9. 
373 See Wai (n 132). 
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constitute from this perspective a possible reading of contemporary trends in private 
international law.374 
 
(i) Voice and Affectedness 
 
A first contemporary trend in choice of law technology reveals an attempt to give voice 
to affected communities. Indeed, these communities, whose interests may not have been 
taken into account when decisions were made, may nevertheless feel the impact of the 
externalities—the negative effects of such decisions outside the state.375 Many examples 
illustrate the way in which traditional expressions of proximity could thus be re-read in 
the context of a more deliberately political project. The ‘effects test’, which now seems 
predominant as a choice of law principle in the field of economic law, is an expression of 
this idea to the extent that it allocates authority to the law of the ‘affected market’.376 
Perhaps more tellingly, the idea that voice should be given to those who feel the impact 
of a particular policy explains why the new EU choice of law rules can be seen to carry 
the fundamental values of due process which, on the other side of the Atlantic, are 
expressed instead in the constitutional checks on over-reaching by individual states.377 
                                                 
374 Such a reading corresponds to Robert Wai’s proposal for an ‘ideational function’ of transnational law, 
directed at disturbing dominant logics in other governance processes; see Wai, ibid. See too, on the 
correlation between authority and responsibility in international law, J Trachtmann, ‘Conflict of Laws and 
Accuracy in the Allocation of Government Responsibility’ (1993) 26 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 975. 
375 On the idea of affectedness as a prerequisite for legitimacy in global administrative law, see A-M 
Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004). On the idea that the conflict of laws may 
give expression to the voices of affected communities, and thereby give effect transnationally to domestic 
constitutional requirements of due process, see Muir Watt (n 57) §198 ff; cf in a similar direction, M 
Everson, ‘The Limits of the “Conflicts Approach”: Law in Times of Political Turmoil’ (2011) 2(2) 
Transnational Legal Theory 271–85.  
376 See above, n355. On the economics of the effects test, see Tratchmann (n 377) 985. 
377 Thus, in tort conflicts, Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations, known as ‘Rome II’, provides for a specific choice of law rule in cases of transnational 
environmental pollution. Article 7 of that instrument gives the claimant a choice between the laws of the 
place of the conduct and those of the place of the harm. The technology integrates a private attorney 
general mechanism into the conflict of laws rule so as to ensure that private interest (in obtaining higher 
damages) coincides with the interests of the global commons (ensuring the highest available level of 
protection of the environment), all the while taking away the incentive for the strategic implantation of 
polluting factories upstream (or in case of cross-winds at the borders of the place of conduct), when the 
pollution is carried down towards a more lenient jurisdiction. In the field of international contractual 
relationships, Regulation EC no 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome I’) aims 
to ensure that structurally weaker parties (consumers, workers, insurance policy holders) always benefit 
from the level of protection ensured by their country of residence or employment, by allowing party 
choice only when it improves the local level of protection, guarding all the while against strategic barrier-
crossing through forum-selection by rendering jurisdiction exclusive and blocking rogue foreign 
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Furthermore, an emerging ‘methodology of anticipation’ aims to ensure that a situation 
or relationship created in a given forum will survive its cross-cultural transplantation to 
another legal order without ‘irritating’ the receiving culture.378 In family law, this may 
even be an attitude implicitly mandated by Article 8 of the ECHR, which imposes upon 
the authorities at the receiving end a high degree of deference to situations officially 
created abroad.379 This duty to anticipate may well entail a correlative duty on the 
creating court to monitor its own effects, ensuring that it is not imposing a relationship 
which is too disturbing to the local cultural ordering where they are destined to be 
implemented. 
 
(ii) Responsibility and Sphere of Influence  
 
A second complementary pole correlates the ambit of social and environmental 
responsibility with the sphere of influence of the various non-state actors. On the one 
hand, the idea that jurisdiction should be coextensive with the responsibility of a 
community towards the world has been developed convincingly in several quarters. 
Noting that ‘jurisdiction has always been about the way in which societies demarcate 
space, delineate communities, and draw both physical and symbolic boundaries’, Paul 
Schiff Berman develops the idea of jurisdiction as an assertion of community 
membership,380 entailing rights or interests,381 but also the correlative duty of the 
community to address issues relating to the conduct of its members elsewhere. 
Remarkably, this idea, which has similarly been offered as an explanation for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
judgments. Both instances may be read as an attempt to give voice to the policies of the most affected 
community, all the while making room for overarching (Union) policies. Externalities imposed on those 
who were not present during the decision-making process are internalised. For more extensive discussion 
of the economic and constitutional function of these rules, see Muir Watt (n 57) §219 ff. 
378 On ‘legal irritants’ see G Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law, or How Unifying Law Ends 
Up in New Divergence’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11. On methodology impelled by the impact of 
human rights in cross-border situations, see above, n 297.  
379 While the sweeping effect of human rights before the recognising court has been illustrated principally 
in the field of family law, an excellent illustration of the idea of a correlative duty appears, outside this 
field, in the reading by US federal courts of the conditions for certifying classes, particularly the 
superiority requirement of Article 23(b) 3 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when a proposed class action 
has a vocation to include parties from abroad (Vivendi, 242 FRD 76 SDNY 2007; Alstom, 253 FRD 266, 
SDNY 2008). 
380 On the membership paradigm in private international law, see M Karayanni, Conference PILAGG, 
Sciences-po, 16 March 2012 (publication forthcoming), and Berman (n 15) 354, 429. 
381 See J Ely, ‘Choice of Law and the State’s Interest in Protecting its Own’ (1981) 23 William and Mary Law 
Review 173.  
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mutations of sovereignty in public international law,382 can also be found in judicial 
dicta. A notable example is the assertion by the US Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co that the extraterritorial conduct of 
corporations is ‘our responsibility’.383 In the same vein, Jacco Bomhoff has proposed to 
integrate the separate idioms of private international law, state action and human rights, 
so as to frame questions of ‘reach of rights’ and jurisdiction as involving 
responsibility.384 He observes very rightly that the absence of the issue of responsibility 
from conflicts thinking may be an important source of the field’s internal confusions. 
The discipline’s focus on authority and jurisdiction may have contributed to an 
undervaluation of the themes of responsibility, duty and positive obligation towards 
those who are in some way outsiders in relation to the forum’s legal order.385 All these 
ideas work together to correlate the scope of duties to spheres of influence of a given 
community. 
But while the above examples concern public or ontological communities,386 a strikingly 
similar idea appears in respect of private actors in John Ruggie’s proposal, contained in 
his report to the UN Human Rights Council on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises. He proposes to correlate 
social responsibility for human rights violations with the corporate ‘sphere of 
influence’.387 The duty to ensure compliance would thus extend along the chain of 
production to sub-contractors in ‘widening circles of accountability’. Thus, ‘the scope of 
corporate responsibility for the respect of human rights is defined by the actual and 
potential human rights impacts generated through a company’s own business activities 
and through its relationships with other parties, such as business partners, entities in its 
value chain, other non-state actors and state agents’.388 While non-state actors attempt 
to gain ‘lift-off’ from local mandatory rules, the way of ensuring ‘touchdown’ is to make 
them accountable to third parties within their circles of influence. Here, of course, under 
the approach outlined above, responsibility is determined in the light of formal but also 
                                                 
382 B Stern, ‘Quelques observations sur les règles internationales relatives à l’application extraterritoriale 
du droit’ (1986) Annuaire Français Droit International 7–52. On the emerging principle of home country 
control over corporate conduct abroad in the context of foreign investment, see Sornarajah (n 102) 155–7. 
383 226 F 3d 88 (2d Cir 2000). 
384 See above, n 12.  
385Ibid, 70. 
386 Within the meaning defined by Fisher (n 351). 
387 Ruggie (n 371). 
388Ibid, §§ 57–58.  
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non-state norms, giving effect through private law tools to informal codes of conduct or 
imperfectly constitutionalised soft-norms, when they have shaped reliance or caused 
harm.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Lacking in horizon, private international law, like its public counterpart, has been largely 
apologetic of existing informal power structures and complicit in the inadequacies 
affecting the governance of private economic power through various denials, exceptions, 
implicit permissions and myths. Informal empire has largely benefited from the 
inhibitions of private international law and the correlative unleashing of private actors. 
However, none of the dogmatic foundations on which the expansion of private economic 
power has relied is irreversible. Contrary to the assumptions of the liberal-positivist 
model, there is no reason in law that economic power beyond the state should not be 
disciplined, that private rule-making authority should not be made accountable, or 
indeed that the global commons be constantly abused. However, a reversal of current 
trends on all these points means that private international law may and must come out 
of the closet and reappropriate its political function. 
Reaching beyond the schism between the public and private spheres of international 
law, private international law should reclaim its governance potential and work to fill 
the holes created either by excluding or denying non-state authority. Paradoxically, 
when domesticated and thus reduced to dealing with the ‘private’ sphere, it was actually 
disabled from taking the ‘private’ seriously. To a large extent, ‘privatising’ international 
law meant reducing its status—like that of classical private law389—to the merely 
facilitative. Used to enable but not to discipline, it was prevented from identifying and 
regulating private economic power, which it was complicit in unleashing from public 
contraints. By taking the ‘private’ seriously, its participation in the politics of 
international law could ensure that interests beyond the state—of which some require 
tethering while others strive for recognition—work towards the planetary good. It is 
                                                 
389 For this conception of private law, see A Ogus, ‘Competition Between National Legal Systems: A 
Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law’ (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 405.  
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contended here that private international law possesses the resources to respond 
appropriately to the challenges of private authority in the global arena.  
In the words of Hannah Arendt, politics is the emergence of a plural public space for 
deliberation and the emergence of power without domination.390 There is hope that the 
politics of private international law may now resemble this ideal, pursuing ways in 
which to recognise and tether private authority in a world in which state and non-state 
rule-makers coexist—in a (hopefully) ‘more mature international society’, where ‘more 
oversight’ is exercised.391 By asserting its political dimension, law need not be 
disqualified as ‘law’; on the contrary, it can be seen as a process of construction of the 
political community.392 However, it does mean that private international law as the 
constitution of private transnational governance needs to abandon the conceit of 
political neutrality—to the extent that neutrality is understood as an apology or a screen 
that prevents it from dealing head-on with the global expressions of non-state power—
and gear its tools towards the protection of the planetary commons. Private autonomy 
should be concerned with responsibility as much as it means freedom from 
parochialism; voice should be given to affected communities; multiple legalities should 
be re-anchored; process-based methodology should give way to clear preferences. The 
program may look ambitious if not utopian. However, as shown here, its implementation 
can start with an additional dose of self-awareness and some loosening-up of the tools 
that are already in place, once the walls of the closet are dismantled and de-constructed. 
                                                 
390 H Arendt, La nature du totalitarisme (Payot, 1990). Cf B Quelquejeu, ‘La nature du pouvoir selon 
Hannah Arendt’ (2001) 85 Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 511. For a description of the 
debate on power without domination, see S Lukes and C Hayward, ‘Nobody to Shoot? Power, Structure, 
and Agency: A Dialogue’ (2008) 1(1) Journal of Power 1.  
391 See Wai, ‘Transnational Private Litigation and Transnational Governance’ (n 8) 250.  
392 See E Jouannet, ‘Koskenniemi, A Critical Introduction’ in Koskenniemi (n 1) 31.  
